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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays on uranium enrichment drawn
from the author's work as a member of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory's
Nuclear Fuel Assurance Project.
The first essay provides the background information necessary to
an understanding of the two subsequent essays. The essay begins with
a brief description of enrichment technologies, and moves to a
historical summary of the market, political, and institutional events
which bear directly on the later essays. The major historical theme
is a description of the promotion and subsidization of private
industrial participation in the nuclear fuel cycle as the vehicle for
making the transition from a military, politically controlled,
industry to a commercial, privately controlled industry. Minor
themes include the tension between the international political system
and the international market system, and the gigantic uncertainties
which currently prevail in international nuclear markets.
The second essay proposes an institutional model of U.S.
enrichment policy, and substantiates two propositions which are
suggested by this model. The model recognizes two sets of objectives
which determine a nation's enrichment policy, and posits an
organizational argument for presuming that commercial objectives,
particularly enrichment privatization, will predominate over security
objectives in the formulation of U.S. enrichment policy. This
proposition is substantiated by examining U.S. enrichment policy with
respect to enrichment production, pricing, contracting, and
technology transfer.
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In addition, the second essay proposes that the result of this
behavior has been the destruction of U.S. credibility as a reliable
supplier of enrichment services. The preeminence of the
privatization policy over international multilateral policies, and
the failure to reconcile the inconsistencies between these two
policies, led to a foreign concern about nuclear fuel supply
assurance and a resulting proliferation of foreign enrichment
projects. This untoward result has defeated both the U.S.'s
commercial and security objectives and created a circumstance of
grave uncertainty in the international enrichment and uranium markets
which continues to plague today's policy makers.
The third essay examines some aspects of one variant of the
medium-term nuclear fuel bank proposed by the Carter Administration
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. After describing the
motivation for a fuel bank, and its linkage to the problem of nuclear
fuel assurance and weapons proliferation, the essay offers a
stockpile forecast which indicates that due to the prevailing excess
enrichment capacity during the next decade, large geographically
dispersed enriched uranium stockpiles will be created, even in the
absence of a fuel bank. Therefore, the relevant policy choice is
between this market-managed system of international stockpiling and
the creation of an international administrative body to manage a
centralized fuel bank. Having defined the broad policy alternatives
the essay proposes a specific plan for such a fuel bank and proceeds
to criticize it. This critique casts doubts on the benefits of such
a fuel bank, due to the nature of the political compromises necessary
for its creation, and points out some of the potentially adverse
feedback effects that such a bank could have on the nuclear market.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Henry Jacoby
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Essay #1: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE
U.S. ENRICHMENT INDUSTRY.
This first essay shall provide the reader with the background
information necessary to an understanding of the two subsequent
essays. The essay begins with a brief description of enrichment
technologies, and moves to a historical summary of market, political,
and institutional events which bear directly on our later essays.
This background material is neither sophisticated nor comprehensive.
The information collected here is widely available in public
sources. From these sources we have abstracted brief summaries of
selective facts and events pertinent to uranium enrichment; the
reader desiring more detailed information is referred to the
citations.
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1.0 ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY1
The enrichment stage is the crucial step in the front end of the
light-water reactor (LWR) nuclear fuel cycle. A single efficiently
sized enrichment plant represents a multibillion dollar capital
investment whose output will supply the fuel demands of roughly 100
nuclear reactors. 2
Enrichment is the process of raising the concentration of U-235
in uranium from naturally occurring levels (0.711%) to higher levels
(3% for LWR fuel, 90% for nuclear weapons). Any enrichment process
separates an incoming uranium feed stream into two outgoing streams:
(1) an enriched product stream, consisting of uranium containing a
greater percentage of U-235 than the feed stream, and (2) a tails
stream, consisting of uranium containing a lesser percentage of U-235
than the feed stream.
1.1 The Gaseous Diffusion Process3
This separation may be achieved by any of a number of
physical processes. Currently, the most widely used commercial
enrichment process is the gaseous diffusion process, which is used in
all U.S. and U.S.S.R. commercial enrichment facilities, and will soon
be used in a newly constructed enrichment plant in France.
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Gaseous diffusion operates on the physical result that
isotopes of differing mass have differing mean speeds, and therefore
will diffuse through a semipermeable barrier at differing rates.
Specifically, U-235 diffuses through such a barrier more rapidly than
U-238. As a result, if UFb gas is pumped into a chamber divided by
such a membrane, after awhile one half of the chamber will show a
higher enrichment level than the other half of the chamber. If the
more highly enriched gas is then used as the feed stream for a second
chamber, the result; is a progressively greater enrichment in the
product stream. Because U-235 and U-238 are extremely similar in
mass the degree of isotope separation accomplished by any single
stage is small. Therefore it requires a series of many such
diffusion chambers to achieve a 3% enriched product stream, and even
more chambers to achieve a 90% enriched product stream. The
electricity required to pump, compress, and cool the UFb gas at each
stage of the diffusion process renders this enrichment technology
highly energy-intensive.
1.2 The Unit of Enrichment Capacity - The SWU
The capacity of a gaseous diffusion plant is measured in
separative work units (SWUs). A SWU is a measure of the energy
expended in separating a feed stream into a product stream and a
tails stream. The greater the enrichment of the product stream, the
greater the number of SWUs required to produce that stream; for
17
example, it requires more diffusion chambers, and thus more energy,
to produce a 90% enriched product than a 3% enriched product.
The relationship between the feed stream, the product
stream, and the tails stream is given by the following three formulae:
(l) F = T P
(z) F I +r P
seP(rtpiv e - F(i-Z 2-X x
I--Y,
where F = feed mass in kg
T = tails mass in kg
P = product mass in kg
S = separative work units
XF = feed assay (concentration U-235)
Xr = tails assay
XP = product assay
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Equation 1 states that total mass is conserved.
Equation 2 states that U-235 is conserved.
Equation 3 is a thermodynamic relationship which expresses the
amount of work that; must be done to separate the feed stream into the
more highly enriched product stream and the depleted tails stream.
The three equations are usually written as:
(-S*) -r
xP - -i-
X F Xr
XF - T
+ Tp (l(Z A 1( XX p
P I--
These equations reveal the strong relationship between
uranium feed requirements, separative work requirements and tails
assay. For example, suppose we wished to produce 1 kg of 3% enriched
uranium. This could be done in a variety of ways:
1. We could operate the enrichment plant at a tails assay of
0.25%, i.e., XT = .0025, which means that we continue to deplete
the feed stream by feeding it through diffusion chambers until
the tails output has a U-235 assay of 0.25%. Given that
19
our product assay is 3% (X = .03) we can use formulae 4-6 to
calculate:
3% product assay
F/P = 6.0
feed assay 0.711% j0.25% tails assay
(s/P = 3.8
0.711% 0.25%
which tells us that 3.8 SWU must be applied to 6.0 kg of natural
feed to produce 1.0 kg of 3% product; along the way, 5.0 kg of
0.25% tails will be produced. Diagrammatically,
3.8 SWU
6 kg -+ | - 1 kg 3% product
natural feed 5. kg O.f. tails
2. Similarly, we could choose to operate the enrichment plant
at a higher tails assay of 0.3%. Because the feed stream need
not be depleted as far, fewer SWUs must be applied to the task.
Because the product contains the same number of atoms of U-235,
however, just as the SWU requirement decreases, so the feed
requirement increases. We calculate:
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/'P = 6.6
0.711% 0.3%
0.711% 1 0.3% = 3.4
which yields the diagram:
3.4 SWU
6.6 kg natural - 1 kg 3% product
feed I
5.6 kg 0.3% tails
3. Conversely, we could reduce the tails assay to 0.20%,
increasing the expenditure of separative work, but saving on
feed requirements. We compute:
F/P = 5.5
0.711% 0.2%
1% (~)3% - .3
S/P = 4.3
O. 711% O. 2%
21
which yields the diagram:
4.3 SWU
5.5 kg 1_ kg 3% product
natural feed 1
4.5 kg 0.2% tails
In sum, the unit of enrichment capacity, the SWU, is not a
measure of physical output, like tons/year, but a measure of the
thermodynamic potential to create output. The physical output of an
enrichment plant may only be calculated after values have been chosen
for X and X .
1.3 Other Enrichment Technologies
A second emerging enrichment technology is the gas centrifuge
process (GCP). The centrifuge process is currently in commercial use
in the enrichment facilities of URENCO, a trinational enrichment
consortium formed by Germany, Holland and the United Kingdom in
1970. The centrifuge process will also be the basis for the next
increment of U.S. enrichment capacity, to be constructed at
Portsmouth, Ohio.
The centrifuge process also takes advantage of the slight
difference in the masses of the two uranium isotopes, U-235 and
U-238, by filling a large cylindrical bowl with UFb and spinning the
bowl at very high speeds. Because the centrifugal force on the
22
heavier U-238 atoms is slightly greater than the force on the lighter
U-235 atoms, the rotating UFb gas is separated into an enriched
product stream and a depleted tails stream.
The centrifuge process may eventually offer a cost advantage
over the gaseous diffusion process because while its capital costs
are comparable, it is significantly less energy consumptive. This
feature, in conjunction with the fact that an efficiently sized
centrifuge plant i roughly 1/3 as large as a diffusion plant,
simplifies the siting of centrifuge facilities and permits a more
flexible matching of SWU capacity to demand.
In addition to the centrifuge process, other enrichment
technologies which are currently in the pilot plant, laboratory
testing or early research stage include:
(1) The Becker nozzle technology;
(2) The South African stationary-wall centrifuge
technology;
(3) The laser enrichment technologies.
23
2.0 THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
This section of the essay will provide a chronological sketch of
the major domestic and international legislative events which have
determined the political and institutional context within which the
U.S. enrichment industry must operate.
2.1 The U.S. Transition from Military to Civilian Control of Atomic
Energy (1948-1954)4
The discovery of natural radioactivity during the early years of
the 20th century alerted scientists to the fact that energy was
produced by the disintegration of heavy atoms. The fission process
itself was discovered in 1939, and became the cornerstone of the
first nuclear chain reaction in 1942. These experimental successes
spawned the Manhattan Project, whose purpose was the development of
an atomic bomb. Under the Project's control, nuclear reactors were
built at Hanford, Washington, and later in South Carolina, for the
production of weapons grade plutonium. In addition, uranium
enrichment facilities were established at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to
produce highly enriched uranium. These efforts culminated in the
explosion of two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki during
August, 1945, and the subsequent surrender of the Japanese to end
World War II.
24
In 1946, the U.S. put forth a comprehensive proposal for
regulating nuclear power under the auspices of the United Nations.
The Baruch Plan envisioned the establishment of an international
authority responsible for managing all phases of the development and
use of atomic energy. The authority was to establish a system of
nuclear licensing, control, and inspection procedures in return for
U.S. nuclear disarmament. The proposal failed due to the opposition
of the Soviet Union, which wished to make U.S. disarmament a
precondition of any negotiation of authority powers, rather than
being contingent upon the successful conclusion of these negotiations.
Despite the failure of the Baruch Plan at the international
level, the U.S. was left to confront the question of regulating the
development of atomic energy at the national level. The result of
these deliberations was the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
which transferred the control of nuclear power from the military
services to a commission of five civilians. The Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) was subject to Congressional review by the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). The 1946 Act legislated a federal
government monopoly of the nuclear fuel cycle. Private ownership of
fissionable materials, or facilities for their production, or of
patents relating to production technologies, was made illegal. All
information concerning fissionable fuels, including their use as a
source of electric power, was classified.
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The AEC assumed the assets of the Manhattan Project on January
1, 1947, including the enrichment plants, research laboratories and
production facilities located in the towns of Los Alamos, New Mexico,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Hanford, Washington. They also inherited
the nation's stock of atomic bombs, along with direct control of
roughly 5,000 government employees as well as indirect control of
50,000 employees of private contractors. The AEC maintained absolute
control over the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including responsibility
for: (1) weapons production, (2) enrichment plant operation, (3)
the promotion of a domestic yellowcake industry, (4) reactor
licensing and leasing of fuel to reactor operations, (5) basic
research in atomic and nuclear physics, and (6) determining and
enforcing security classifications on information in its possession.
The AEC chose to pursue the contractor philosophy established
under the Manhattan Project. Although the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
permitted the AEC itself to engage in research, construction and
production, the Commission chose to employ private contractors for
these purposes. Of the total AEC budget in any year, 95% was paid
out to contractors, with only 5% being retained for AEC support
personnel. Contractors have included universities, independent
agencies, and industrial laboratories. In particular, enrichment
plant contractors have included Union Carbide and Goodyear.
Contracts were rarely let on the basis of competitive bidding;
rather, contractors were selected on personal AEC judgments regarding
26
their efficiency, reliability and secrecy. Enrichment contractors
are paid on a cost plus fixed fee basis. The relationship of the AEC
to its contractors is a supervisory one. The AEC issues general
policy guidelines, sets goals and reviews results; the contractor
supplies scientific, engineering, administrative, management and
direct labor skills.
During its early years the AEC functioned in an atmosphere of
great secrecy, in an attempt to guard the state secrets relevant to
the atomic bomb. Even information of only tangential importance to
the weapons program was subject to strict security classifications.
The Congressional watchdog committee assigned to AEC affairs, the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), did not know the size of the
atomic stockpile, the current rate of output, or the unit cost of
production. Therefore, the JCAE had no objective basis for
evaluating performance or exercising control, and was often put in
the position of merely rubber-stamping appropriations requests and
giving formal approval to actions that had already been taken.
2.2 Atoms for Peace and the Promotion of Atomic Energy (1954-1964)5
On December 8, 1953, the first major step was taken towards
lowering the barriers of secrecy that had been erected around the
industrial applications of atomic energy. On this date President
Eisenhower delivered his famous "Atoms for Peace" speech to the
27
United Nations. This speech proposed the creation of an
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a repository for
fissionable materials contributed by the nuclear powers; the
fissionable fuels were intended for use in the promotion of peaceful
uses of nuclear power. Despite the rejection of the IAEA proposal by
the U.S.S.R., the U.S. offer of international cooperation as a
replacement for international competition in the commercialization of
nuclear power was warmly received by most nations.
The implementation of President Eisenhower's proposals
necessitated a series of legislative actions that were contained in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. At the international level, the 1954
Act authorized the U.S. to negotiate Agreements for Cooperation with
foreign nations regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These
Agreements were the foundation for exchanges of previously classified
information concerning industrial uses of atomic energy, as well as
some information on defense stocks essential to European allies.
Subject to the 1954 Act, the U.S. concluded a series of
bilateral agreements for cooperation with foreign nations. These
agreements specified that all nuclear materials would be used for
peaceful purposes, that the U.S. had the continuing right to inspect
all materials and facilities it supplied, and that U.S. consent was
required to permit the retransfer of any material or facility to a
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third nation. The conditions of these bilateral agreements set
precedents for the multilateral negotiations that eventually led to
the creation of the IAEA in 1957, although they may have limited the
scope of powers available to the IAEA because they were already in
place at the time of the IAEA's establishment. Despite President
Eisenhower's original conception of the IAEA as a fuel bank for the
promotion of peaceful nuclear power, it has never been used as a
conduit for fissionable fuels or nuclear reactors. Instead, the
Agency has functioned mainly as a locus of technical assistance to
less-developed nations, and, since the passage of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1971, as an administrator of the
international materials accounting safeguards system.
At the national level, the 1954 Act committed the government to
the aggressive promotion of a private atomic energy industry as a
replacement for government ownership of all stages of the nuclear
fuel cycle. The AEC continued to retain title to all fissionable
materials and continued to own the enrichment facilities, but private
industry was permitted to possess (not own) fissionable fuels and to
build, own and operate nuclear reactors under license from the AEC.
During this era the AEC launched an extensive program of
subsidization designed to encourage private industrial participation
at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, with particular emphasis
on the uranium mining and milling industry and reactor construction.
(See Sections 4.1 and 4.2)
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2.3 Enrichment Privatization (1964-1976)
In 1964 the AEC Act was amended to permit the private ownership
of fissionable fuel. Subsequent to this amendment, a timetable was
established for the termination of government nuclear fuel leases and
the orderly transition to mandatory private ownership of fissionable
fuels. This transition was concluded with the initiation of toll
enrichment in 1971. As of January 1, 1971 utility customers must
either purchase enriched uranium from the AEC, or supply their own
natural feedstock and pay the AEC for the SWUs used to enrich this
feed; these latter toll enrichment services were priced on the basis
of the recovery of the government's costs. In addition, the AEC no
longer guaranteed the repurchase of plutonium contained in utility
spent fuel (see Section 4.1), although amendments permitted the
establishment of private plants for spent fuel reprocessing.
Finally, all existing government fuel leases had to be terminated by
June 30, 1973, either by the purchase of the leased fuel, or its
return to the government.
During this period, the government's stockpile of nuclear
weapons had grown oversized, and its demand for fissionable materials
had correspondingly declined. The bulk of the remaining military
enrichment demand was for highly enriched uranium used to fuel naval
submarine reactors. As the government demand declined, the civilian
demand increased, largely as a result of the AEC's ten-year promotion
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plan. Therefore, the primary function of the enrichment plants
gradually evolved towards one of satisfying civilian needs for low
enriched uranium to fuel LWRs, and away from one of satisfying
military demands for highly enriched uranium for use in atomic
weapons.
This evolution was accompanied by increasing political pressure
for the privatization of the enrichment industry, that is the
relinquishment of the government SWU monopoly, and a plan for the
transition to a 100% privately owned fuel cycle. The role of the
government was to be relegated to a posture of exercising regulatory
oversight of health and safety standards through the vehicle of the
licensing process. The process of privatization was foreshadowed by
President Nixon's 1969 directive to the AEC which ordered them to
prepare the three government enrichment plants for eventual sale to
the private sector, by
"operating its uranium enrichment plants as a separate
organizational entity within the AEC, in a manner which
approaches more closely a commercial enterprise, ...(although)
the President will not seek legislation at this time to
authorize sale of the facilities to private industry...since the
optimum time for this transfer will be sometime in the
future."7
Although this sale was never carried out, the Nixon and Ford
Administrations did succeed in engineering a broad reorganization of
the federal atomic energy bureaucracy. On January 19, 1975, the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), an independent
agency responsible to the President and the Congress, was created,
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along with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The responsibilities
of the AEC were divided between these two agencies, by assigning ERDA
responsibility for enrichment plant operations, SWU pricing, SWU
contracting, the management of government stockpiles of natural and
enriched uranium, and nuclear R&D (including the breeder program),
while reserving to the NRC the health and safety regulatory issues
surrounding the licensing process, including the question of
permitting plutonium recycle in LWRs. This bifurcation was intended
to separate the AEC's promotional, production, and research
activities from its regulatory activities, on the grounds that it was
logically inconsistent to ask the AEC to aggressively promote atomic
development, on the one hand, and to conscientiously regulate its
growth, in the public interest, on the other. Although ERDA was
staffed, by and large, with old AEC personnel, ERDA assumed
responsibility for many areas of non-nuclear R&D, including research
into coal, solar, and geothermal technologies.
After President Nixon resigned his post, President Ford, and
ERDA, carried the banner of enrichment privatization to the Congress
in the form of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act (NFAA) of 1975. This
legislation did not propose the sale of existing facilities, but
rather supported the invitation to private corporations to build the
next increment of enrichment capacity. The role of the Government
was to assist in technology transfer and to provide a series of
guarantees to private enrichers.
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The NFAA was the culmination of a three year process of
attracting private industrial interest in uranium enrichment. The
process began in 1972, when the government invited private industry
to make proposals for building, owning, and operating the next
increment of domestic enrichment capacity. In response to this
solicitation, a consortium of three corporations--Bechtel
Corporation, Union Carbide Corporation, and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation--formed the Uranium Enrichment Associates (UEA).
Subsequently, Union Carbide and Westinghouse withdrew from UEA,
however, Bechtel was later joined by Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company. In May 1973, the AEC awarded UEA the first Access Permit to
previously classified uranium enrichment technology, and UEA entered
a phase of project evaluation, which ended December 31, 1974, at a
cost of $6 MM.
This evaluation resulted in a UEA proposal to build, own, and
operate, a 9 MMSWU gaseous diffusion enrichment plant in Dothan,
Alabama, for operation in 1983. The projected cost of the facility
was $3.3 billion (1975 dollars), not including the cost of additional
power supply to operate the plant, to be financed 15% by equity and
85% by debt; 40% of the financing was to be acquired from domestic
sources and 60% from foreign sources. UEA proposed to offer 25-year
toll enrichment contracts, priced to recover costs plus a 15% after
tax rate of return on equity.
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In addition, UEA concluded that some form of government
cooperation and temporary guarantees were essential to UEA's ability
to attract project financing. Therefore, on May 30, 1975, UEA
submitted a proposal to ERDA asking for the negotiation of a contract
to provide certain assurances to UEA. After review of the UEA
proposal by ERDA, the State Department, and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), President Ford submitted the NFAA to Congress on
June 26, 1975. The NFAA would authorize ERDA to offer temporary
assurances to private enrichment ventures, including:
1. buying enrichment services from private enrichers or
providing enrichment services to private enrichers from the
government stockpile to accommodate plant startup and
loading problems;
2. guaranteeing the delivery of enrichment services to
customers who hold SWU contracts with private enrichers;
3. assuming the assets and liabilites (including debt) of a
private enricher if the project threatened to fail during
the first year of commercial operation, at the call of the
private enricher or the government, with compensation to
domestic equity investors contingent on the reasons for
failure and the performance of the equity investors.
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The NFAA asked for contract authority of $8 billion to provide
these assurances, although if all went well, almost no government
expenditures would be involved.
The NFAA became the center of a raging controversy in
Congressional hearings, chiefly surrounding the nature of the
guarantees suggested by the UEA proposal. The closing of the U.S.
order books in mid-1974 (see section 4.4.2) was taken as undeniable
evidence of the need for additional enrichment capacity, but many
Congressional observers favored public rather than private ownership
of uranium enrichment. Opposition to the NFAA was strengthened by a
study of the UEA proposal, conducted by the Government Accounting
Office (GAO), which characterized the NFAA as a "giveaway" to private
industry. This viewpoint was adopted by enough members of Congress
to stop passage of the NFAA during the 1975 and 1976 Congressional
sessions.
With the accession of the Carter Administration in 1977,
the emphasis on enrichment privatization was dropped. Instead, it
was announced that the next increment of enrichment capacity would be
8.8 MMSWU of centrifuge capacity, to be built at Portsmouth, Ohio by
the late 1980's, and to be government owned, but operated by private
contractors. Presumably, this additional capacity will permit a
re-opening of the order books as part of the Carter Administration's
nuclear foreign policy of supply assurances aimed at restoring the
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U.S.'s international image as a reliable supplier of enrichment
services.
1977 also saw another reorganization of the federal energy
bureaucracy. Slightly more than two years after the creation of
ERDA, it was abolished and its responsibilites were assigned to the
new Department of Energy (DOE). DOE was an attempt to consolidate
bureaucratic responsibility for energy policy in a single agency, by
combining ERDA with the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), in
addition to consolidating energy-related portions of other agencies.
DOE was chartered on October 1, 1977, and it assumed all of ERDA's
prior responsibilities and personnel, including enrichment plant
operations, contracting, pricing, and stockpile management. DOE was
headed by James Schlesinger, who had been chairman of the AEC during
the early 1970's. It was also during this period that the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy was abolished, and its watchdog role was
transferred to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
and the House Committee on Science and Technology.
2.4 International Attempts at Proliferation Controls (1970-1978)
2.4.1 The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)8
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As the decade of the 1970's approached, the number of potential
suppliers at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle was increasing
rapidly, and as weapons stockpiling programs tapered off, the goal of
the nuclear industry switched from one of satisfying primarily
military needs to one of satisfying commercial needs. With the
forecasted rapid growth in commercial nuclear power and the rapid
spread of nuclear technology, it became obvious that an international
framework of safeguards was necessary to ensure that the
commercialization of nuclear power was not accompanied by the
widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This safeguards framework was established by the NPT, which
entered into force in March, 1970. All non-nuclear-weapon states
which sign the NPT are obligated not to acquire nuclear weapons or
explosive devices, and to accept IAEA-administered safeguards
standards and inspections on all peaceful nuclear activities under
their control; in particular these standards require all NPT parties
to comply with IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports to non-weapons
states, whether or not the importer is an NPT member. In return for
signing the NPT, non-weapon states receive a guarantee from nuclear
suppliers that they shall "cooperate in contributing" to peaceful
nuclear development, with special attention to lesser developed
countries (LDCs).
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During the eight years since its negotiation, the NPT has been
signed or ratified by 40 of the 53 nations having at least one
element of the nuclear fuel cycle (mine, mill, enrichment plant,
reactor, reprocessing plant) in their territory; 9 of the remaining
13 nations have concluded non-NPT safeguards agreements with the
IAEA. France is the only avowed, non-Communist, nuclear weapons
state which has not ratified the NPT, nor has it negotiated any
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, chiefly due to the French refusal
to demand a veto over retransfers of French nuclear fuels or
components to third parties. Other non-NPT signatories of special
concern include Communist China, Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel,
Pakistan, South Africa and Spain.
2.4.2 The Znger Committee and The London Suppliers'
Conferences9
The ratification of the NPT by many of the nuclear supplier
nations led to a series of informal supplier conferences, held to
consider a mutually agreeable set of fuel and technology export
controls. In particular a special committee, known as the "Zanger
Committee", was convened to specify what material and equipment
needed to be covered by IAEA safeguards. The Znger Committee
encountered immediate difficulties in defining a list of relevant
materials and technologies. The U.S. advocated the adoption of a
comprehensive "trigger list" of materials and equipment which would
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automatically incur safeguards in any international transaction.
Other nations, particularly Germany and Japan, opposed this
comprehensive list on the grounds that it would inhibit their ability
to penetrate the U.S.-dominated export market. Beyond these
disagreements, negotiators questioned the value of such a list in
view of the non-representation of France (not an NPT party) and the
U.S.S.R. (banned for fear of industrial espionage) at the
Committee meetings.
Little progress was made in defining the list until the Indian
"peaceful nuclear explosion" of May, 1974, shocked the suppliers into
action. A list was agreed to in August, 1974, but the failure of the
French to deposit the requisite letter of intent cast doubts upon its
effectiveness. This unsatisfactory result led the U.S. to convene a
further series of secret meetings, during 1975, among nuclear
supplier states (France, Great Britain, Germany, U.S.S.R., Canada,
Japan and the U.S.). The aim of these so-called London Conferences
was to remove safeguards from commercial competition and to ban, or
at least strictly control, sales of enrichment or reprocessing
technologies.
It is difficult to assess the results of the London Conferences,
because the discussions were pursued in an atmosphere of strict
secrecy, aimed at avoiding the image that an export cartel was being
formed. Nonetheless, the broad policy directions of the participants
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could be perceived, as summarized by Wonder
(19):
"Canada, for its part, continued to press for a 'model contract'
which would standardize the safeguard terms. The United States
stressed the regional fuel-cycle facility concept, though
apparently did not present any concrete proposals in this
regard. The British suggested some politically more acceptable
equivalent of the NPT be found to accomodate non-parties who
objected to the discriminatory overtones (e.g. imposing no real
obligations on existing nuclear weapon states) of the treaty.
The Germans and French emerged as the chief obstacles to a more
comprehensive agreement. The French typically suspected ulterior
commercial motives of the United States though it is said that
the French position softened as time went on. The Germans,
however, remained difficult. The German delegation maintained
nuclear transactions were becoming conventional in character and
that severe restriction on export activity would be
counter-productive. The Germans and French perspectives on the
discriminatory character of a cartel and the threat export
restraint would pose to their industries grew almost
indistinguishable."10
Needless to say, in the face of these conflicts, no
comprehensive safeguards agreement was reached. The immediate
achievement of the London meetings was an exchange of letters between
supplier states, in January, 1976, in which the exporters agreed to
notify each other and the IAEA before concluding a contract for
reactors or fuel technology. Although this exchange of letters
succeeded in formally incorporating France into a broad nuclear
policy agreement, it was little more than a formalization of existing
practice, in view of the absence of any veto powers in the
agreement. Apparently this degree of consultation did little to stop
the German agreement to sell enrichment and reprocessing technology
to Brazil, or the French agreement to sell reprocessing technology to
Pakistan.
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2.4.3 The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
(INFCE)11
The residual degree of non-participation in the NPT has left
the proliferation concerns of many nations unanswered. These
concerns have been exacerbated by the recent spread in enrichment and
reprocessing technologies, and the continuing research on breeder
reactor cycles. The inability of the NPT and the London Conferences
to prevent the spread of these technologies led President Carter to
sharply reverse the direction of U.S. nuclear policy by imposing a
moratorium on the U.S. pursuit of plutonium technologies. Subsequent
to the imposition of that moratorium, President Carter called for the
convocation of a two-year International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
(INFCE) study, aimed at bringing together worldwide nuclear leaders
to jointly assess the costs and benefits of alternative nuclear fuel
cycles, with explicit recognition of the economics and proliferation
resistance of each alternative. Presumably, INFCE hopes to produce
an international consensus about the wisdom of pursuing
plutonium-based fuel cycles. INFCE officially began during 1977,
with about 40 nations being represented.
2.4.4 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
Concurrent with the INFCE study, the U.S. Congress approved the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242, 22 U.S.C 3201),
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which is designed "to provide for more efficient and effective
control over the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability," by
negotiating the construction of international mechanisms for
improving fuel supply assurance, and by unilaterally taking such
actions as are required "to confirm the reliability of the United
States in meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel
to nations which adhere to effective non-proliferation policies." In
addition to clearing the way for the re-opening of the contract order
books and the further expansion of enrichment capacity, the Act
empowers the President to initiate international negotiations with
buyer and seller nations, aimed at:
(1) the establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel
Authority (INFA) as the instrument of international fuel
assurance;
(2) the creation of international spent fuel repositories and
the establishment of an INFA-monitored spent fuel buy-back
policy;
(3) the creation of an interim stockpile, pending establishment
of INFA, to which DOE would contribute roughly 10 MMSWU;
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(4) an assessment of the desirability of, and options for,
foreign cross-investment in new United States enrichment
facilities.
The Act envisions that the benefits of these fuel assurances
will be made available only to those nations which:
(1) accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear
activities;
(2) do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear
explosive device;
(3) do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing
facilities;
(4) place all existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities
under effective international auspices and inspection.
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3.0 THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET ENVIRONMENT
3.1 Uranium Oxide
3.1.1 Government Subsidization12
The international uranium market developed and grew during the
1950's as a result of stimulation by the U.S. government in
connection with its weapons program. At the close of the Second
World War, U.S. uranium requirements were being met by foreign
sources, particularly Canada and the Belgian Congo. Beginning in
1948, the AEC set out to encourage the building of a domestic uranium
industry by making open market purchases at prices that would
encourage domestic entry into the industry. The result of this and
other forms of stimulation was a rapid growth in the domestic uranium
industry. This expansion peaked during the 1950's and 1960's. By
the late 1960's the AEC had reduced its support of the industry,
which entered into a period of decline as anticipated commercial
demand did not materialize to compensate for the declining military
demand.
This history of government support of the uranium market was not
unique to the United States. In response to the U.S. weapons demand,
extensive exploration was undertaken in Canada, resulting in Canada's
establishment as one of the world's leading producers. By 1958,
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Canada had sold over 74,000 tons of U 3 0 to the AEC. This
burgeoning commercial linkage was broken, however, when, in 1960, the
AEC decided to limit new U 30 O purchase contracts to domestic
customers. The result was the rapid disintegration of the Canadian
uranium industry, and the intervention of the Canadian government
which by 1970 had accumulated natural uranium stockpiles at a cost of
$100 million.
In similar fashion the Australian Government encouraged uranium
exploration by offering rewards for the discovery of uranium ore and
conducting airborne radiometric surveys aimed at locating ore
deposits. This period of stimulation lasted from 1947-1961 and
resulted in the production of uranium in several deposits.
The South African government also responded to the weapons
procurement needs of the U.S. and the U.K., by subsidizing the
production of uranium as a by-product of the gold mining industry.
The South African production history is much like the Canadian
experience; production peaked in the late 1950's and dropped
precipitously to roughly half of that peak value by 1965 due to the
reduction in foreign weapons demands. Unlike the Canadian case,
however, this roller coaster experience did not necessitate extensive
intervention by the South African government, because uranium was not
a primary mining product, but only a gold mining by-product.
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In sum, as the decade of the 1970's approached and the long
awaited civilian uranium demand began to materialize, uranium
reserves and production capacity were primarily located in the U.S.,
Canada, South Africa and the Francophile countries (France, Gabon,
Niger). These reserves and production facilities had grown in
response to national subsidization programs aimed at satisfying U.S.,
U.K. and French weapons procurement demands. After a boom in
production during the 1950's, the international industry suffered a
decade of decline and overcapacity during the 1960's, with a
resulting increase in national protection and support of the uranium
industry through the mechanism of national stockpile accumulations.
Despite these assistance programs, the uranium industry entered the
1970's in a seriously depressed condition.
3.1.2 Government Intervention: Three Embargoes13
This early era of government subsidization gave way to a period
of direct government intervention in uranium markets. The late
1960's and early 1970's witnessed the imposition of three national
embargoes aimed at exports or imports of natural uranium. The first
of these was a U.S. embargo on the importation of foreign uranium
imposed by the AEC in 1966. This embargo was maintained through a
provision in the AEC enrichment contracts which prohibited the
importation of foreign feed for enrichment in U.S. facilities, for
subsequent use in domestic reactors. Because no U.S. utilities were
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using natural uranium reactors and no U.S. utilities held enrichment
contracts with foreign enrichers, this provision effectively
insulated the domestic uranium industry against price competition
from the anticipated wave of less costly uranium imports from Canada
and South Africa. As it became clear, however, that the Canadians
and Australians would not permit their producers to flood the market
with low-priced supplies, the U.S. announced (in 1973) that the
import embargo would be gradually lifted during the years 1977-1984.
The second of these embargoes was an embargo on Australian
mining and exports of U 3 O imposed by the newly elected Australian
Labor Party in late 1972. This embargo brought a halt to the
then-formative marketing efforts of potential Australian producers,
removing a potential major source of inexpensive, high quality
uranium resources from the world market. The stated motivation for
the embargo was a growing concern in Australia about the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly a fear that
Australian-supplied U30 F would be subjected to spent fuel
reprocessing as a means of acquiring plutonium for weapons purposes.
The embargo remained in effect throughout the four-year tenure
of the Labor Party, but it was subject to review when the
Conservative Liberal Party returned to power in 1976. After an
extended debate surrounding the proliferation and environmental
impacts of uranium exports, the Australian Government agreed to
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resume contracting for yellowcake exports, during 1977, subject to
safeguards and pricing contract provisions established by Australian
Government through the Australian AEC. The details of these more
stringent safeguards provisions, and the pricing authority's
determination of the world market price at which Australian U 3 0O may
be sold, have not been finalized.
The third embargo, the Canadian uranium export embargo, was
triggered by an exogenous proliferation event, the explosion of an
atomic device in India in 1974. Although the detonation of this
explosive device by the Indian Government was billed as a peaceful
nuclear explosion, this event rudely awakened the world's nuclear
powers to India's potential weapons capability. The international
political response to the tangible evidence of weapons proliferation
was one of shock and dismay, and many nations publicly decried
India's actions.
Canada reacted particularly forcefully to the Indian explosion.
Prevailing speculation was that the explosive device was constructed
with plutonium reprocessed from spent fuel discharged from
Canadian-supplied heavy water reactors, fueled by Canadian uranium.
These suspicions caused Canada to embargo uranium exports to India
and to undertake national contemplation of more stringent safeguards
regulations applying to the retransfer, reprocessing, or other reuse
of spent fuel generated with Canadian uranium.
As in Australia, an extensive period of Government review ensued
leading to a September 5, 1974 proclamation by the Atomic Energy
Control Board of Canada (AECB) that uranium export licenses would be
subjected to two tests:
1. a reserve protection test--exports would only be permitted
after uranium suppliers had demonstrated the commitment of
at least a 30-year reserve of nuclear fuel for all
existing, committed, and planned reactors in Canada for any
ten-year forward period;
2. a price test--exports must be marketed at world market
prices, as determined by the AECB.
Canada has always required that uranium producers submit their
export contracts to the AECB for examination of safeguards provisions
aimed at insuring that Canadian uranium would be used for purely
peaceful purposes. Growing non-proliferation concerns, stimulated in
large part by the Indian explosion, led to the imposition of a
Canadian embargo on uranium exports, beginning January 1, 1977,
pending the negotiation of a revised bilateral safeguards agreement
between the Canadian government and the uranium buyer's host nation.
The official Canadian policy legislated an embargo on exports to all
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nations which had not ratified and signed the NPT. Although most
nuclear nations have ratified the NPT, few have formally signed it.
The result of this embargo was a cessation of Canadian uranium
exports to all nations except Finland (an NPT signatory), Spain
(under old contracts), and the U.S. (with which Canada has a special
"interim agreement"). Negotiations were immediately initiated with
Japan and the European nations to establish interim agreements
pending formal signature of the NPT, and the first new uranium export
contracts were approved by the AECB in 1978.
In sum the 1970's was an era of severe dislocations in supply
continuity in the international uranium market. The alternate
disappearance and reappearance of major uranium producers like Canada
and Australia created an atmosphere of uncertainty about the likely
future course of the uranium market. Although both Canada and
Australia have returned as U3 Os suppliers, this re-entry has been
accomplished at the cost of intensified safeguards demands and the
creation of national marketing boards aimed at securing "world market
prices" for uranium exports.
3.1.3. Spiralling Uranium Prices: Westinghouse's
Commercial Impracticability and the Uranium
Cartel14
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The embargoes described in the preceding section coincided with
an unprecedented rise in prices during the period November, 1972
through September, 1976. Spot uranium prices, as defined by the
Nuclear Exchange Corporation's (NUEXCO's) Exchange Value for
immediate delivery, rose by a factor of seven over this period with
the most rapid rises occurring during 1974, when prices doubled, and
1975, when they doubled again. In the two decades prior to this
increase, prices had been relatively stable, in current dollar
terms.
This rapid price increase, caught Westinghouse Electric
Corporation in a critical situation of uncovered short sales of U30s,
which resulted in the announcement during September, 1975, that due
to "commercial impracticability" Westinghouse would be unable to
deliver roughly 65 million pounds of U 3 09 that it had contracted to
sell to various buyers. The predictable result of this announcement
was the initiation of extended litigation by 27 utilities in 14
separate legal actions, attempting to compel uranium deliveries by
Westinghouse.
During the conduct of its defense, Westinghouse unleashed a
storm of legal and investigative activity by claiming that in large
measure the rapid price rise leading to its contract default was the
result of the creation of an international uranium cartel. This
allegation is founded on evidence regarding price fixing agreements
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made by foreign firms for uranium sales outside of the United
States. In early 1972, at the suggestion of the Canadian and
Australian governments, a number of foreign uranium firms met and
founded the "Uranium Club", whose express purpose was to establish
minimum price schedules and to allocate the non-U.S. market. The
Canadian and Australian governments felt that such a cartel agreement
was necessary to prevent predatory competition from arising due to
the prevailing excess supply in the uranium export market. Despite
evidence that such a cartel did exist, there is no firm evidence of
cartel participation by U.S. firms, and at least two observers
conclude that cartel activities cannot explain the uranium price
increase. 15
3.2 Competition in the Enrichment Market16
Throughout the 1960's, as international competition grew in the
supply of natural uranium, UFb conversion facilities, fabrication
services, and reactor systems, the U.S. maintained a near monopoly
position in the supply of enrichment services. Prior to 1970, the
only commerical enrichment competitor to the U.S. was the U.S.S.R.,
which concentrated its sales in Communist nations, and the only other
nations possessing significant enrichment capacities were France and
the U.K., both of whom operated small diffusion plants exclusively
for weapons purposes.
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In 1970 this circumstance was altered by the negotiation of the
Treaty of Almelo which created a trinational enrichment venture,
known as URENCO, which was backed by the West German, Dutch and
British governments. URENCO was intended as a cooperative commercial
venture to construct and operate a series of centrifuge enrichment
plants by pooling classified R&D results derived in the heretofore
independent national centrifuge enrichment research programs. URENCO
proceeded to construct two centrifuge facilities, from which
commercial deliveries began in 1976, and to sign toll enrichment
contracts covering the eventual expansion of URENCO's capacity to 2.1
million SWJUs (MMSWU).
The French also emerged as an enrichment competitor during the
1970's, with the formation of the EURODIF enrichment consortium.
Chartered in 1972, the original members of France, Belgium, Spain,
and Italy were joined by Iran in 1975. EURODIF is currently building
a gaseous diffusion plant using French-supplied technology, from
which the first commercial deliveries should be made in 1979, and has
signed toll enrichment contracts covering an expansion of EURODIF
capacity to 10.8 MMSWU.
During the 1970's the Soviet Union's commercial enrichment
supplier, TECHNABSEXPORT, began to step up efforts to market toll
enrichment services to non-Communist world buyers. Contracts were
concluded with Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, West Germany,
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Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the U.K., with delivery dates extending
from 1976 to 1990. These contracts cover the Soviet expansion in the
enrichment capacity available for commercial sales to non-Communist
nations to 3 MMSWU.
In addition to these three toll enrichment competitors who have
already signed SWU contracts, the year 1975 saw the announcement of
three more potential toll enrichment competitors. The first of these
potential entrants is COREDIF, a spin-off of the EURODIF consortium
with the same participants but different ownership shares. COREDIF
announced plans to build a 10.8 MMSWU gaseous diffusion plant by
1989. The second potential entrant is South Africa's Uranium
Enrichment Corporation (UCOR), which announced its intention to build
a commercial enrichment plant using its domestically developed
stationary-wall centrifuge process. A pilot plant is currently in
operation and unofficial South African sources estimate that a 5
MMSWU plant will go onstream in 1986. The third potential entrant is
NUCLEBRAS, a joint venture of Brazil and West Germany, which has
plans to build an 0.2 MMSWU demonstration plant in Brazil during the
mid-1980's using the German-supplied Becker nozzle technology.
During 1976 the Japanese Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation (PNC) announced plans to construct an 0.05
MMSWU gas centrifuge plant by 1980. If successful, this plant will
be followed by a demonstration plant of roughly 0.5 MMSWU for
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completion during the late 1980's, which shall be expanded to 4 MMSWU
by 1995. Meanwhile, Japan has been actively seeking partnership in
joint enrichment ventures, where Japanese financing can complement a
partner's enrichment technology and uranium feed; these negotiations
have been extensively pursued with Australia, which has developed its
own version of the centrifuge technology, although no official
agreement has yet been concluded.
A host of other nations have evidenced an interest in pursuing a
commerical enrichment technology. Even without Japanese
participation, Australia has expressed confidence in its ability to
build a commercial facility using its domestic centrifuge
technology. Although Canadian plans for a domestic joint enrichment
venture with EURODIF are now in abeyance, this interest could revive
if the market picks up. Portugal is conducting negotiations with
Germany in an effort to create a nuclear pact modeled on the
German-Brazilian agreement. Sweden has expressed interest in
acquiring an established enrichment technology for use in a domestic
enrichment plant. Other nations expressing interest in acquiring
enrichment capability include India, Iran, and Zaire.
3.3 Nuclear Reactors
3.3.1 Early Nuclear Power Programs (1955-1970)17
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The shape of early nuclear power programs was strongly
conditioned by the military choices about the technologies suitable
for weapons production. The commercial reactor programs were pursued
earliest by the four nuclear weapons states--The U.S.S.R., France,
U.K. and U.S.--based on variations of their military technologies.
The U.S.S.R. put the world's first power reactor in place in 1954,
using enriched uranium fuel produced in the enrichment facilities
developed for its military program. The British and French reactors
were of the MAGNOX variety, graphite-moderated and fueled by natural
uranium, and were designed as efficient plutonium sources for weapons
production, rather than economical producers of electricity. As a
result, neither nation had any success exporting the MAGNOX reactor
for commercial purposes, and both have abandoned its development in
favor of reactors which use low-enriched uranium fuel.
The U.S. civilian reactor program got off to a slower start than
that of foreign nations, particularly the United Kingdom. The U.S.
chose to commerialize the LWR technology which used low enriched
uranium reactor fuel. This strategy took advantage of the enrichment
facilities built for weapons purposes, as well as the development of
the pressurized-water reactor (PWR) to power the Navy's new Nautilus
submarine, commissioned in 1955. The PWR technology was first
exploited in the Shippingport, Pennsylvania plant in 1957, while the
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boiling-water reactor (BWR) technology, developed in 1954, was
utilized in the Dresden, Illinois plant in 1959.
The birth of the commercial nuclear era came in December, 1963,
when Jersey Central Power and Light Company awarded a contract to
General Electric to build a 560 megawatt (MWE) BWR at Oyster Creek.
This event triggered a worldwide interest in U.S.-supplied LWR
technology and catapulted the U.S. into the position of commercial
leadership in nuclear reactor technology as the 1960's came to a
close. More recently major commercial nuclear power industries were
launched in West Germany, Sweden, Italy and Japan, all adopting
variants of the LWR technology, and Canada, using a natural uranium
fueled reactor. By the end of the 1960's the interest in commercial
nuclear power had spread around the globe to include virtually every
major industrialized nation as well as numerous less-developed
countries.
3.3.2 Reactor Slippage (1970-1978)18
The preceding section described the development of different
reactor technologies in the nuclear weapons states, followed by the
large scale entry into the international reactor market by
non-weapons states as the 1970's approached. This entry was in
anticipation of the forecasted boom in reactor demand. This boom,
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however, was slow in coming, and the 1970's were not an era of excess
demand for reactors, but an era of chronic overcapacity.
This overcapacity was the result of scaling the reactor industry
to meet the demands for nuclear reactors as reflected in official
government estimates. Regional and national forecasts of installed
nuclear capacity are published on a regular basis by DOE and its
foreign atomic energy commission counterparts. Usually these
forecasts are based on utility interview data, although recently some
more sophisticated econometric modeling techniques have brought some
rigor to long-run forecasting.
In the past, significant errors have resulted from accepting
national forecasts at face value. In addition to the uncertainties
associated with such a difficult forecasting task, many nations have
a history of excessive optimism in forecasting nuclear power growth.
The nation with the longest history of nuclear growth forecasts is
the United States, and its forecasts present a good case study of the
historical optimism of nuclear growth estimates. Using the 1970,
1975, and the 1985 installed nuclear capacities as a convenient point
of reference, Table 1 shows a history of forecasted nuclear capacity
as a function of the year in which the forecast was made. The
striking feature of these time series is the precipitous decline in
the forecasts beginning in 1970; in the four years from 1973-1977,
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TABLE 1
COMPARISION OF USAEC NUCLEAR POWER
FORECASTS 1962-1977
AEC FORECAST Installed Power at EOCY, GWe
Made in Year
1962
1964
1966
1967
1969
1970
1972
1973
1975
1976
1977
1975
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
16
29
40
61
62
59
54
47
40
39
39
1980
40
75
95
145
149
150
132
102
82
67
60
1985
255
277
300
280
255
205
145
127
(a) Table 16 of Appendix IV of AEC Report to the
President, "Civilian Nuclear Power", Dec. 1962.
(b) WASH-1055, March 1965
(c) AEC Press Releases S-20-66 (June 1, 1966) & S-23
(Sept. 8, 1966).
(d) WASH-1084, December 1967
(e) WASH-1139 statement of May 1969
(f) WASH-1139, January 1971
(g) WASH-1139 (72), December 1972
(h) WASH-1139 (74), February 1974; mean of cases B&D
(i) R.W.A. LeGassie, ERDA, Testimony to the U.S.
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, April
23, 1975.
(j) Grand Junction Conference, October 1976, ERDA "Mid"
Case
(k) Grand Junction Conference, October 1977, ERDA "Base"
Case
SOURCE: (2), pg. 65, updated.
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official forecasts of 1985 installed capacity were cut exactly in
half. This pattern is repeated in the 1975 and 1980 data.
This upward forecasting bias is not confined to the United
States. The prevalence of this phenomenon was revealed at a series
of meetings of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris during
February, 1977. At these meetings, national representatives convened
in confidential group sessions to produce joint forecasts of nuclear
growth through 1990. These meetings were unusual because they
operated through an iterative Delphi process which permitted national
representatives to challenge the forecasts of other representatives
in an effort to strip away the planner's dreams from the forecaster's
realities. The result of these candid, closed-door proceedings was a
set of sharply reduced growth estimates. Using the 1985 forecast as
a point of reference, the upshot of the IEA meeting was a broad cut,
on the order of 50% in many cases, in worldwide GWE growth
estimates. Even this reduction has not written an end to the
slippage story. Since the IEA meeting, the United States has further
reduced its reactor forecast, while reports of foreign delays in the
nuclear press reveal that foreign growth estimates will continue to
decline.
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4.0 COMMERCIAL POLICIES OF AEC-ERDA-DOE
4.1 Reactor Subsidization and Promotion19
As described in Section 2.2, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
committed the government to the aggressive promotion of a private
civilian atomic energy industry, where government licensing of fuel
cycle facilities was substituted for direct government operation of
these facilities as the primary form of regulation. The Act
authorized private possession, but not ownership, of fissionable
fuels, and encouraged private participation in all phases of the fuel
cycle except enrichment, where the government ownership monopoly was
maintained, although private contractors continued to operate the
plants. The subsidies made available to private industry included:
assistance in reactor construction intended to prove the commercial
viability of atomic power, leases of nuclear fuel at subsidized
rates, guarantees to buy back plutonium in spent fuels at subsidized
prices, and the assumption by the government for liability to the
public from nuclear accidents.
These subsidies were necessary to encourage private industry to
undertake atomic energy. Although the AEC and Congress had assumed
that private enterprise would welcome the access to previously
restricted information as a vehicle for gaining admission to the
nuclear power industry, this did not prove to be the case. Atomic
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power was capital-intensive and risky; therefore, in view of the
ample supply of low cost alternative fuels, private initiative in
building nuclear reactors was not forthcoming. The disappointing
response of private industry was evidenced by the few utilities who
took advantage of the financial inducements offered by the AEC in
1955 and again in 1957 in the Commission's invitation of proposals
for a number of reactor prototypes. In all, only 11 projects were
undertaken in response to these subsidies.
This cautious response was not because the subsidies were
anything less than generous. In 1953 Congress authorized the
construction of the first large-scale civilian reactor at
Shippingport, Pennsylvania. This 60 MWE facility provided
electricity to the Duquesne Light Company at Pittsburgh. The total
cost of the Shippingport plant was $120 million, of which the
government contributed $100 million; Duquesne Light provided the
site, $15 million of generating equipment, and $5 million toward the
cost of the reactor. In short, roughly 85% of the plant was
subsidized by taxpayer contributions.
The AEC Act of 1954 forbid this sort of direct subsidy, by
prohibiting the AEC from contributing to the capital cost of
privately owned reactors. Subsidies, however, remained available in
other forms. The AEC provided its R&D findings to private industry
at no charge. In some cases, nuclear fuel was provided at no
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charge. It paid reactor operators for data they supplied regarding
technical and economic experience. In 1957 Congress agreed to assume
the bulk of the risk of a catastrophic nuclear accident by providing
$500 million of insurance to private utilities at a nominal charge.
In addition, state regulatory commissions helped promote nuclear
power by permitting accelerated amortization of nuclear plants, and
the recovery of nuclear R&D costs in their rate structures.
The JCAE reacted vigorously to the foot-dragging of private
industry by proposing that the development of civilian power could be
accelerated if the government were to build and operate a series of
demonstration plants. The Eisenhower Administration and the AEC
resisted this suggestion as the result of a philosophical disposition
in favor of private power rather than public power. Nevertheless,
the JCAE persisted, and in 1960 the AEC announced a 10-year program
aimed at making atomic power competitive in some parts of the country
and overseas by 1970. This commercialization program concentrated on
the successive construction and testing of experimental, prototype,
and eventually full-scale demonstration reactors, with the emphasis
on the most competitive reactor technologies. If construction
proposals were not forthcoming from private industry, the AEC was to
build the prototypes itself, but would stop short of building and
operating full-scale demonstrations.
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By 1970 there were 29 operating reactors in the U.S.,
representing 3% of the nation's electrical generating capacity. By
1975 nuclear power had grown to represent almost 8% of the nation's
electrical generating capacity, and official forecasts showed nuclear
power to be roughly 1/3 of domestic capacity by 1990. By these
measures, the AEC has succeeded in promoting the creation of a major
private atomic energy industry.
Even this promotional effort of the 1960's was not pursued
without subsidy to private industry, chiefly in the form of the
hidden subsidy in the nuclear fuel prices charged by the AEC. Prior
to 1965, the AEC leased fuel to utilities at an annual rental charge
of 4-5% of the average total cost, rather than the marginal cost of
producing the fuel. Since utilities normally allow 6-12% for the
cost of their fuel inventory, this rental charge involved a
substantial subsidy. In addition, the AEC paid utilities for the
plutonium that was produced as a by-product of power generation, even
though much of this spent fuel leased by utilities was never
reprocessed. Since early AEC cost data remain classified, it is
impossible to assess the propriety of the plutonium price, or the
effect of pricing at average rather than marginal cost, although both
procedures may have contained significant elements of subsidy.
Throughout this era of aggressive promotion and subsidization,
the JCAE played an increasingly important role. The JCAE regularly
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opposed the slow-growth policy of the Eisenhower Administration and
the AEC, who favored leaving the initiative in developing civilian
atomic power to private industry. The JCAE favored a more direct
role for the government and a more aggressive development of atomic
energy, chiefly as an instrument of foreign policy. Although there
was no impending energy crisis during this era, the JCAE tried to
accelerate atomic development as a mark of national prestige, as a
means of offering technical assistance to our allies, and through
this assistance (and the development of the hydrogen bomb) as a
contribution to national security. The JCAE-AEC struggle went on for
years, with Congress continually giving the AEC appropriations in
excess of the Commission's requests. The JCAE began to participate
directly in the details of the AEC's decision-making process, and
came to function "as a board of directors" for the atomic enterprise,
with the AEC functioning in an administrative capacity.
4.2 Uranium Industry Subsidization and Protection2 0
As with the reactor industry, the AEC vigorously promoted the
development of a domestic uranium mining and milling industry during
the 1950's and 1960's. The AEC established fixed floor prices for
U 3 O purchases, including bonus payments for initial uranium
deliveries, for particularly high-grade ores, and for exploration and
development procedures. The AEC encouraged the uranium milling
industry by signing long-term cost plus profit contracts with
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prospective millers which included substantial subsidies by allowing
rapid depreciation of mill plant and equipment.
The result of this stimulation was a rapid growth in the domestic
uranium industry. As indicated by the data in Table 4, this
expansion peaked during the 1950's and early 1960's. By this period,
however, the AEC had decided that it was no longer in the
government's interest to encourage further expansion of the domestic
uranium industry. Beginning in 1958, the AEC adopted a policy of
signing no new U0 8g contracts, and from 1962-1966, the AEC limited
uranium purchases to 500 tons U, O8 per property at a fixed price of
$8 per pound.
These "maintenance" contracts had a dual purpose. First, the
reduced purchases were aimed at limiting the large uranium stockpile
being accumulated by the AEC due to the enthusiastic response to the
AEC stimulation policy plus the slackening of military uranium demand
as weapons procurement targets were satisfied during the mid-1960's.
Second, although civilian demand was not forthcoming to take up the
slack left by the decline in military needs, the AEC recognized the
need to preserve some semblance of a domestic uranium industry in
anticipation of booming civilian needs. Therefore, the $8 uranium
price was intended to encourage the operation of existing firms by
covering short-run variable costs, while discouraging the entry of
new firms by covering long-run marginal costs.
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As the 1966 termination date for the maintenance contracts
approached, and the commercial demand had still not materialized, the
AEC began to "stretch-out" its contractual commitments through 1970
to maintain a base load domestic uranium industry. During 1969-1970
the AEC priced contract deliveries on a cost-based formula aimed at
covering only variable costs. During this period prices averaged $6
per pound of U3 Os.
The result of the AEC maintenance and stretch-out policy of the
1960's was a steady contraction of the domestic uranium industry.
Many firms left the industry, exploratory and drilling activity
declined sharply, and there was substantial merger activity.
Therefore, as the decade of the 1970's approached the international
uranium industry was in a seriously depressed condition, with the
domestic industry being sustained only by the direct purchases of the
AEC with the resulting accumulation of a massive AEC stockpile of
50,000 tons of U3 0o.
4.3 Operating History of DOE
4.3.1. Tails Assays
During the Manhattan Project years the goal of enrichment plant
operations was weapons production, not efficiency, and although
precise operating tails assay data are classified, it is believed
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that during the wartime years most enrichment was done at tails
assays between 0.3% and 0.5%. With the advent of civilian control of
the enrichment plants by the AEC in 1946, the operating tails assay
was set at 0.2%, where it remained throughout the 1950's and 1960's.
During these two decades all of the wartime tails material was
recycled through the enrichment plants to reclaim its U-235 content
in excess of 0.2%. Beginning July 1, 1971, the operating tails assay
rose to 0.3%, and on July 1, 1975, it was lowered to 0.25% where it
is forecasted to remain through 1990.
4.3.2. The Split Tails Program
Despite the depressed financial condition of the domestic uranium
industry, described in Section 4.2, the AEC announced its intentions
to dispose of its natural uranium stockpile. The scheme for
disposing of this stock, with a minimum of disruptive effect on the
production industry, was the split tails policy, announced in March,
1972. This scheme was conceived while James Schlesinger, now
administrative head of DOE, was Chairman of the AEC. The split tails
policy took advantage of the recent rise in the AEC operating tails
assay to 0.3%, effective July 1, 1971. This increase in operating
tails from 0.2% to 0.3% had increased uranium demand roughly 20%.
The AEC took advantage of this demand increase by maintaining the
transactions tails assay at its historical value of 0.2%, which had
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originally been established in 1968. This transactions tails assay
was the tails assay applicable to transactions between the AEC and
its toll enrichment customers. AEC toll enrichment contracts
contained Appendices which specified a customer's natural uranium
deliveries to the AEC, and enriched fuel returns from the AEC, as a
function of the tails assay established by the AEC. The AEC
enrichment contracts permit the AEC to unilaterally choose the tails
assay, and to vary that tails assay on 540 days notice in the Federal
Register. Therefore, the AEC chose to maintain the transactions
tails assay of 0.2%, such that SWU customers continued to supply
uranium to the AEC as if the diffusion plants were running at the
0.2% tails assay. In fact, of course, the enrichment plants were
operating at a tails assay of 0.3% (later 0.25%) and the AEC was
supplying the necessary additional natural feed to the diffusion
plants from the AEC stockpile.
The achievement of the split tails policy was to leave
expectations founded on the historical 0.2% tails assay unchanged,
while slowly disposing of the domestic uranium stockpile without
unduly depressing the uranium price. Naturally the split tails
policy did reduce U 3 O' demand, but most uranium industry
participants agreed that the split tails policy was far preferable to
simply "dumping" large portions of the government stockpile on the
open market. Because the government U3 O8 stockpile averaged roughly
4 years worth of recent domestic production, massive open market
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transactions would undoubtedly have significantly lowered the U 3 0 
market price.
In addition the split tails policy was a hedge against a
repetition of the boom-bust cycle exhibited by the uranium market
during the 1960's. By analogy the AEC feared that raising the
transaction tails assay to the operating tails assay would cause a
boom in uranium demand, and excessive entry into the mining industry,
that would eventually become excess capacity when sufficient SWU
capacity was constructed to permit operating at the planned long-run
equilibrium tails assay at 0.20%. Additionally, the AEC wished to
avoid conferring windfall profits on mining companies. Because these
companies tend to be capital-intensive, rather than labor-intensive,
a sudden leap in uranium demand could bestow large short-term profits
on existing sellers.
4.3.3. The Advance Feed Program
The effort of the split tails policy to dispose of the AEC
stockpile with minimum market disruption is consistent with the
history of AEC involvements in the creation and protection of a
domestic uranium industry. Protection of the uranium market was also
a motivating factor in ERDA's creation of the advance feed program
during 1975. Advance feed deliveries resulted from the drastic
reactor timetable slippages discussed previously. Because of these
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postponements of demand, toll enrichment customers successfully
pleaded with ERDA to permit renegotiation of ERDA enrichment contract
delivery schedules without paying termination charges (See Section
4.4).
These adjustments in enriched product delivery schedules were
not, however, directly translated into adjustments in natural uranium
feed deliveries. Rather ERDA created the advance feed program
whereby a customer slipping enriched product deliveries further into
the future would still have to deliver natural feed to ERDA subject
to a schedule similar to the original enrichment contract delivery
schedule. The purpose of this program was to prevent short-term
disruptions in ERDA's enrichment plant operations due to the sudden
unavailability of feed, and to protect the uranium industry from a
sharp decline in demand as the result of ERDA's actions in declaring
an open season. Given the large ERDA stockpile of domestic uranium
as an easement to scheduling problems, one may conclude that
protection, rather than scheduling, was the main motivation for the
advance feed policy.
4.3.4. The Preproduction Stockpile and Tails Recycle
While the currently ongoing split tails program is drawing down
DOE's natural uranium stockpile, DOE is creating in its place a
substantial preproduction stockpile of enriched uranium. This
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preproduction stockpile is being built up during the 1970's, when DOE
enrichment capacity exceeds contract demands, for draw-down during
the 1980's, when contract demand will exceed forecasted capacity.
The feed for this preproduction stockpile is being supplied from the
DOE U 3 0 stockpile, the advance feed program, and the tails recycle
program.
The current DOE tails recycle program is an outgrowth of the DOE
experience in the recycling of wartime tails during the 1960's. The
current DOE tails stockpiles consist of a substantial quantity of
0.3% tails resulting from the operation of the diffusion complex at
an 0.3% tails assay from 1971-1975. The recycling program proposes
to feed this tails material into the enrichment plants during the
years 1977-1979 to recover its U-235 content in excess of 0.25%.
4.4 Contracting History of DOE
4.4.1 Requirements Contracts
DOE enrichment contracting has undergone many major changes since
the original offering of SWU services, and is currently in a state of
flux. Initially, the AEC offered nuclear fuel to utilities only on a
leased basis, pursuant to the provisions of the 1946 AEC Act. All
uranium and enriched fuel was legally owned by the U.S. Government.
In 1964, Congress amended the AEC Act to permit private utilities to
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own nuclear fuel, and subsequent to these amendments the AEC first
offered toll enrichment services in 1971, whereby they contracted to
enrich uranium supplied by the utilities. These contracts were known
as requirements (REQ) contracts because utility buyers contracted for
the requirements of a specific reactor; in turn, the AEC agreed to
supply these requirements for the life of the reactor. While
utilities maintained updated forecasts of fuel demands on file with
the AEC, the precise size of fuel deliveries could be specified on
180 days notice by the utilities.
The prices for requirements contracts were established on a
cost-recovery basis by the AEC, and were constrained by an escalating
price ceiling. Contract prices were published in the Federal
Register, effective 180 days after publication.
4.4.2 Long Term Fixed Commitments Contracts, The Closing of
the Order Books, and Conditional Contracts21
In 1973, the AEC discontinued the negotiation of REQ contracts,
and replaced them with long term fixed-commitment (LTFC) contracts.
The four crucial distinctions of this new contract form from the
requirements contracts were: (1) The SWU contract was not reactor
specific; (2) the fixed commitment contract was much longer term (30
years) and much less flexible: rather than firming up fuel
deliveries on 180 days notice, utilities were locked into firm
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schedules on a rolling 10-year period and buyers were subject to
substantial penalties for failing to take deliveries on schedule; (3)
the contract price, while based on cost recovery, was not limited by
any ceiling price clause--prices are changed on 60 days notice by
publication in the Federal Register; (4) SWU customers were required
to make advance payments of $3.3 million/GWE in three installments
during the first two years following contract execution--these
prepayments are credited against SWU charges for the first fuel
deliveries, and are forfeited if the customer terminates the contract
before the first fuel delivery. Further, when AEC announced the
institution of the LTFC contracts, they specified that prior to July,
1974, no contracts would be signed for reactors with planned
first-core loadings after July, 1982.
The initiation of the LTFC contracts created a surge in
enrichment contracting which forced the closing of the AEC contract
order books in July, 1974, only 9 months after LTFC contracts were
first offered. This surge far exceeded the demand that the AEC had
anticipated. This unexpected demand reflected a problem inherent in
the LTFC contracting system,
"Utilities, understandably anxious to protect themselves
against even the remote risk of enrichment shortages, were
generally inclined to put in for the largest quantities of
separative work they thought they might possibly need, and
some asked for deliveries at dates that looked much too
early to the Commission. Also, with some notable
exceptions, their estimated enrichment needs made no
allowance for plutonium recycling.
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However, AEC was in no position to say to any utility that
its estimates of its own needs were unrealistic and would
not be accepted as the basis for contracing."22
In other words, because the AEC was the only established supplier
of SWU services there was a strong incentive for utilities to push
forward their reactor timetables to qualify for the July, 1982 cutoff
date. In addition, because the costs associated with stockpiling
wcre by
excess enriched fuel far outweighed.the costs of having to idle
generating facilities for lack of fuel, utilities forecasted reactor
load factors well in excess of anticipated results as a form of
self-insurance during the firm 10-year commitment period. The net
result of this overordering was an artificial exaggeration of actual
enrichment needs and the premature exhaustion of the AEC's supply
capability.
During the first 9 months of LTFC contracting, enough contract
requests were received to exhaust AEC forecasting SWU capacity
through 1985, leaving AEC in the unpleasant position of having to
deny contracts to willing buyers. At the time of contract
suspension, the AEC had executed contracts representing the needs of
273 GWE of nuclear capacity, and had received requests for LTFC
enrichment contacts from an additional 91 GWE of reactors. At that
time the AEC's projected available SWU capacity was large enough to
sustain approximately 290 GWE, at 0.3% operating tails with no
plutonium recycle. The AEC exercised its legislative authority to
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enter into a small number of contracts above nominal capability by
contracting for a total of 320 GWE of generating capacity.
This still left 44 GWE of generating capacity without the
requested SWU contracts. To satisfy those customers, AEC agreed to
enter into a limited number of conditional enrichment contracts.
These contracts were identical to the standard LTFC contracts in
every sense but one; their execution was conditional upon an NRC
finding in favor of plutonium recycle. The logic of this condition
was that if plutonium recycle was approved, ERDA would have the
additional capacity to satisfy these conditional contracts. No
advance payments were required from conditional customers until the
contracts were made firm.
Not all of the proffered conditional contracts were signed; a
total of 27 conditional contracts were executed by ERDA, bringing the
enrichment contract commitments to 341 GWE of electrical capacity.
No generic decision has been rendered by the NRC regarding plutonium
recycle, and in the meantime, 18 conditional customers exercised
their option to terminate their conditional contracts, either because
they had been assigned a firm contract by another ERDA customer, or
had seen their own reactor plans delayed or cancelled.
In an effort to restore faith in U.S. enrichment supply
reliability, President Nixon stated, on August 6, 1974, that the U.S.
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would "in any event" fulfill the fuel commitments of the conditional
contracts from domestic sources.2 3 This announcement, coming one
month after the closing of the order books, effectively made the
conditional contracts firm. This public promise was finalized during
September, 1977 when the U.S. offered to firm up the contracts of the
remaining 9 conditional customers.
4.4.3 ERDA's Open Season and Case by Case Contract Relief24
Subsequent to the closing of the order books, the continuing
slippage in reactor installations led utilities holding LTFC
contracts to petition ERDA for an "open season" during which
customers would adjust their contracted delivery schedules to reflect
recent delays without incurring onerous penalty costs. Eager to free
up overcommitted SWU capacity, ERDA granted this request for an open
season during the thirty days following June 19, 1975. One hundred
ninety-three (193) of the 247 utilities holding LTFC contracts took
advantage of this opportunity to alter their contracts; the effective
result was a cumulative demand reduction of 27 MMSWU during the
period 1976-1988, corresponding to a reduction in the nuclear
capacity under ERDA enrichment contracts from 341 GWE to 329 GWE, and
an average slippage in reactor demands of two years.2 5
Despite the readjustments of the first open season, further
erosion of utility timetables once again brought pressure to bear on
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DOE for a second open season. DOE's response, in April 1977, was a
statement that they would consider case-by-case contract relief for
enrichment customers who have mismatches between contract commitments
and actual needs. The dimensions of this relief have not been
specified except to state that there would be no second open season
free ride for customers, rather, penalties shall be imposed for
termination or postponement. A DOE survey during early 1977 revealed
the magnitude of the requested contract adjustments: sixteen
reactors were judged to be likely candidates for total termination,
and the average requested delay was 1-2 years. If granted, the
requested adjustments would reduce DOE deliveries over the decade
1978-1988 by 30 MMSWU.
4.4.4 Adjustable Fixed Commitments Contracts
It is likely that the contract adjustments will take the form of
an option for LTFC customers to convert to Adjustable
Fixed-Commitments (AFC) contracts. On February 7, 1978, DOE relea
a draft of the proposed AFC contract for use by DOE upon the
resumption of long-term enrichment services contracting. The AFC
contract is a compromise between the REQ and LTFC contracts; its
specific aim is to offer the customer greater flexibility than the
LTFC contract. It retains many features of the LTFC contracts
including advance payments, no ceiling on SWU prices, a 10-30 year
contract life, the customer's option to acquire tails material, a
sed
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designated (but not required) reactor use, termination penalties, the
maintenance of the embargo on foreign feed, and the ability to
dispose of excess enriched uranium by assignment, sale in private
markets, or accumulation of a stockpile. The distinguishing
flexibility features are:
(1) A reduction in the firm commitment period from a rolling
10-year period to a 5-year rolling period, of which the
first three years shall be firm commitments, the fourth
year's commitments shall be subject to a variation of - 10%,
and the fifth year's commitments may vary by + 20%.
(2) The ability of the the customer to delay the initial
delivery period up to a maximum of 5 years, for a reduced
penalty charge.
(3) The variable tails assay option which permits the utility
customer to specify, within limits, the transaction tails
assay(s) for each uranium delivery to the enrichment plant.
This allows the customer to fine tune his enriched fuel
output, by varying his natural fuel input, to meet his
specific needs.
DOE has yet to determine: (1) the termination charges associated
with the conversion from an LTFC to an AFC contract, (2) whether
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advance feed provisions will accompany contract conversion, and (3)
the non-proliferation terms under which the AFC contract will be
extended to foreign users. The finalization of these decisions will
permit a reopening of the contract order books.
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5.0 SUMMARY
The chronology of major events described in Essay #1 is
recapitulated in the timeline of Figure 1. We shall be making
reference to these events in subsequent essays and the reader may
find it useful to return to Figure 1 to refresh his memory regarding
an event's historical context. The essence of this chronology is the
unique attempt to make the long-run transition from a military,
politically controlled, industry to a commercial, privately
controlled industry, and the major theme of this first essay has been
a description of the promotion and subsidization of private
industrial participation in the nuclear fuel cycle, as the major
vehicle for making this transition. We have recounted the role of
the AEC, and its foreign counterparts, in subsidizing the national
and international acceptance of civilian nuclear power, and in
promoting the creation of private domestic reactor and uranium
industries. In addition, we have documented the effort to extend
this privatization policy to the enrichment sector. Along the way,
we have also encountered two minor themes which have characterized
the evolution of this transition:
1. The tension between the international political system and
the international market system
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As noted, the military-commercial transition was to be
accomplished by encouraging the participation of private industry at
various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Because, however,
enrichment and reprocessing technologies represent potential sources
of nuclear weapons, nations were unwilling to relinquish total
control of nuclear technologies to private entities. The result has
been a series of international political attempts (Atoms for Peace,
NPT, London Conferences, INFCE) to define the ground rules within
which private nuclear industries must function. These international
efforts have revealed broad disagreements between nations as to the
degree of regulation that should be applied to nuclear trade. While
some countries see the imposition of strict rules on technology
transfers as a necessary part of a non-proliferation policy, others
perceive these restrictions as discriminatory attempts to preserve
the market power of established nuclear weapons states through
technological barriers to entry.
2. The gigantic uncertainties prevailing in the international
nuclear markets
Clearly the military-commercial transition is not yet completed;
therefore, nuclear markets display a complex mixed public-private
structure, with which the infant nuclear industries must deal. The
result has been a painful period of self-education for market
participants. A series of events have rocked the commercial uranium
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and enrichment markets, including: the closing of the U.S. order
books, the rapid uranium price increases, the Canadian and Australian
export embargoes, and the Westinghouse claim of commercial
impracticability. These destabilizing events, among others, have
created an atmosphere of tremendous uncertainty about the future of
the commercial nuclear markets. The unpredictable role of
international politics in determining fuel supplies, and the
continuing slippage in reactor installations, which has increased the
uncertainties in demand, have left both suppliers and consumers
worried about the stability of fuel supply. Whether these
uncertainties will be resolved, such that a series of smoothly
functioning markets can exist, remains to be seen.
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FIGURE 1
SUMMARY TIME LINE
Atomic Energy Act passed in U.S., signalling era of secrecy.
Eisenhower proposes Atoms for Peace.
Atomic Energy Act amended to signal era of internationalism
and promotion.
IAEA created.
Congress amends AEC Act to permit private owner-
ship of fissionable fuels.
AEC institutes foreign feed embargo.
URENCO created by Treaty of Almelo.
First ratification of NPT
Initiation of toll enrichment.
AEC raises tails assay from 0.2% to 0.3%
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1946
1953
1954
1957
1964
1966
1970
1971
1972 EURODIF created.
Split tails program announced as means of drawing
down AEC U3 Os stockpile.
Australian Labor Party comes to power and
embargoes U 3O0 exports.
1973 Requirements enrichment contracts replaced by
long-term fixed-commitments enrichment
contracts.
U.S. announces gradual lifting of foreign feed
embargo during years 1977-1984.
1974 AEC closes contract order books, executes
conditional contracts.
India detonates atomic device
Canada announces export embargo pending stricter
safeguards agreements.
U 308 market prices double.
1975 AEC lowers tails assay from 0.3% to 0.25%.
AEC is replaced by ERDA and NRC.
NFAA goes to Congress with UEA proposal.
Germany sells enrichment technology to Brazil.
ERDA declares open season subject to advance feed
constraints.
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Westinghouse announces default on U 3 OX
contract deliveries due to "commercial impractic-
ability."
COREDIF announces creation of enrichment
consortium.
South Africa announces plans for commercial
centrifuge enrichment plant.
U 3 01 market prices double again.
1976 Japan announces plans for commercial centrifuge
enrichment plant.
First commercial deliveries from URENCO
facilities.
1977 ERDA announces case by case contract relief will
be offered to enrichment customers experiencing
reactor delays.
DOE is created by the combination of ERDA and FEA.
First meeting of INFCE
1978 DOE proposes draft of adjustable fixed commitments
enrichment contract for use in re-opening
enrichment contract order books.
U.S. passes Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
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FOOTNOTES
1 For a layman's introduction to the technologies of
the nuclear fuel cycle, the reader is referred to
(2), pp. 105-123, and (11), pp. 389-407.
2 (2), pg. 117.
3 For more detail regarding enrichment technologies,
see (3).
14 (17), pp. 175-177; (16), pp. 539-540, 542-547.
5 (17), pp. 177-184; (16), pg. 541.
6 (18), pp. 7-8, 27-34, 61-63; (16), pp. 553-554;
(10), pp. 33-44.
7 (15), pg. 7.
8 (17), pp. 190-191.
9 (19), pp. 23-28.
10 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
11 For more detail see "INFCE Working Groups Being
Firmed Up," Nuclear Fuel. Vol. 2, No. 20 October 3,
1977, pp. 3-5
12 (9), pp. 126-131; (14).
13 (12); (14).
14 (12); (9), pp. 143-150.
15 (9), pp. 168-170; (5).
16 Material excerpted from news reports compiled in (4).
17 (17), pp. 184-186.
18 (8), pp. 24-25.
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19 (16), pp. 550-553.
20 (9), pp. 126-131.
21 For more detail regarding LTFC contracts, see (13);
for more on the closing of the order books and
conditional contracting, see (6), pp. 511-521.
22 (6), pp. 572-573.
23 (6), pg. 528.
24 (7) and "Utilities May Want Out of 16 SWU Pacts,"
Nuclear Fuel Vol. 2, No. 12, June 13, 1977, pp. 1-1a
25 (7)
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AN ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL OF U.S. ENRICHMENT POLICY
1.0 THE MOTIVATION FOR A MODEL
From an industrial economics viewpoint, the performance of
AEC-ERDA-DOE in the enrichment market offers a unique perspective.
This executive agency, which we shall abbreviate simply as the AEC
for convenience, has long held a near-monopoly position in the
international commercial enrichment market. From this monopoly
position the AEC has been responsible for both the promotion and
regulation of the domestic civilian atomic energy industry, while
simultaneously acting as a primary instrument of U.S. nuclear foreign
policy.
The multiple roles filled by the AEC have created situations of
conflicting motivations within the agency where, for example,
domestic and foreign policy objectives have called for differing
solutions to a perceived problem. A historical review of U.S.
enrichment policy reveals two categories of objectives which
determine the course of a nation's enrichment policy: security
objectives and commercial objectives. Security objectives include
both contributing to the national defense, and the preservation of
national security by limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In the context of enrichment policy, security objectives translate
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ESSAY #2:
into limiting the spread of enrichment technologies, as enrichment
plants offer one route to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Commercial objectives include the promotion of a domestic
civilian nuclear power industry both as an innovative force in
nuclear technology and as a source of export revenues aimed at
improving the balance of payments. In the context of enrichment
policy, U.S. commercial objectives include the following dimensions:
(1) a desire to encourage the installation of privately owned
nuclear reactors as a source of electrical power;
(2) a desire to protect and stimulate domestic nuclear fuel
cycle industries, such as uranium mining and milling, and reactor
vessel manufacturing;
(3) a desire to encourage the export of nuclear fuels and
nuclear fuel cycle components as a source of international trade
revenues;
(4) a desire to eventually transfer operation and ownership of
domestic enrichment facilities to private corporations.
The reader must keep the multidimensional nature of commercial
objectives in mind when reading these essays. If not explicitly
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stated, the context of any generic references to "commercial
objectives" should permit the reader to infer which dimensions of
commercial objectives are being discussed.
These two sets of objectives are, at times, both conflicting and
interdependent. For example, a conflict may arise when the nation
considers the transfer of its enrichment technology. While
commercial objectives associated with stimulating international
export trade may be satisfied by such a transfer, the resulting
dispersion of enrichment technology may run contrary to security
objectives. An example of the interdependence of objectives arises
in the establishment of toll enrichment contract terms. If prices
and other contract terms are set solely on the basis of commercial
objectives associated with enrichment privatization, the result may
be to increase the incentive for foreign entry into the enrichment
market. This entry, in turn, may have an undesirable impact on U.S.
national security.
This essay concerns itself with the interplay of these two sets
of objectives in the formulation of U.S. enrichment policy. Given
that conflicts arise between these objectives, how are these
conflicts resolved? Stated another way, how does the U.S. Government
weigh these objectives? To posit an answer to these questions is to
implicitly offer a model of U.S. behavior which must then be examined
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against the experience of the last 30 years. The following essay
proceeds to propose and scrutinize such a model.
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2.0 THE CARNEGIE SCHOOL OF ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY
We shall find the roots of our propositions in a bureaucratic
process model of the AEC. This model rejects the notion of
comprehensive rationality, according to which organizations pursue
value-maximizing behavior. A comprehensively rational organization
would presumably consider the set of all possible alternative courses
of action, weigh the global costs and benefits of each alternative,
and pursue the optimal alternative as defined with respect to an
explicit objective function. Such a model is used in the traditional
microeconomic theory of the firm, which posits that firms search the
universe of alternatives and choose to pursue that series of actions
which yields maximum profits.
To replace these maximizing assumptions, we appeal to Herbert
Simon's concept of "bounded rationality", as applied to firm behavior
by Cyert and March (3), according to which organizations pursue
satisficing behavior, which does not seek only the optimal
alternative, but is glad to accept any alternative which satisfies
broad constraints. Rather than examining the universe of possible
alternative actions, the process of organizational search is
simple-minded. Search is motivated to find a solution to an
immediate problem, and it begins in the neighborhood of the current
solution and proceeds sequentially until a satisfactory alternative
is generated. This firefighting behavior, where organizations react
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to the stimulus of a short-run problem rather than seeking the
development of a long-run strategy, is consistent with an
organization's inability to simultaneously confront the global
implications of any alternative action without encountering an
information overload. Organizations further seek to avoid the
necessity of dealing with uncertainty by imposing standard operating
procedures on the environment which predetermine the direction of
organizational response.
The application of these concepts to the prediction of
organizational decision-making conveys a profound respect for the
difficulties of engineering any major change in organizational
behavior. In the pursuit of an organizational objective the
organization develops immense inertia, therefore, the course of
organizational actions can only be altered by the repeated
application of consistently directed external forces. Organizations
are inherently blunt instruments whose efforts cannot be redirected
simply by directives from the top, or changes in the external
environment, which demand a sharp reordering of the organization's
priorities. Rather, such a change requires the replacement of
existing standard operating procedures with new routines, and the
passage of sufficient time to allow the organization to learn these
new repertoires.
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Therefore, organizational behavior usually changes at a glacial
rate. Over long periods of time, organizations may learn from
experience which causes changes in goals, operating procedures, and
search routines, but these changes are incremental and adaptive,
rather than quantum leaps. In sum, the best predictor of what an
organization shall do tomorrow is what it did today, which is only
infinitesimally different from what it did yesterday. Predictions of
behavior are based on explanations of the organizational routines,
and the trends in these routines, unveiled by prior organizational
history.
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3.0 APPLICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY TO U.S. BEHAVIOR
3.1 The Central Proposition
We shall seek to apply the preceding organizational theory to an
explanation of U.S. enrichment policies. The AEC's commercial
mandate, as expressed in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, has been to
promote the creation of a domestic civilian atomic energy industry,
to be owned and operated by private corporations rather than public
agencies. Therefore, we shall postulate that the AEC has been the
guardian of the domestic commercial objective.
What does this assumption imply? If our organizational theory is
indeed borne out in practice, this assumption would imply that the
AEC would fashion enrichment policy primarily to satisfy domestic
commercial objectives, with inadequate concurrent consideration of
international security objectives. In circumstances characterized by
broad uncertainties in potential outcomes due to the interdependency
between commercial and political objectives, the AEC would seek to
avoid a global analysis of these interactions by adhering to
well-established standard operating procedures for promoting domestic
privatization while leaving the international security aspects to
work themselves out. In short, conflicts between commercial and
security objectives would be resolved by giving primary weight to
commercial considerations. Furthermore, the AEC would be slow to
respond to changes in the external environment which necessitated a
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reordering of organizational objectives. Instead, the
"commercialization-first" mentality would continue to persist,
despite accumulating evidence of its non-workability, and only
marginal changes would be made in enrichment policy, aimed at
relieving short-run pressures rather than changing long-run
strategies.
Our insights into organizational theory lead us to expect that
the AEC's organizational inertia in pursuit of domestic commercial
objectives was the dominant force in shaping U.S. enrichment policy.
As indicated in essay #1, during the description of the running
battle between the AEC and JCAE, the preferences of the AEC are not
translated directly into U.S. policy prescriptions, but are subject
to external review. In the case of the AEC, forces acting to alter
AEC policies come from a variety of sources which may be conveniently
summarized as the Administration (President, OMB, State Department,
and other agents of the Executive Branch), and the Congress (JCAE).
However, in attempting to influence AEC behavior from the outside,
these external forces have an inherent disadvantage: the tenure of
political office is typically so brief, in comparison to the life of
a bureaucratic organization, and the focus of political officers is
so tied to critical, short-run issues, that effecting changes in the
strategic long-run behavior of a bureaucracy is uncommon.
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Therefore, this essay shall seek to describe the United States'
enrichment policy as the vector resultant of the AEC's powerful
organizational inertia in pursuit of commercial objectives and the
imposition of tangential external forces from a series of
Presidential Administrations and the Congress aimed at incorporating
the security objective into the AEC's decision-making calculus. In
sum, the organizational theory leads to the following proposition:
U.S. enrichment policies may be understood not as the result of a
continuous global rebalancing of domestic commercial and
international security considerations, but as the result of the AEC's
primary emphasis on domestic commercial objectives, often to the
neglect of the security implications of the resulting enrichment
policies.
3.2 The Substantiation of the Proposition
The history of the AEC, as discussed in essay #1, lends some
evidence to our proposition. The subsidization of domestic civilian
atomic power during the 1950's and 1960's was obviously consistent
with the dimension of the AEC's commercial mandate which encourages
the broad acceptance of nuclear power. The AEC vigorously promoted
atomic energy through the encouragement of a private domestic uranium
industry as well as a private domestic reactor industry, while
steadfastly resisting pressure from the JCAE for direct government
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participation in these industries. Essay #1's description of uranium
price floor guarantees, the dispersal of technical data, the
subsidization of enriched fuel prices, and the support for enrichment
privatization, reveals the continuing growth of bureaucratic momentum
behind the various dimensions of the domestic commercialization
objective.
In examining our proposition our primary emphasis shall be on the
influence of the dimension of commercial objectives relevant to the
enrichment privatization policy. The enrichment sector was the last
remaining stage of the fuel cycle under government control and the
relinquishment of this technology to private control was seen as the
next logical step in the twenty-year process of privatizing the
nuclear fuel cycle. As described in essay #1, the legislative
approval of toll enrichment in 1964 removed a key legal barrier to
enrichment privatization and cleared the way for the initiatives of
the Nixon-Ford Administrations, culminating in the UEA proposal and
the NFAA of 1975.
We shall trace the effect of enrichment privatization in three
areas of enrichment policy: SWU production, SWU contracting and
pricing, and SWU technology transfer. In each area we shall look to
see whether the actions of the AEC conform to our hypothesis.
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3.3 The Implication of the Proposition: A Second Proposition
Even if our proposition proves to have some validity, it had
little adverse impact on U.S. nuclear policy prior to the late 1960's
because no large-scale conflict had arisen between commercial and
security objectives. Rather, the United States Government had
successfully pursued a consistently integrated nuclear strategy.
Domestically, this strategy consisted of the subsidization, and
subsequent protection, of private industries at each stage of the LWR
fuel cycle with the exception of uranium enrichment.
Internationally, U.S. strategy chose to position the U.S. as the
monopoly supplier of enrichment services, where in return for this
monopoly the U.S. guaranteed the entire non-Communist World a
reliable, adequate supply of enrichment services at a reasonable
price.
This international strategy simultaneously satisfied commercial
and security objectives. The best means of controlling the spread of
enrichment technology was to make foreign nations technologically
dependent on the U.S. This technological dependency in turn
encouraged the growth of U.S. reactor exports and the realization of
significant revenues from sales of enrichment services, both of which
satisfied U.S. commercial objectives. As Wonder (23) summarizes it,
"The diplomacy of Atoms for Peace created a framework within which
American corporate interests could be pursued."l
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This framework within which security and commercial objectives
conveniently complemented each other, began to disintegrate during
the late 1960's. It is the source of that disintegration which is
the focus of this essay. We shall argue that the failure of the U.S.
Government to respond to rapidly changing environmental conditions by
implementing a revised strategy was in large measure responsible for
this disintegration. We shall trace this strategic oversight to the
property of bureaucratic inertia in support of the policy of
enrichment privatization, and the resulting blindness to the fact
that the pursuit of commercial objectives in the form of enrichment
privatization was inconsistent with the pursuit of security
objectives in the form of supply assurances. The failure to
implement a revised strategy led to a U.S. enrichment policy that was
both confusing and inconsistent. This inconsistency, in turn,
damaged U.S. credibility as a reliable supplier of enrichment
services, which has had undesirable effects in both commercial and
security spheres.
In sum we are led to a second derivative proposition:
The failure of U.S. enrichment policy to achieve a balance
between commercial and security objectives contributed to the decline
in U.S. credibility as a reliable enrichment supplier, which had
negative impacts in both commercial and security domains.
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3.4 Subtleties not Captured by the Propositions
Even though we would argue that the validity of our propositions
results because an organizational theory which recognizes bounded
rationality is more realistic than an organizational theory founded
on global rationality, our simplistic identification of the AEC with
the domestic commercialization objective fails to capture at least
two additional aspects of reality.
First, because the AEC is a collection of individuals and
subunits with disparate demands, different perceptual biases, and
limited boundaries of concern, there will never be a consensus
regarding the operational goals of the organization. Our inference
that the AEC strongly supported enrichment privatization as an
extension of its domestic commercial mandate, may be more carefully
stated by inferring that enrichment privatization received strong
support at the AEC Commissioner level. This inference is founded on
public statements by AEC Commissioners and their successors at ERDA
and DOE.
Undoubtedly this Commissioner-level support was an effective
force behind privatization, but it does not imply that similar
support existed uniformly throughout the AEC. Certainly the
Production Division of the AEC, which was responsible for the
existing plants and their technology, was not altogether enthusiastic
104
about the prospect of privatization, as this would constitute a form
of bureaucratic hari-kari. In addition to the natural impulse to
preserve its influence and existence, the Production Division had
grown increasing protectionist of their own technology, and opposed a
giveaway to private industry. Therefore we must recognize that the
AEC Commissioners encountered opposition to enrichment privatization
from forces internal to the AEC, as well as some of the external
forces mentioned earlier.
Second, whenever judging the actions of the AEC it is prudent to
recall that the AEC personnel are only an administrative veneer which
sits atop a massive foundation of employees responsible first to
private contractors. In the case of enrichment operations these
private contractors are the corporate giants Union Carbide and
Goodyear. As such, the AEC does little work in-house, but instead
uses the resources of its contractors, particularly Union Carbide at
Oak Ridge, to see to the daily operation of the enrichment plants as
well as to conduct long-range planning studies. Given the strong
influence of Union Carbide on the AEC's long-run strategic plans, it
is not surprising that many AEC decisions look like they were
generated by a private, commercial firm.
The impact of the private enrichment contractors on the question
of enrichment privatization is less clear. Both Union Carbide and
Goodyear are paid on a cost-plus fixed fee basis, and although they
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insist that their enrichment operations are done more for public
service than corporate profit, it is difficult to assess the value of
these contracts without further research. It is perhaps significant
that no corporation has seen fit to compete with Union Carbide for
its AEC contract, and representatives of Carbide suggest that they
would gladly relinquish the contract if such competition should
arise.
If indeed the AEC enrichment operations contracts are far from
lucrative, there is little reason to expect Union Carbide and
Goodyear to oppose enrichment privatization. Presumably they would
be in a particularly good position to enter the market as private
enrichers, if they so desired. Although Union Carbide was an
original member of UEA, they backed out of the consortium after
evaluating the proposal. Goodyear also evidenced some interest in
private enrichment, but only as a supplier of centrifuges for use in
a private enricher's plant, not as a private enricher itself.
In sum, our identification of the AEC as the custodian of the
domestic commercial objective is certainly a simplification. This
assumption is both weakened and reinforced when we choose to model
the AEC based not only on the public pronouncements of its
Commissioners, but when we also allow for the internal structure of
the AEC and the relationship to its contractors. The reader must
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carry these qualifications in mind when reading the balance of this
essay.
3.5 Outline of the Essay
The format of the essay will be as follows. The influence of the
privatization initiative, and associated commercial objectives
relative to reactor exports and the domestic uranium industry, will
be traced by examining U.S. policy in three areas of enrichment
operations: SWU production, SWU contracting and pricing, and SWU
technology transfer. In each instance we shall seek to explain U.S.
policy choices primarily in terms of commercial objectives, as
modified by prevailing security objectives.
In the area of SWU production we shall show that the roots of the
AEC production strategy lie in a computer model which is founded
solely on the commercial objective of providing nuclear fuel at
minimum cost, with no concurrent consideration of security
objectives. We shall demonstrate how an apparently minor
modification of this program in an attempt to incorporate security
objectives, could result in significant changes in the operating
plan. In addition, we shall describe how the major policy results of
this commercial model have been institutionalized as AEC standard
operating procedures, which has led to the continuation of these
policies after the disappearance of their analytic reason for being.
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In the area of SWU pricing and contracting we shall narrate the
history of changes in the methods for calculating toll enrichment
prices. We shall indicate how these changes were consistent with an
AEC attempt to increase prices, as an encouragement to private
enrichers, within the broad legal limits of AEC pricing discretion.
In addition, we shall demonstrate that the AEC has historically
underpriced SWU's relative to the prices that would have been yielded
by an alternative institutional structure. Prior to the 1970's, this
underpricing was consistent with the dimension of the commercial
objectives which subsidized the generic growth of nuclear power, and
during more recent years the AEC's partially successful struggle
against this underpricing bias is consistent with the enrichment
privatization dimension of commercial objectives. Lastly, we shall
find that AEC SWUs are differentially priced, and we shall
demonstrate that the motivation for this differential pricing is as
much an incentive for customers to convert to long-term contracts,
similar to those suggested by potential private enrichers, as it is
an unbiased attempt to recover actual differences in costs.
In the area of SWU technology transfer we shall examine the two
U.S. enrichment multilateralization initiatives of 1971 and 1974. We
shall find that in both instances, the implementation of these
foreign policy proposals was guided by the demands of the balance of
trade and enrichment privatization dimensions of commercial
objectives, rather than security objectives.
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Finally, we shall trace the undesirable feedback effects of these
production, pricing, contracting, and technology transfer policy
choices in an effort to demonstrate how they unintentionally
contributed to the decline in U.S. credibility as a reliable SWU
supplier, as suggested by our second proposition.
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4.0 SWU PRODUCTION
This section of the essay examines the AEC's rationale in
choosing the operating characteristics of the enrichment plants, i.e.
the tails assays and feed loading patterns which determine the
physical output of the diffusion complex. We shall focus on three
aspects of AEC production strategy--(1l) the choice of the operating
tails assay, (2) the tails recycle program, and (3) the preproduction
stockpile program (including the split tails feed sales and advance
feed policies)--and ask what they reveal about the AEC's objectives,
in light of our first hypothesis. We shall trace the origin of these
decisions to a Union Carbide computer model, and we shall see how the
justification for these policies has evolved over time. In this
manner we shall show that these operating decisions are founded on
purely commercial considerations, often to the neglect of security
objectives, and that the AEC has continued to pursue these policies
despite shifts in the external environment which have caused the
original economic justifications for these decisions to disappear.
4.1 The Hatch-Levin Model
The roots of the current enrichment operating strategy are to be
found in a computer model created by Union Carbide Corporation under
contract to the AEC during the mid-1960's. This model was described
by its authors, Hatch and Levin, in a journal article published in
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1969; the succeeding paragraphs give a flavor of the Hatch and Levin
(6) analysis.
The genesis of the position faced by the AEC in the mid-sixties
has been stated quite colorfully by Congressman Craig Hosmer,
"In the late 1940's and early 1950's the United States sized and
built its massive three unit enrichment complex on the basis of
requirements for atomic bombs. Even before the complex went
on-line, the H-bomb was invented and the entire investment became
obsolete. We took a $2.5 billion bath."2
Nonetheless, the plants were operated at high production rates until
about 1964, when the military SWU demand declined and commercial
demand was not forthcoming to replace it.3 Accordingly, power
levels were cut back sharply and have only begun to be restored
during the 1970's to satisfy anticipated commercial requirements.4
The problem of making the best economic use of this excess enrichment
capacity is the fundamental issue confronted by the Hatch-Levin
model.
The authors begin by stating the AEC's motivation for developing
this computer model;
"The basic objective of the long range planning studies is
the development of a detailed, logical operating plan for
producing the enriched-uranium requirements at minimum cost," 5
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which is obviously desirable since "the ultimate purpose of all this
is to provide nuclear electric power at minimum cost." Because the
total costs of the enriched uranium product are the sum of the
enrichment costs of the AEC and feed costs of its customers, the
authors translate the broad goal of cost minimization into the
specific objective of minimizing the present value of the combined
controllable costs of the AEC and its customers for the production of
the enriched uranium requirements. In this context "controllable"
describes those incremental costs which have not yet been incurred,
as distinguished from previously "sunk" costs, including the
construction costs of the existing plants and the acquisition cost of
the already existing AEC enriched uranium stockpile. The authors
point out that this cost minimization objective in no way restricts
AEC pricing policies; no matter how the enriched material is priced
economic efficiency is served by producing the desired output at
minimum cost.
Hatch and Levin characterize their model as an "optimizing
economic model of the enriched-uranium industry," and they adopt the
following general criteria for economic optimization, as stated by
Baumol:
1. Optimal Activity Level: The scale of an activity should, if
possible, be expanded so long as its marginal net yield (taking
into account both benefits and costs) is a positive value; and
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the activity should, therefore, be carried to a point where this
marginal net yield is zero.
2. Relative Activity Level: For optimal results, activities
should, wherever possible, be carried to levels where they yield
the same marginal returns per unit of effort (cost).
As applied to the AEC diffusion complex, the first of these
criteria requires that existing plants be operated such that "the
incremental cost of enriched product in any year is equal to the
discounted cost of product from eventual new diffusion plants."6
This requirement is illustrated in the following example.
Suppose that the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of fuel from a new
diffusion plant in 1985 is $300/kg U, and further suppose that the
applicable discount rate is 5%. Then we can calculate that enriched
fuel should be produced during the year 1978 until the marginal cost
of producing the last unit equals the present value of $300/kg U,
which is:
$300 = $203.05
(1.05)8
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At this point the marginal net yield of the last unit is zero;
assuming rising marginal cost, prior to this unit the marginal yield
was positive and after this unit the net yield will be negative.
Note that if demand is not sufficient to require the
construction of new enrichment plants during the period under study,
then the appropriate value for comparison is not the LRMC of product
from additional plants, but the highest value of incremental cost
occuring during the period of study, discounted from the year of
occurrence. This determines that the optimization study must cover a
sufficient period to insure identification of the year of highest
incremental cost.
The second optimization criterion requires that the AEC choose
the operating tails assay such that "the marginal cost of product due
to feed equals the marginal cost of product due to separative
work."7 Such a choice is illustrated in the following example.
Suppose that we wish to solve the simpler one-period problem of
meeting a product demand P with an existing separative work capacity
S. How should we choose the tails assay? In this instance the
incremental cost of feed is the market price for natural U 3 0 8 as
UF , which we shall call p . The incremental cost of separative
work is the cost of the electricity needed to power the diffusion
cascades, which we shall call p .
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Therefore defining F = units of natural feed supplied
toll enrichment customers
S = separative work units supplied
the AEC
by
by
We can write the cost function as
C(P) = P1 F + P2 S.
Using the ideal cascade equations reproduced on page 18 of essay #1,
we can rewrite F and S as functions of the product mass (P), product
assay (Xp), feed assay (Xf) and tails assay (Xt):
C(P) = P 1 p (X - Xt )
(Xf - Xt)
+ P2 P * (1 - 2Xp) 
- P * (X - X )
(Xf - Xt )
- P *(X p-Xf)
(Xf - Xt)
Because P, Xp, Xf, P1 , and P2 are
n (1-Xp )
(1 - 2Xf) ln I (Xf) 
(1 - 2Xt) n (t ) I
fixed, this cost
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function can be minimized by operating at that tails assay
where dC = 0. Performing this differentiation yields the
dP
transcendental equation:
P 1 ( -l t-n XT
which can be solved iteratively for Xt* Harkening back
to the original formula for the cost function,
C(P) = P1 F + P2 S
we can see that this X* is that tails assay where the
t
marginal cost of product due to feed (dC) equals the
(dF)s
marginal cost of product due to separative work
(dC) . Thus when p 1= $30/lb U3 08 and P2 = $100/SWU, the
(dS)F
optimum one-period operating tails assay is X t = 0.25%. Figure 2
plots the optimal tails assay as a function of SWU price and uranium
price for a number of cases.
In applying these two optimization criteria to the design of an
operating strategy, the basic consideration is that until at least
the early 1980's, AEC SWU capacity exceeds demand, meaning that some
of this excess capacity may be used to preproduce a stockpile of
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enriched uranium for use in meeting demands during the subsequent era
when annual demands outstrip capacity. Carried out wisely, such a
preproduction program offers an economic advantage by delaying the
need for expensive increments to enrichment capacity, albeit it at
the expense of the carrying costs incurred on the AEC inventory of
preproduced fuel.
Therefore, Hatch and Levin use these optimization criteria to
dictate the tradeoffs of: (1) preproduction of fuel in existing
facilities whose incremental costs are solely due to additional
power, vs. later production of fuel in new facilities whose
incremental costs include a capital cost component as well as an
electricity cost component, and (2) preproduction at less costly
lower-power levels vs. later production at higher-power levels at
which power is used less efficiently by the diffusion complex. They
summarize the application of these criteria as follows:
"The discounted incremental cost of product due to both feed
and separative work should be everywhere equal in all years up to
the year of highest incremental cost in the existing plants,
subject to the constraint that production requirements are met in
all years"8.
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In order to apply these criteria, the Hatch-Levin model requires
exogenous forecasts of enriched uranium demand, gaseous diffusion
costs, feed costs, the discount rate, and the rate of technological
change. These forecasts were obtained as follows:
(1) SWU demand--AEC reactor forecasts were used to compute
enrichment demands;
(2) Gaseous Diffusion Plants costs--capital costs were estimated
based on actual AEC construction costs, inflated to the present using
the Engineering News-Record (ENR) Construction and Building Cost
Indexes. Forecasts assumed that construction costs would continue to
escalate at the same rate as they had in the past. Operating costs,
which consist mostly of electric power costs, were assumed to remain
stable because, "power costs have remained essentially constant over
a considerable period of time."
(3) Feed costs--AEC estimates of future prevailing market
prices, rather than AEC acquisition costs, were used to forecast feed
costs.
(4) Discount rate--rates used ranged from 5% - 15%.
(5) Rate of technological change--estimates were made based on
the experienced rate of technical development and the theoretical
limits of the gaseous diffusion technology.
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Using these exogenous forecasts the model proceeds through a
nested hierarchy of iterations that yields a general solution which
satisfies the optimization criteria, exhausts AEC-owned stockpiles in
the last year of the production plan, and requires the construction
of additional separative capacity in the year after the end of the
production plan. Because the input forecasts were subject to a
degree of uncertainty, sensitivity tests were made to analyze the
effects of variations in input assumptions on the operating plan.
4.2 The Results of the Hatch-Levin Model
When this model was used by the AEC during the 1960's to choose
the diffusion operating plan for the next campaign, it produced three
results which are pertinent to our discussion: (1) it selected an
operating tails assay equal to roughly 0.30%, (2) it recommended the
preproduction of a large SWU stockpile, and (3) it mandated a program
of tails recycling. In a broad sense the model's "reasoning" in each
of these three results is as follows:
(1) The operating tails assay is generally simply a function of
the relative price of natural feed and enrichment services, and
during the mid-sixties uranium price forecasts were for $6/lb. U 3 0 
and SWU price forecasts were for $30/SWU. This price ratio called
for an operating tails assay of approximately 0.30%; ex post
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the U 3 Og price was underestimated relative to the SWU price, so
today an optimum tails assay of approximately 0.20% is indicated.
(2) The large electrical demand charges, relative to stockpile
carrying costs, determined that SWU capacity should be used at full
capacity at all times. Because in the early years of a campaign, SWU
capacity exceeded SWU demand, and conversely SWU demand exceeded SWU
capacity in the later years of the production plan, full capacity
operation resulted in the creation of a significant stockpile in the
early years of the production plan which was drawn down to satisfy
demands in later years.
(3) The time profile of buildup of the preproduction stockpile
was not particularly important, as long as it did eventually get
built to satisfy future demands. If anything, there was an economic
incentive for building the stockpile slowly by recycling enrichment
tails from previous operations. Tails recycle consumes lots of
excess SWUs, moderates the rate of the stockpile's increase, and
recovers valuable fuel from what was otherwise waste. The economic
advantage of tails recycle arises from the fact that enrichment tails
are stored as UFb . Therefore, tails are ready to be vaporized
directly in the enrichment cascade, unlike natural uranium which must
be converted to UFb before it is a fit enrichment feedstock. Thus,
subject to demand constraints, tails feedstock has an absolute cost
advantage over natural feedstock equal to the cost of conversion,
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roughly $4.15/kg UFb (1977 $). Based on these sorts of
considerations the Hatch-Levin model recommended an extensive program
of tails recycling over the campaign period.
4.3 The Commercial Nature of the Hatch-Levin Model
The Hatch-Levin model is a comprehensive and sophisticated piece
of operations analysis. Unlike many "economic" computer models, it
rests on a firm foundation of economic principles and resists falling
prey to the use of average costs instead of marginal costs, and
acquisition costs instead of market prices; it is correctly
specified, as far as it goes. At the time of the model's creation it
required the state of the art computer technology available at The
Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Not surprisingly, however, the model's outputs did not yield an
optimal production strategy, due simply to inaccuracies in the input
forecasts. With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see that
demand was overestimated, while uranium prices, diffusion plant costs
(particularly electric power costs), and the discount rates were
underestimated. Ex post, these forecasting errors combined to select
a higher than optimal tails assay and to accumulate a larger than
optimal preproduction stockpile, although these results cannot be
taken as evidence that the model was poorly formulated or improperly
used.
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What is interesting for our purposes is not the input forecasting
errors, but the nature of the model and what it reveals about the
influence of commercial objectives on AEC operations. The
Hatch-Levin model, designed as the AEC's response to the 1964
Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act calling for toll enrichment, is
purely a commercial model, i.e., one built with the sole objective of
cost minimization in mind. This efficient, business-like approach
has certain security objective implications which the model fails to
consider.
The AEC preproduction stockpile has an impact on the perceived
degree of supply assurance. Specifically, a large stockpile
represents both insurance to SWU buyers that enriched fuel will be
available in the event of unforseeable production shortfalls, and a
competitive threat to potential entrants into the enrichment market.
Therefore, the larger the stockpile, the greater the potential for
assuring a supply of enriched fuel and the greater the barriers to
entry into the enrichment market. As a result, it has been argued,
particularly by elements at the State Department, that a large
preproduction stockpile decreases the incentives for foreign nations
to pursue enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder technologies, and
thus reduces the drift towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In the terminology of welfare economics, this argument maintains that
the AEC preproduction stockpile provides an external benefit which
would not be internalized in a competitive market price. Because the
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Hatch-Levin model contemplates the tradeoffs between preproduction,
idle capacity, and the use of varying feedstocks solely in terms of
market prices, it fails to capture this external effect.
The most important instance of this omission arises in the
creation of the tails recycle program. As noted earlier, tails
recycle is favored on economic grounds because it saves on UF6
conversion costs, as tails material is already in the form of UF6.
If, however, we tentatively accept the argument that the
preproduction stockpile provides an external assurance benefit, not
reflected in market prices, we could attempt to capture this benefit
by adding a "security premium" to each kilogram of enriched fuel
added to the preproduction stockpile. It is clear that tails recycle
slows the buildup of the preproduction stockpile, and therefore
provides a smaller potential external benefit than would be derived
if natural feed was used for preproduction purposes. Therefore, the
inclusion of a security premium will tip the scales more in favor of
using natural feed, rather than tails feed, for preproduction
purposes than would be the case if solely market prices were used.
Viewed in this manner, the timing of the tails recycle program is
determined by the tradeoff between the postponement of the UF6
conversion costs associated with natural feed and the reduction in
the size of the preproduction stockpile associated with tails
recycle. To understand how this tradeoff works, consider the
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following example. Suppose that the DOE production plan calls for
recycling 0.3% tails down to the operating tails assay of 0.25%
during the next N years. What is the security premium which we must
be willing to pay in order to render us indifferent to the selection
of tails feed vs. natural feed for the purpose of building the
preproduction stockpile?
We calculate that the preproduction of 1 kilogram of 3% enriched
uranium can proceed by either of two routes:
1 kg U 3% fuel = 6.0 kg U natural U3 Os
+ 6 kg U conversion services
+ 3.8 SWU
OR
1 kg U 3% fuel = 55 kg U 0.3% UFL tails
+ 7.6 SWU
Therefore we may compare the costs and benefits of the following two
production plans--
A. (the current plan) recycle 55 kg U of tails in year 1 and
feed 12 kg U of natural uranium in year N+1;
B. (the alternate plan) feed 12 kg U of natural uranium in year
1 and feed 55 kg U of tails in year N+1.
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In case B, the size of the preproduction stockpile will exceed
the size of the case A preproduction stockpile by 1 kg U of 3% fuel
throughout the years 1, 2,...N, even though both plans require the
same amount of SWUs. Therefore defining the security premium per kg
U of preproduced fuel as P, and the discount rate as r, the net
present value of the additional external benefits of pursuing plan B
rather than plan A are (assuming benefits accrue at year-end)
N
Additional benefits = P t
t=1 (1+r)
The net present value of the additional costs of plan B is simply the
difference in conversion costs as the result of using the 12 kg U of
natural feed in year 1 rather than in year N + 1 (assuming costs
occur at beginning of year):
Additional costs = $4.15 * 12 1 - (1+r) N
Therefore we would be indifferent between the selection of tails
feed vs. natural feed for preproduction purposes at the point where
the additional costs of pursuing plan B equalled the additional
benefits of pursuing plan B, i.e., for that P* such that
tl ( $49.80 1 - (l+r) N
Choosing as representative numbers N = 3 (the length of the current
DOE tails recycling program) and r = 10%, we solve this relationship
to find P* = $5. For assigned values of P< $5, the current operating
plan A, which chooses to recycle tails at the margin, is preferred,
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while for P>$5, natural feed, rather than tails feed, should be used
at the margin (plan B).
In sum, if we value stockpile increments at $1000/kg U
(corresponding roughly to a uranium market price of $40/lb. U3 , a
conversion market price of $4.15/kg U, and a SWU market price of
$100/SWU)9, then the inclusion of a small security premium of $5/kg
U (equal to 0.5% of the value of a stockpiled fuel unit) will offset
the economic advantages of tails recycle.
4.4 Departures from Global Rationality
If the Hatch-Levin model had remained the root of the AEC
production planning through the present, we would have little to add
to the preceding criticism. While the model is clearly commercial in
nature, its decisions are based on an honest attempt at cost
minimization rather than political attempts at the protection or
promotion of domestic commercial interests. Although our point
regarding the neglected security implications of tails recycle is
still valid, there is little to indicate that this program, by
itself, has had serious negative international ramifications. As
such, the continued use of the model for production planning would
lend only slight support to our behavioral hypothesis. Fortunately,
for our purposes, this has not been the case.
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4.4.1 Operating Tails History
One can trace the history of AEC production planning through
years of AEC testimony before the JCAE. During the original 1966
testimony surrounding the establishment of toll enrichment, the AEC
indicated that "we would expect that the plant would operate at a
tails assay equivalent to that set up in the table of enriching
service,"1 0 namely 0.2%. This 0.2% operating assay was confirmed
in the original announcement of a $26/SWU toll enrichment charge in
September, 1967.11 By February, 1971, the rise in the SWU price
had resulted in a revised operating plan subject to which the 0.2%
operating tails assay would slowly rise to 0.25% during the years
1975-1980.12 Presumably this plan was the result of simulations of
the Hatch-Levin model.
This operating plan was subsequently revised to implement the
split tails feed sales (STFS) policy. As recently as October, 1971,
AEC officials explicitly refer to simulations of the Hatch-Levin
model as the key determinant of the operating plan. As of this date
the simulations called for a steady state operating tails assay of
0.25% and the need for additional enrichment capacity in 1982. This
operating plan was modified for split tails by establishing an
operating tails assay of 0.3% and a transactions tails assay of 0.20%
during the years 1972-1974. After 1974 STFS were to have been
completed, the operating and transactions tails assays were to have
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been equalized at 0.25%, and the 0.3% tails generated during STFS
operations were to be recycled during later years of the
campaign. 13
By August, 1973, the AEC was "projecting an operating tails assay
of around 0.3 percent U-235 for its plants for a substantial period
into the future"14 although the then-current costs of feed and
separative work would have indicated a tails assay of 0.26%.15 The
source of this operating plan is not clear from the record, but it
appears to be a definite deviation from the dictates of the
Hatch-Levin analysis. Raising the operating tails assay was a way to
increase preproduction and continue to postpone the need for new
privately owned enrichment capacity until 1982, consistent with
earlier AEC projections.
The inference that the tails assay had become more the captive of
the domestic privatization policy than the outcome of a cost
minimizing strategic calculation is supported by later events.
During the testimony preceding the initiation of the LTFC contracts,
the AEC indicated that "it is estimated that the capacity of the
existing diffusion plants, as improved and uprated, will not be
completely contracted for until about the end of calendar year
1974."16 Specifically, the AEC estimated that it could support 382
GWE of enrichment contracts at a tails assay of roughly 0.30%,
assuming the adoption of plutonium recycle beginning in 1980 as
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indicated in the appendices to the AEC enrichment contracts.1 7 The
AEC recognized, however, that the timing of the increase from 110 GWE
to 382 GWE of enrichment contracts could not be predicted precisely,
so they rewrote the enrichment criteria to permit AEC to enter into
enrichment contracts in excess of the "available capability" of the
diffusion plants, which had been historically defined as the capacity
of the base plant plus the two current capacity expansion programs,
the Cascade Improvement Program (CIP) and the Cascade Uprating
Program (CUP) (See Essay #3 section 3.1.2), operated at the
"economic" tails assay, then defined as 0.3%. The open-endedness of
this posture was emphasized in correspondence between AEC
Commissioner Dixie Lee Ray and the JCAE where she provided her
interpretation under the revised criteria that, "No limitation is
placed on the mode of operation of the plants."18
The removal of this "available capability" restriction permitted
the AEC to enter into contracts which would necessitate operation at
an uneconomically high tails assay if these contracts were eventually
satisfied from AEC diffusion facilities. In fact, AEC anticipated
that any contracts above economically available AEC capacity would be
terminated in favor of a domestic private enricher. Therefore, the
AEC saw this additional flexibility as necessary to avoid a
contracting gap between the time at which AEC capacity was exhausted
and the time when a private enricher began writing contracts, thereby
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smoothing the transition to private enrichment. As summarized by the
GAO,
"AEC...believed that by the end of 1974 industry could be in a
position to assume responsibility for providing any additional
enrichment capability needed and all contracts beyond AEC's
capability would then be consummated between the private enricher
and the customer."19
The logic of these events lends credence to the argument that the
tails assay of 0.3% was selected not on economic grounds, but was the
assay necessary to keep the AEC order books open through the end of
1974, when a private enricher was anticipated.
As described in essay #1, the removal of this restriction did not
succeed in keeping the order books open. The unanticipated rush in
enrichment contracting forced the closing of the books as of June 19,
1974, at which time the AEC had executed or received requests for 364
GWE of enrichment contracts. Given the unexpectedly high contract
load factors, and the limited interest in plutonium recycle, included
by utilities in the LTFC contract appendices,2 0 the contracting
rush guaranteed that the AEC enrichment plants would be operated at a
tails assay of 0.3% or greater, pending contract termination in favor
of a private enricher, if contract demands were to be met.
In sum, the mismanagement of the LTFC contracting process had
turned the problem of choosing an operating plan on its head. Rather
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than selecting an operating assay on economic grounds and then
signing contracts to meet the projected supply, the unanticipated
contracting rush had forced ERDA to select an operating assay which
would produce enough enriched uranium to satisfy projected demands.
The necessity of stylizing the operating plan to the overstated
contract demands became the public basis for ERDA's production
policy. As summarized at the Oak Ridge Enrichment Conferences of
1975 by the ERDA Chief of Operational Planning, "The 0.30% tails
assay is essentially fixed by our contracting policy,"'2 1 rather
than determined by a Hatch-Levin economic calculation. In his
opening remarks at these conferences, the Director of the ERDA
Production Division observed that, "The considerations leading to a
determination of the preproduction stockpile level now must be
different from those originally used in the mid-1960's."
Nevertheless he argued that, "Preproduction is generally accepted as
the proper thing to do. This preproduction stockpile must now
provide inventory for a transition to private operation of new
enrichment plants.n 22 Therefore, he publicly modified the AEC
objective function to read, "The objective of the (AEC) operating
plan is to maximize the preproduction stockpile within identified
assumptions and constraints." (emphasis added).2 2 He continued,
however, to certify the health of the AEC policy of non-interference
in the domestic uranium market by adding, "One of the constraints
imposed is that ERDA will not purchase additional feed."
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This feed constraint served to guarantee the continuation of the
tails recycle program. Slippages in REQ contract deliveries meant
that the AEC natural uranium stockpile was being depleted more
rapidly than had been anticipated. In the absence of dwindling
natural stocks the only source of enrichment feedstocks for
preproduction purposes was 0.3% tails. At Oak Ridge, ERDA indicated
that 0.3% tails would be recycled "in order to maximize the operating
tails assay and thus the production of enriched uranium." 24 This
recycling would be made possible by the reduction in the operating
tails assay "to perhaps as low as 0.25%...(due to the) reduced
demands and the associated reduced feed availability during the
1976-1979 time period."2 5 Despite this temporary reduction in
operating tails. ERDA spokesman made it clear that the long-run
operating tails assay would be at least 0.30%.
During mid-1975, ERDA administered the open season on enrichment
contracts, which reduced ERDA's total contractual commitment to 329
GWE while delaying deliveries under most contracts. Nonetheless,
contract demands, rather than cost minimization, continued to shape
diffusion plant operating plans. In November, 1975 ERDA presented
four alternate operating plans which displayed the possible range of
tails assays required to satisfy contract demands under various
assumptions regarding plutonium recycle and split tails feed sales.
Long-run equilibrium tails assays ranged from 0.29% to 0.37%, and all
plans included tails recycle programs. In the face of these broad
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uncertainties, ERDA did not attempt to define one operating plan.
Rather, ERDA representatives indicated that the formulation of such a
plan would be an ongoing process pending the resolution of these
uncertainties, and reminded customers that, "the final tails assays
will be determined by the requirements in the appendices of your toll
enrichment contracts." 26
By October, 1977 enough of these uncertainties had been resolved
to permit DOE to state,
"we plan to continue to operate our enrichment plants at a tails
assay of 0.25% and eventually customers will have to supply
uranium feed on that same basis. The current 0.20% transaction
tails assay will be continued, however, at least until October 1,
1980."27
This decrease in the tails assay, made possible by the anticipated
Portsmouth centrifuge plant (despite the Presidential ban on
plutonium recycling), was intended to reflect the rapid rise in
uranium market prices during 1974-1975 which rendered an 0.3%
operating tails assay obsolete from a cost minimization viewpoint.
4.4.2 Stockpile Forecasting History
Because the size of the preproduction stockpile is necessarily
determined by the AEC choice of operating tails assays and power
levels, the history of AEC stockpile forecasting has fluctuated
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widely with each change in operating plans. As conceived originally
by the Hatch-Levin analysis, the preproduction stockpile was to be
exhausted by 1982, the year when additional enrichment capacity was
needed. This notion that the preproduction stockpile was being built
only to be drawn down in later years is reflected in the July, 1973
testimony of AEC Commissioner Clarence Larson who indicated that the
AEC operating plan would yield a preproduction stockpile which peaked
at 34 MMSWU in 1978 and was drawn down to zero by 1983. 28
Following the initiation of LTFC contracts, and the subsequent
closing of the order books, AEC policy shifted abruptly to
contemplate the construction of a steady-state preproduction
stockpile, intended to cover a variety of contingencies including
unforseen events that would affect the output of existing plants, and
the need to provide a backstop against possible slippages in
production from prospective new private enrichers. During the heyday
of the Nixon-Ford privatization initiatives, as much as 42 MMSWU of
preproduced uranium was seen as desirable to provide back-up for
commercial enrichers, as embodied in the NFAA of 1975.29 This
portion of the preproduction stockpile would be used to guarantee
that enriched fuel would be available under all circumstances to
those customers who signed contracts with private enrichers. On top
of this commercial backstop function, ERDA contended that there was a
basic commercial reason for maintaining a 90-day working inventory of
preproduced uranium necessary to insure smooth delivery to enrichment
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customers; this minimum reserve stockpile amounted to roughly 8
MMSWU.
Therefore the enrichment privatization policy encouraged the
increase in the long-run operating tails assay from 0.25% to 0.30% as
a means of maximizing preproduction, while indirectly necessitating
this increase to satisfy the artifically inflated demands created by
the LTFC contracting fiasco.
While ERDA was busy planning how to maximize the preproduction
stockpile, events occurred which caused the stockpile forecasts to
grow alarmingly. During 1973, AEC plans forecasted that the
preproduction stockpile would be exhausted by 1983;30 in 1974 the
AEC forecasted that the stockpile would reach a level of roughly 32
MMSWU by 1986;31 in 1975 the AEC again revised its estimate of the
1986 preproduction stockpile up to 45 MMSWU. 32 This growth in the
stockpile was the result of slippage in REQ contract demands, the
LTFC open season, and the extension of the STFS policy.
This growth in stockpile forecasts attracted attention from the
Office of Management and Budget. Budget-conscious program monitors
saw the growing stockpile forecasts as evidence that DOE was
overbuilding enrichment capacity and was wasting tax dollars by
incurring carrying costs on an excessive preproduction stockpile.
136
Just as budgetary pressure was brought to bear during the early
1970's to encourage disposal of the U 3 0 ? stockpile, so OMB
encouraged reductions in the preproduction stockpile by delaying
CIP/CUP and cutting back power levels. As shown in Tables 2 and 3
both the AEC and OMB consistently reduced AEC Production Division
appropriations requests for CIP/CUP investment funding and cascade
power funding during the early 1970's. Many times these reductions
were partially offset by Congressional appropriations in excess of
OMB requests, due chiefly to the efforts of the JCAE which had
historically supported an aggressive preproduction policy.
OMB was not alone in its suspicions about the size of the
preproduction stockpile. Potential private enrichers pointed to a
large preproduction stockpile as evidence of both demand slippages
and prevailing excess enrichment capacity which made enrichment
privatization unacceptably risky without extensive government
guarantees. Further lack of a clear DOE policy detailing the
acquisition and dispersal of the preproduction stockpile has
aggravated existing uncertainties in the uranium and enrichment
markets. Quoting a representative of the French Atomic Energy
Agency,
"...it is now more important for the uranium mining industry to
know what the long-term stockpiling policy of utilities or
governments will be than to know if it is the low or the high
estimate of installed reactor capacity which will actually be
achieved in a given year."33
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Therefore, DOE now has a variety of reasons to try to reduce the
apparent size of the preproduction stockpile. A reduced stockpile
will reduce the budgetary pressure to cut back on appropriations used
to expand the diffusion complex through CIP/CUP, while increasing the
apparent necessity for future enrichment capacity, preferably pri-
vately owned and operated. As a result DOE has been receptive to TVA
requests to cutback power deliveries to the diffusion complex, 34
to delays in the Portsmouth GCP startup schedule, 35 to calls for a
contribution to an international fuel bank, 36 and to negotiations
with the Japanese for the sale of a portion of the preproduction
stockpile.
Similarly the continuation of the tails recycle program may be
viewed as an excellent way to reduce the size of preproduction
stockpile while continuing to operate the diffusion complex at full
capacity. In addition the tails recycle program has become a
necessary complement to the STFS policy. Given DOE's commercial
objective of fostering a stable uranium demand, the department
maintains a policy of no direct purchases in the feed market.
Therefore, as the natural uranium stockpile is depleted by STFS and
enriched fuel preproduction, tails material becomes the only
alternative source of preproduction feed for the cascades.
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4.4.3 The Selection of Policies Based on Standard Operating
Procedures
In sum, this review of the AEC operating history has demonstrated
that, like many comprehensive, rational, decision-making algorithms,
the Hatch-Levin model has been increasingly ignored since its use
during the late 1960's, and has been replaced by a piecemeal
bureaucratic approach to production planning. Despite the changing
prices and market conditions, the Hatch-Levin model has not been
continuously resimulated during the intervening years. Instead it
has lapsed into disuse, and yet its broad results, namely the
creation of a preproduction stockpile and the tails recycle program
live on after it. That these results have been institutionalized is
a natural implication of the assumption of bounded rationality.
Individuals tend to accept the broad policy prescriptions of the
early Hatch-Levin simulations without recalling their precise origins
or the assumptions that lay behind them.
Today many of the original justifications for the preproduction
stockpile and tails recycle program have vanished. The broad
slippages in demand have postponed the need for aggressive capacity
expansion and subsequent maximum use of this expanded capacity for
preproduction purposes, yet only recently has DOE shown indications
of responding to this changing environment by cutting back on
preproduction plans. Similarly, the current DOE natural uranium
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stockpile has already been fully converted to UF6, 37 thereby
eliminating the economic rationale that tails recycle saves on
conversion costs, and yet a substantial tails recycle program is
currently ongoing.
This review of operating policies reveals that these policies are
less the result of a grand economic plan than the accumulation of a
sequence of feedback-react responses by the AEC to a variety of
pressures. Operating assays, stockpile sizes and feed loading
patterns, were chosen to satisfy the disparate demands of enrichment
privatization, uranium industry protection and a reduced federal
budget, rather than the original economic objective of cost
minimization. Because the size of AEC stockpiles of natural and
enriched uranium are presumably measurable quantities, 38 these
stockpiles have been used by external agents as indicators of AEC
performance. Much as a utility's rate of return is a critical
variable which is monitored by a regulatory commission, so the
magnitude of the AEC stocks has become the focus of external
attention in assessing AEC performance. Therefore the AEC has been
placed in a satisficing posture of trying to keep the preproduction
and U3 08 stockpiles within acceptable limits while trying to promote
uranium industry protection (through STFS, advance feed deliveries,
tails recycle and a policy of no feed purchases) and
142
enrichment privatization (by providing a back-stop preproduction
stockpile).
4.5 Summary
We conclude that our investigation into the AEC's SWU production
planning process yields evidence favorable to our central
proposition. Our research into the Hatch-Levin model has
demonstrated that the roots of the AEC's toll enrichment production
strategy lie solely in the commercial objective of cost
minimization. Furthermore, we have shown that the single-minded
pursuit of cost minimization, where market prices are used as proxies
for operating costs, may not yield a production plan which
incorporates security objectives; our sample tails recycle
calculation has demonstrated how the inclusion of a vanishingly small
stockpile security premium in the AEC's calculations could
significantly alter the AEC's operating plan. Finally we have
documented how the broad policy prescriptions of the Hatch-Levin
model, such as tails recycle and a large preproduction stockpiling
program, have become institutionalized as part of the AEC's standard
operating procedures. As a result these programs continue to exist
despite the disappearance, or weakening, of their economic
Justifications. This in turn leads to a situation where AEC
enrichment policies are chosen more in response to short-term
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external pressures than the guidelines set down by strategic long-run
planning.
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5.0 SWU PRICING AND CONTRACTING
This section of the essay focuses on the AEC's enrichment pricing
policies and their interaction with the changeover from requirements
(REQ) to long-term fixed commitments (LTFC) enrichment contracts.
The management of this changeover process has been described in
detail in essay #1. We shall begin by providing a narrative history
of the AEC's toll enrichment pricing policies which shall explain in
some detail the evolution of the current procedure for pricing SWUs
sold under REQ and LTFC contracts, as well as the proposed fair value
pricing scheme. Then we shall return to evaluate these policies, and
describe their interaction with the changeover to LTFC contracts, in
light of our behavioral hypothesis. This research shall lend further
evidence to the assertion that the AEC has been motivated primarily
by commercial objectives in its pricing and contracting policies.
5.1 A Narrative History of AEC Toll Enrichment Pricing
5.1.1. The 1966 Criteria: Cost-Recovery REQ Pricing
The history of toll enrichment prices is documented in Table 4.
The original REQ toll enrichment prices were established on the basis
of the 1966 Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria promulgated by the
AEC pursuant to the 1964 Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which
required that the charges for enrichment services shall be
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TABLE 4
TOLL ENRICHMENT PRICING HISTORY
Effective
Date REQ. Price ($/SWU) LTFC Price ($/SWU)
07-01-62 $30.00/SWU 
-
01-01-68 26.00 
-
02-02-71 28.70 
-
11-14-71 32.00 
-
08-14-73 38.50 36.00
01-01-74 38.90 36.40
07-01-74 39.30 36.80
12-18-74 47.27 42.10
01-01-75 47.80 42.95
07-01-75 48.80 43.85
08-20-75 
- 53.35
12-18-75 59.80 
-
01-01-76 60.95 
-
04-27-76 
- 59.05
08-25-76 65.83 
-
10-01-76 
- 61.30
01-27-77 69.75 
-
07-01-77 67.58 
-
11-29-77 
- 74.85
03-29-78 76.82 
-
07-01-78 83.15
Source: (23), pg. 6.
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"nondiscriminatory" and shall "provide reasonable compensation to the
Government". The Criteria proceeded to add that, "AEC's charge for
enriching services will be established on a basis that will assure
the recovery of appropriate Government costs projected over a
reasonable period of time."3 9 The Criteria specified that the AEC
should seek to establish an average charge over this time period
which should be kept "as stable as possible." The criteria
explicitly recognized the possibility of preproduction stockpiling
and indicated that "interest on the separative work costs of any such
preproduced inventories" would be included in the SWU price.
The AEC implemented these criteria by posting a $26/SWU toll
enrichment price as of September 21, 1967.4 0 This price equaled
the projected average cost of sales of separative work for fiscal
years 1966-1975, as calculated in Table 5. The important points to
note about the Table 5 calculation are:
1. The 5% discount rate was based on the average rates on U.S.
Treasury interest-bearing debt;
2. As specified by the criteria, depreciation was determined on
the historical cost of investment in plant which is actually
used, and excludes costs properly allocable to plant in
standby and excess capacity resulting from military
procurement policies;
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TABLE 5
PROJECTED AVERAGE COST OF SALES OF
SEPARATIVE WORK FY 1966-1975 ($/SWU)
1. Direct and indirect costs of operating
the gaseous diffusion plants (primarily
power) $13.90
2. Depreciation 3.65
3. Interest at 5% on plant and working capital 2.93
4. Other costs 0.87
5. Interest at 5% on preproduction 1.15
6. Total of (1)-(15) 22.50
7. 15% contingency 3.50
8. Total average cost $26.00
Source: (28), pg. 108.
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3. SWU demand was calculated on an operating plan which assumed
an 0.2% operating assay over the 10-year period;
4. The 15% contingency, which amounted to using a risk-adjusted
discount rate of 7.5% rather than the risk-free Government
borrowing rate of 5%, was intended to allow for
unpredictable uncertainties such as cost inflation;
5. "The AEC noted that for this purpose a 7.5 percent rate of
return could be considered as a possible composite cost of
money from debt and equity sources associated with a
privately financed enrichment enterprise, including an
assessment of the business risks associated with such an
enterprise. The possibility of future uranium enrichment
operations being conducted in the private sector of the
economy is currently under study." 41
In order to guarantee enrichment customers an upper bound on
enrichment prices, the criteria specified that toll enrichment prices
would be constrained by an escalating price ceiling. In calculating
the ceiling, 1/3 of the 1965 ceiling price of $30/SWU was fixed to
provide for recovery of investment in the diffusion plants, while the
remaining 2/3 was escalated to cover variable costs; the labor
portion ($5) was escalated in line with the six-month moving average
hourly wage of production workers in the Chemical and Allied Products
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Subdivision of Manufacturing Industries, while the energy portion
($15) escalated according to the six-month moving average cost per
kilowatt-hour of electric energy used in all AEC diffusion facilities.
5.1.2 Commercial REQ Pricing
Unfortunately, the desired price stability did not come to pass,
and the AEC reacted to rising costs and the Nixon privatization
initiatives by raising the toll enrichment price to $28.70/SWU during
1971. This price increase represented an entirely new "commercial
basis" for enrichment pricing, and the AEC revised the criteria
accordingly. The AEC indicated that the revised criteria were
consistent with President Nixon's 1969 announcement that the AEC "is
to operate its uranium enrichment facilities in a manner which
approaches more closely a commercial enterprise"; the criteria
implemented this decision by establishing a price which would "best
meet the criteria of comparability to a commercial operator", because
the price would equal "the estimated cost of separative work from a
new enriching plant utilizing advanced technology and designed and
operated for the primary purpose of meeting civilian nuclear power
requirements." 42 The assumptions used to calculate this
"commercial" price are listed in Table 6.
The important facts to be noted about the $28.70/SWU price and
the revised commercial criteria are:
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TABLE 6
ASSUMPTIONS USED AS BASIS FOR
COMMERCIAL ENRICHMENT CHARGE OF $28.70/SWU
Plant: A new gaseous diffusion plant,
constructed at a separate site and
incorporating technology anticipated to
be available in 1975.
Capacity: 8.75 MMSWU
Investment: $880 million (1970 dollars)
Power Usage: 2400 MWE
Power Cost: 4.5 mills/KWH
Operation & Maintenance (excluding power), R&D and
Process Support: $16 million/yr.
Financial:
Debt/Equity Ratio: 50/50
After-tax Return on Equity: 12%
Interest Rate on Debt: 7%
Amortization Period: 25 years
Source: (28) pp. 3-4.
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1. Rather than basing prices on the recovery of
backwards-looking historical costs, the commercial criteria
contemplate the forward-looking construction of a
hypothetical new plant;
2. The commercial pricing criteria retained the escalating
$30/SWU price ceiling;
3. The commercial criteria adopted private, rather than
Government, discount rates, which include a return to equity;
4. The commercial criteria indicated that the AEC would
periodically review the SWU price to keep it in line with
updated forecasts of investment costs and discount rates,
rather than attempting to maintain a constant price over a
ten-year campaign period.
5.1.3 A Return to Cost-Recovery REQ Pricing and a Change in
Campaigns
These commercial criteria were only in effect for a few months.
Their establishment drew sharp criticism both from dissenting AEC
Commissioner James Ramey and the members of the JCAE who argued that
the only justification for the commercial criteria was "to create a
higher profit image and thereby facilitate transfer of the gaseous
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diffusion plants to private ownership", 43 and that it was likely
to fail in this attempt because "(given current circumstances) nobody
in his right mind would touch these diffusion plants by way of
purchase with a 10-foot pole." 44
Congressional disapproval of the commercial criteria resulted in
the passage of an Omnibus Bill which provided that the SWU price
should be established "on the basis of assuring recovery of
appropriate Government costs for work done in existing Government
plants." 45 Consistent with this legislative mandate the AEC
revised the criteria to return to the original cost-recovery criteria
established in 1966, except that the AEC chose to implement these
criteria by redefining the 10-year campaign period to be 1971-1980
and by estimating SWU demands under the assumption that plutonium
recycle would begin in 1974; the 15% contingency, the 5% discount
rate, and the use of uninflated cost forecasts were retained from the
original $26/SWU calculation. Using those new assumptions the AEC
established a price of $32/SWU in November, 1971. Although the
operating plan was revised during 1971 to reflect a long-term
operating tails assay of 0.25% as well as the split tails policy, the
$32 price remained unchanged.46
5.1.4 The Initiation of LTFC Pricing and the Creation of an
REQ-LTFC Price Differential
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Once again the desired price stability could not be maintained
due to unanticipated increases in electric power costs. In August
1973, concurrent with the initiation of LTFC contracting, the AEC
once again increased the SWU price. Because the criteria remained
unchanged, the cost-recovery calculation was basically an updated
version of the 1971 calculation--the 1971-1980 campaign period and
the 15% contingency remained unchanged--with the following exceptions:
1. The discount rate was increased to 5.5%;
2. Natural uranium sold by the AEC as a result of STFS was
included as an AEC cost, and evaluated at projected market
value;
3. Enrichment prices were automatically inflated at the rate of
1% every six months beginning January, 1974;
4. REQ contract sales were priced at $2.50 higher than LTFC
sales to compensate AEC for the additional risks associated
with greater demand uncertainties in the case of REQ
contracts rather than LTFC contracts; 47
5. The price ceiling was eliminated for LTFC contracts because,
after the declassification and annual publication of AEC
diffusion costs and the direct inclusion of cost-recovery
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language into the 1954 Act by the Omnibus Bill of 1970, the
purpose of the ceiling no longer applied; the price ceiling
was retained for REQ customers as it was explicitly written
into their contracts;
6. Unlike increases in the REQ SWU price, which became
effective 180 days after publication in the Federal
Register, LTFC prices could be changed with no advance
notice simply by Federal Register publication. "In
justifying this change, AEC stated that it was not ordinary
commercial practice to give lengthy notice for price
increases." 48 In sum, these new calculations yielded a
SWU price of $36/SWU for LTFC customers and $38.50/SWU for
REQ customers.
5.1.5. Further Price Increases and the Inclusion of Additional
Costs
Even though the inclusion of the 2% annual escalation factor had
laid to rest the myth of stable campaign prices, this scheme alone
could not keep pace with rising costs. Therefore, in December, 1974
the AEC raised the prices to $42.10/SWU for LTFC sales and $47.80/SWU
for REQ sales. These increases were based on the same 1971-1980 cost
recovery calculation with the following exceptions:
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1. The discount rate was increased once again to 6%;
2. The automatic escalator was raised to 2% every six months;
3. Costs of gas centrifuge R&D were included in AEC costs;
4. LTFC prices were further reduced by $2.15 from REQ prices to
reflect interest on advance payments received from LTFC
customers.
Once again, these updated prices failed to keep pace with rising
costs and during late 1975 prices were increased to $53.35/SWU for
LTFC sales and $60.95/SWU for REQ sales. These prices were based on
calculations identical to prior cost-recovery calculations, as were
the subsequent price increases during 1976 and 1977 detailed in Table
4. The only changes of any significance over the period were an
increase in the discount rate to 6.5%, the inclusion of a credit for
feed recovered by tails recycle, and the abandonment of the automatic
escalation provisions in favor of updating the SWU prices every six
months.
5.1.6 Fair Value Pricing
While the official SWU pricing procedure had reached some degree
of consistency during the years 1975-1977, ERDA was proposing a
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dramatic change in the enrichment criteria which would substitute
fair value pricing for cost recovery pricing of LTFC sales. The
proposed fair value price would modify the cost recovery pricing
formula to include a risk-adjusted, private discount rate, an
allowance for corporate income taxes, and "other costs typical of
private operation." 49 ERDA's specific assumptions used in
determining a June, 1975 fair value price of $76/SWU are documented
in Table 7.
The analysis lying behind these assumptions was as follows: 50
1. The 12% discount rate had two components: a 10% factor
representing the average real before-tax rate of return on
private investment, as given by OMB, and a 2% ERDA risk
adjustment intended to reflect the "above-average risk
associated with uranium enrichment";
2. The 50/50 debt-equity ratio was chosen as reasonably
representative of the financing ratios in the electric
utility industry;
3. The 15% equity cost of capital was based on Federal Power
Commission estimates that a 15% return was needed to attract
capital to public utilities;
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TABLE 7
ASSUMPTIONS USED IN DETERMINING $76/SWU FAIR VALUE PRICE
1. Discount rate: 12%
2. Debt-equity ratio: 50/50*
3. Interest rate on debt: 8.3%*
4. Return on equity: 15%*
5. Historical cost amortization period: 16 years
6. New enrichment technology R&D costs:
7. State & local taxes, and insurance:
$25 million/year
1% of gross investment
8. Working inventory of preproduced uranium: 90 days
* for Federal income tax calculation purposes only.
Source: (18) pp. 457-466.
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4. The 8.3% debt cost of capital corresponded to an average
interest rate on "certain highly rated bonds" during the
years 1970-1974;
5. The allocation of 1% of gross investment for state and local
taxes and insurance was estimated by determining the amount
paid for these items by two of ERDA's diffusion plant power
suppliers-- Ohio Valley Electric Corporation and Electric
Energy, Incorporated;
6. The 90-day working inventory of preproduced enriched uranium
was based on ERDA calculations presented by Kiser at the
1975 Oak Ridge Enrichment Conferences (25); unlike the ERDA
cost recovery scheme which recovers only the interest on the
separative work costs of preproduction, the fair value price
would include the interest on the natural uranium contained
in this working inventory.
A comparison of ERDA's $53/SWU cost recovery price and the
proposed $76/SWU fair value price is given in Table 8. The use of a
higher discount rate and the inclusion of Federal income taxes
account for virtually all of the $23/SWU net difference.
The main point that needs to be made about this fair value price
is that it was not intended to represent a commercial charge for
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TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF $53/SWU COST RECOVERY
CHARGE AND $76/SWU FAIR VALUE CHARGE
1. ERDA cost recovery price
2. Less 15% contingency
3. Difference due to discounting at
12% rather than 6.5%
4. Federal income tax
5. Other taxes and insurance
6. U3 0 contained in 90-day
preproduction working inventory
7. Laser enrichment R&D
TOTAL
$53.35/SWU
6.96
$416.39
9.69*
12.32
2.15
3.36
2.09
$76.00/SWU
* does not include effect of difference in discount rates in
items 4-7; total difference including these items is $14.17.
Source: (18) pp. 460-462.
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enriching services, unlike the AEC's commercial charge of $28.70/SWU
established during the latter half of 1970. The fair value price did
include insurance costs, income taxes, and a higher discount rate,
but continued to compute depreciation based on the historical
acquisition cost of the gaseous diffusion plants, and did not include
a provision for return on equity. Therefore, the GAO review of
ERDA's fair value proposal concluded that,
"ERDA's proposed ($76) charge is about midway between its
existing cost recovery price of $53 an SWU for
fixed-commitment contracts and the estimated initial (UEA)
commercial price of $100 an SWU." 51
ERDA stated that the purpose of the fair value legislation was to
"eliminate or reduce the difference between the Government's
charge for enriching services and those of potential domestic
private enrichers...(thereby removing) any barriers that may
prevent utilities from entering into enrichment contracts with
private industry...and end an unjustifiable subsidy to both
foreign and domestic customers." 52
Furthermore, ERDA added that if the $76 charge was not high enough to
encourage utilities to contract with domestic private enrichers, "it
planned to add an amount to the fair value charge to meet this
objective." 53
The fair value legislation has failed to receive Congressional
approval to date. Throughout the intervening three years the fair
value price computation has continued to be updated to reflect rising
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costs. The fair value price would have been approximately $90/SWU as
of May, 1976 and would have risen to $100/SWU by October, 1977. 54
5.1.7 The Redefinition of the Cost-Recovery Campaign Period
Despite the disapproval of the fair value legislation, ERDA
substantially modified its conventions for pricing SWUs within the
confines of the cost-recovery mandate. In September, 1977, ERDA
announced that it was changing the definition of its campaign period
from 1971-1980 to 1976-1986, in mid-campaign. This change of time
horizons and subsequent recomputation was designed to account for the
fact that incremental investment in improving and uprating the
diffusion barriers, as well as the Portsmouth add-on, planned for the
early 1980's, would not be captured during the 1971-1980 campaign and
would, therefore, result in a sudden surge in SWU prices during the
subsequent campaign.
The effect of this campaign shift was partially blunted by a
change in DOE's depreciation method. During all previous
cost-recovery calculations the gaseous diffusion base plant was
depreciated on a 30-year straight-line basis from 1958-1988, however,
because the recent investments in CIP/CUP will not be economically
depreciated by 1988, the depreciation schedule was changed to
depreciate the entire diffusion complex (the undepreciated portion of
the base plant plus CIP/CUP) to the year 2000. The Portsmouth
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centrifuge plant will be amortized over 25 years, once plant
production begins, and capital expenditures for centrifuge R&D are
amortized to the end of 1988.
The net effect of the campaign shift, after allowing for the
offsetting effect of stretching out the depreciation schedule on the
original base plan, was to increase applicable costs by about
10%.55 In addition to these two changes, DOE included $50 million
of annual laser enrichment research and development costs for
recovery in the SWU price.
The outcome of these changes in the pricing procedure was the
establishment of a price of $74.85/SWU for LTFC sales and a price of
$83.15/SWU for REQ sales. The components of these enrichment charges
are summarized in Table 9. The LTFC price went into effect during
November, 1977, while the REQ price did not go into effect until
March, 1978, and even then the full $83/SWU price was not realized
because it exceeded the prevailing $77/SWU ceiling charge.
5.2 Evaluation of the AEC Pricing Policies
Having described the AEC's enrichment pricing procedures, what
generalizations may be drawn about these policies, and how do they
relate to our behavioral hypothesis? Our evaluation of the AEC
163
TABLE 9
COMPONENTS OF $74.85/$83.15 CHARGE
COMPONENT
Power
Other diffusion operating
Diffusion capital projects (CIP/CUP)
Centrifuge R&D
Base plant and working capital
Split tails feed sales
Interest on separative work costs of
preproduction
Laser R&D
Portsmouth add-on costs
Contingency @ 15%
CHARGE($/SWU)
34.94
5.65
6.18
3.80
3.25
1.80
6.51
2.05
2.67
66.85
10.03
76.88
76.90
6.25
83.15*
(2.05)
74.85
Rounded to
REQ contracts risk surcharge
REQ price
LTFC contracts
Advance payment credit
LTFC price
* Ceiling charge during first 6 months of 1978 is $76.82.
Source: DOE pricing representatives
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pricing policies shall focus on three general results that come out
of the first decade of toll enrichment pricing experience:
(1) the instability of SWU prices and SWU pricing conventions,
(2) the underpricing of SWUs, and
(3) the differential pricing of SWUs,
and seek to show how these results are consistent with our
proposition.
5.2.1 Instability in Prices and Conventions
The preceding chronological narrative of AEC enrichment pricing
shows quite clearly that the AEC was singularly unsuccessful in
maintaining a stable current dollar price for enrichment services
over any ten year campaign period. Levelized pricing was originally
conceived as a means of dealing with the Government's peculiar
situation of abundant excess capacity without discouraging utilities
from pursuing nuclear reactor installations. Because of the scale
economies in gaseous diffusion facilities, actual production costs
were expected to decline over the years of a campaign as excess
capacity came into use. Rather than charging utilities for the
actual cost of production during each year, for fear of discouraging
nuclear power growth during the early campaign years due to higher
prices, the AEC chose to establish a price based on average campaign
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production costs which would understate forecasted costs during the
early campaign years and overstate forecasted costs during later
campaign years. 56 Clearly this levelized campaign pricing
strategy is consistent with our behavioral hypothesis, because it
encouraged the growth of domestic and international nuclear power by
reducing toll enrichment prices during the early years of the
campaign and providing the stable basis for a long-term utility
commitment to nuclear electric generation.
Rising costs and rising political privatization concerns
destroyed the AEC's attempts at stable pricing. Beginning with the
announcement of the commercial criteria in mid-1970, SWU prices have
risen steadily and dramatically; starting with the announcement of
the $32/SWU price in 1971, announced REQ prices have first closely
tracked then exceeded the escalating price ceiling, as shown in Table
10. Announcement is defined as the date when the proposed price
increase is submitted to the JCAE for review. Due to the 45-day JCAE
review period and the 180-day waiting period after Federal Register
publication, the effective date of the price increase will be some
seven months after the announcement date. Because the announced
prices have paralleled or exceeded the REQ ceiling, the effect has
been to effectively peg REQ prices to the REQ ceiling price
throughout the mid-1970s, as shown in Table 11.
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TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF ANNOUNCED REQ PRICE WITH
ESCALATING PRICE CEILING
ANNOUNCED 1
REQ PRICE ($/SWU)
$26.00
$28.70
$32.00
$38.50
$47.80
$60.95
$69.80
$83.15
REQ PRICE
CEILING ($/SWU)
$30.70
$32.16
$32.91
$39.12
$40.83
$52.34
$65.06
$67.58
1 "Announcement" is defined as the date when the proposed price
increase is submitted to the JCAE for review. Due to the 45-day
JCAE review period and the 180-day waiting period after Federal
Register Publication, the effective date of the price increase
will be some 7 months after the announcement date.
Source: (23), pg.
(29), pp.
(20), pg.
(10), pg.
6
60-62,
360
901
167
DATE
11/29/67
06/10/70
12/21/70
02/08/73
06/14/74
06/20/75
06/22/76
09/29/77
TABLE 11
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE REQ PRICE WITH
ESCALATING REQ PRICE CEILING
DATE
01/01/69
02/02/71
09/06/71
08/14/73
01/01/74
07/01/74
12/18/74
01/01/75
07/01/75
12/18/75
01/01/76
08/25/76
01/27/77
07/01/77
01/01/78
03/29/78
ANNOUNCED
REQ PRICE ($/SWU)
$26.00
28.70
32.00
38.50
38.90
39.30
47.27
47.80
48.80
59.80*
60.95
65.83*
69.75*
67.58*
69.80
76.82*
REQ PRICE
CEILING ($/SWU)
$30.83
34.07
36.72
40.59
40.83
47.27
47.27
52.34
59.80
59.80
65.06
65.83
69.75
67.58
76.82
76.82
* denotes effective price = ceiling price
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Source: (23), pg. 6.
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The lessons of these price data are difficult to interpret. At
one level the rising prices are simply a reflection of rising AEC
costs, including changes in the Government interest rate, and the
inclusion of additional unanticipated AEC costs (such as STFS costs
and R&D costs) into the cost recovery formula as was appropriate. At
another level this explanation is too unsophisticated,because it
fails to explain such maJor changes in AEC pricing procedures as the
two-time redefinition of the campaign time horizon, the introduction
of an automatic escalator, the levying of a risk surcharge on REQ
sales, the adoption of an advance payment credit for LTFC sales, the
changeover in depreciation schedules, the elimination of the LTFC
price ceiling, the reduction in advance notice for LTFC price
changes, the short-lived experiment with commercial criteria, and the
fair value pricing proposal.
Each of these actual, or suggested, changes has either increased
the SWU prices or opened the way for later increases in SWU prices.
The redefinition of the campaign duration, the introduction of an
automatic escalator, and the creation of an REQ surcharge are
consistent with the proposition that the AEC sought to pin REQ prices
at the legal upper limit in order to prepare the international market
for the prices that would be charged by a domestic private enricher,
thereby reducing the barriers to private entry into the SWU market,
as well as encouraging REQ customers to convert to LTFC contracts.
As will be described in more detail later, the encouragement of
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conversion to LTFC contracts is also consistent with the enrichment
privatization policy.
Of course the campaign redefiniton and the automatic escalator
also brought rising prices for LTFC customers. As before, this trend
towards increasing the SWU price is consistent with our behavioral
hypothesis because it helps to eliminate the utility preference for
Government- supplied, rather than private, enrichment services,
solely on price grounds. In addition, the adoption of an advance
payment credit and the recent changeover in the base plant
depreciation schedules reinforce the differential pricing policy by
helping to keep LTFC prices lower than REQ prices.
The reduction in advance notice for LTFC price changes is also
consistent with the privatization policy, because it is intended to
conform to commercial standards of doing business. The AEC's defense
of this change makes this point quite clearly (see section 5.1.4).
Similarly the elimination of the price ceiling for LTFC sales may
be seen as a tactical move in the enrichment privatization strategy,
because it clears the way for subsequent Congressional passage of
some variant of commercial or fair value pricing for LTFC SWUs
without recourse for the customer. Presumably if the differential
pricing policy had been successful in encouraging all REQ customers
to convert to LTFC contracts, whereby the REQ customer gave up his
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ceiling price protection in return for an initial reduction in
prices, the subsequent transition to fair value pricing for all AEC
r
enrichment segvices would have been greatly simplified.
Many of the preceding attempts to link the instabilities in AEC
SWU prices and procedures with our behavioral hypothesis are highly
speculative. The argument that these changes were a reasonable
response to rising costs offers an equally good explanation of these
events, with two notable exceptions: the adoption of commercial
pricing criteria during the last half of 1970, and the push for fair
value pricing, beginning in 1975. In these two cases, unlike many of
the prior events, the public record clearly shows that the motivation
for the pricing changes was not increased costs, but a political
effort by the AEC to promote domestic enrichment privatization. The
insight into the AEC's motivation in pursuing, or proposing,
commercial and fair value pricing strengthens the plausibility of our
alternative explanation of the other changes in AEC pricing
procedures in light of our behavioral proposition.
The plausibility of our explanation is further augmented when one
examines the AEC's motivation for the changeover from REQ to LTFC
enrichment contracts. The management of the changeover to LTFC
contracts is described in detail in essay #1. The major additional
point that needs to be made here is that the prime motivation for
this changeover was to foster enrichment privatization. In
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announcing the new contract format, AEC Chairman Schlesinger defended
the LTFC contracts by arguing that the AEC needed
"to move toward contracts that are firm and business-like and
(facilitate) reliable planning for supplying enrichment services
on a long-term basis...I believe the improved planning basis will
be of value to industry as it moves into this major production
activity."57
This position was amplified in correspondence with the JCAE wherein
Chairman Schlesinger stated,
"This action (i.e. the initiation of LTFC contracting) by the AEC
is part of a coordinated effort to assist and encourage the
participation by private industry in the supply of enrichment
services, the only portion of the nuclear fuel cycle not yet in
the private sector. (emphasis added)"58
This insight into the role of the privatization policy in the
changeover to LTFC contracting lends added weight to our supposition
that the more subtle changes in the AEC pricing procedure were part
of the AEC's "coordinated effort" to encourage domestic enrichment
privatization referred to by Chairman Schlesinger.
5.2.2 Underpricing of SWUS
The criticism has frequently been made that the AEC cost-recovery
pricing scheme has resulted in a persistent underpricing of SWUs. It
is alleged that this persistent underpricing of SWUs represents a
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subsidy to users of AEC enrichment services and biases the choice of
the operating tails assay downward.59 This criticism has a long
history. As early as 1963, in a discussion of AEC pricing policies
prior to toll enrichment, Mullenbach (16) commented on the "hidden
subsidy (to the private atomic power industry) in the prices charged
by the AEC for fuel.",,6 0 That this policy of subsidization has
persisted during the toll enrichment era is reflected in a 1978 study
by Moore (9) where he asserts,
"There is little argument that the current pricing formula for
enrichment services, which is based on recovery of the
government's costs over a reasonable period of time, understates
economic costs."61
Indeed even the JCAE has long recognized that enrichment services
have long been underpriced. A few months prior to the OPEC oil
embargo of 1973, one long-standing member of the JCAE was moved to
defend the U.S's low cost atomic fuel policy as follows:
"The reason they (i.e.U.S. SWUs) are of such lower price
(compared to alternative fuels) is the fact that there is a
Government policy of making them available at reasonable recovery
costs in order to accelerate the industry and get a source of
fuel which is domestic in nature...(emphasis added)"62
We shall find ourselves in agreement with the assertion that the
AEC pricing procedure has long underpriced SWUs, and we shall seek to
roughly evaluate the extent of the subsidy that this underpricing
entails. In order to more precisely specify the nature of our
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agreement and attempt any subsidy calculations, however, we need to
consider the ungrammatical question, "Underpriced compared to what?"
In order to respond to this question one is required to imagine
an alternative institutional framework, which yields a different
pricing scheme, against which the AEC pricing policy may be
compared. A favorite point of pricing comparison by economists is
marginal social opportunity cost (MSOC), because theoretical welfare
economics demonstrates that if a society prices all of its goods and
services at their respective MSOC (as would occur in a series of
perfectly competitive markets) then the allocation of these outputs
will be pareto optimal.
We argue that a comparison between AEC prices and MSOC is a moot
point (see footnote 79); instead, we shall draw the more realistic
comparison between the price charged by the AEC and that which
presumably would have been charged by a series of alternative forms
of ownership. These comparisons are fundamentally more revealing
because, unlike the creation of a competitive market, they
represented viable institutional alternatives to public ownership of
enrichment facilities during the toll enrichment era. It is
virtually useless to compare AEC toll enrichment prices over the last
15 years with those which would be established by a competitive
enrichment industry, simply because the creation of a competitive
industry was not feasible. Even if a different private corporation
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were to own and operate each of the three gaseous diffusion plants,
the structure of the enrichment would be a highly concentrated
oligopoly rather than a competitive industry. Although much of the
theoretical literature and case study research into the behavior of
oligopolistic markets defies sweeping generalizations, it is safe to
say that there is broad support for the assertion that highly
concentrated oligopolies, such as the aluminum smelting and tin can
industries, display significant deviations from the competitive
pricing standard of MSOC. The conclusion that a workably competitive
enrichment industry was unlikely throughout the first decade of toll
enrichment was shared by the 1969 White House Task Force on Uranium
Enriching Facilities, headed by the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers, Paul McCracken.6 3
Given, therefore that the U.S. government was not in a position
to relinquish control of the enrichment industry to a group of
competitive sellers, what institutional alternatives to public
ownership were plausible, what prices might these alternatives have
yielded, and how would these alternative prices have compared to
those charged by the AEC? Subsequent sections shall compare AEC
prices to:
(1) accounting costs;
(2) the prices that might have been charged by a regulated
monopolist;
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(3) the prices that would have been charged if ERDA's fair value
pricing legislation had been approved;
(4) the prices that were charged by the AEC's foreign
competitors in the enrichment market; and
(5) the prices that would have been charged by a domestic
private enricher upon enactment of the NFAA.
Each of these successive benchmarks will reveal a separate facet of
what observers mean by "underpricing" and its attendant "subsidy."
5.2.2.1 Comparison with Accounting Cost
We have found that, despite the 15% allowance for contingencies,
AEC prices have consistently failed to keep pace with accounting
costs. This failure is the result of a number of influences.
5.2.2.1.1 Lag Factors
First, the AEC REQ SWU pricing procedure is: (1) characterized by
a significant "regulatory lag" between the time that price
calculations are made and the time that these prices take effect; and
(2) is constrained by a backwards-looking escalating price ceiling.
These two factors guarantee that during a period of rapidly inflating
costs, the AEC price structure cannot hope to keep pace with these
costs.
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The regulatory lag results from two legal restrictions. By the
Atomic Energy Act of 1964 the AEC is required to give the JCAE 45
days to review any changes in the SWU price, and by the provisions of
the REQ contracts, any price changes cannot take effect until 180
days after publication in the Federal Register, which succeeds the
JCAE review. Therefore there is roughly a 7 1/2 month lag between
the time that the AEC announces a price change, and the time that
this change goes into effect; this lag is before any allowance for
the time it takes the AEC to prepare and review this price
internally. Allowing for this additional lag means that
approximately one year elapses between the time that the AEC incurs a
cost increase and the time that the price begins to reflect this
additional cost. During the years 1971 - 1977, when the major
component of SWU costs, electric power, was tripling in price, this
one year lag was a major source of downward bias in the SWU price,
when compared to actual costs.
This downward bias was aggravated by the backwards- looking
method for establishing the price ceiling, which provides for
escalating the price ceiling for a prospective six-month period based
on the labor and power cost experience of the previous six-month
period. Obviously this ceiling price will not keep pace with actual
costs during an era of rapid inflation, and will bias the SWU price
downwards when compared to accounting costs in years when the price
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ceiling is binding, e.g. for much of the period 1974 - 1978 (see
Table 11).
5.2.2.1.2 The Use of Uninflated Costs
In addition to these lag factors, which play the dominant role in
explaining the inability of AEC prices to recover costs, there exist
some other systematic tendencies in the AEC pricing procedure which
further bias the SWU price downwards. The AEC has always made its
cost forecasts in constant dollars with no allowance for cost
inflation, as well as other factors.64 Only during the years 1974
and 1975 was an automatic escalator used in attempt to keep SWU
prices in line with inflation, and even these were too modest to be
successful. Therefore AEC prices were always in the process of
trying to "catch up" with inflation, rather than trying to anticipate
it.
5.2.2.1.3 Levelized Pricing
In retrospect the choice of a levelized pricing strategy also
biased the SWU price downwards. As explained in Section 5.4, the
concept of a stable compaign price meant that the AEC would operate
at a deficit in the early years of the campaign and would presumably
reap an offsetting surplus in the later years. Because the AEC had a
habit of changing the campaign horizon in mid-stream, however, the
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original campaigns were never completed, and the offsetting
surplusses were never realized.
Although the use of the accumulated income term as an automatic
self-correcting mechanism offset the downward bias introduced by the
use of uninflated cost projections and the levelized pricing concept,
some ex ante downward bias still remains because the income term is
only an ex post correction which cannot anticipate the need for
further future corrections.
5.2.2.1.4 Demand Overestimation
Third, the AEC revenue forecasts have demonstrated a systematic
tendency to overestimate SWU demands and to underestimate the
slippage in SWU capacity additions, both of which have biased the SWU
price downwards, compared to accounting costs. The tendency of
official government forecasts to overestimate demand is documented in
essay #1. More recently, the use of enrichment contract data as a
source of demand estimates has also yielded unrealistically high
forecasts (see essay #1, section 4.4.2). In either case the result
has been an overestimation in the denominator of the pricing equation
and a resulting downward bias in the SWU price. The magnitude of
this bias is difficult to estimate, because to the extent that
forecasted demand is not realized there will be some downward bias in
the forecasted size of the preproduction stockpile which shall have
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an additional effect on the SWU price. In any event, sensitivity
tests done by the AEC during 1971 have shown that an unanticipated
slippage in demand results in an underestimation of the SWU price,
"principally resulting from additional interest costs on preproduced
inventories."65
Similarly the AEC has demonstrated a systematic tendency to be
overly optimistic about the completion dates of the CIP and CUP
programs. In their original 1969 estimate, the AEC had planned to
complete installation of CIP/CUP by 1978;66 as of 1978 the most
recent estimate of the completion date is 1982.67 Sensitivity
tests reveal that unanticipated slippage in these plant improvements
biases the SWU price downwards,6 8 because the resulting reduction
in the actual amortization costs is more than offset by the decline
in SWU production.
5.2.2.1.5 Cost Underestimation
Fourth, the AEC cost estimates have been systematically too low.
This effect is most prominent in the forecasting of power costs,
where the AEC's standard operating procedure has been to assume a
constant power cost throughout the campaign period. For example,
during the 1970 computation of the $32/SWU price, power costs were
assumed to remain constant at 5.2 mills/kwh, which was the forecasted
average power cost during 1972,69 while during the most recent
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computation of the $83.15/REQ SWU price, power costs were assumed to
remain constant at 16 mills/kwh from 1976-1986. Of course these
simplistic forecasts have proven to be underestimates time and again
which has contributed to the downward bias in the SWU price.
Nevertheless, this standard procedure continues to be pursued; rather
than deal explicitly with the uncertainties of a sophisticated
forecast, the AEC chose to negotiate a predictable environment by
imposing a standard operating procedure and sticking to that
procedure despite its flawed record. This is a simple, but
illuminating, example of the validity of much of the organizational
theory summarized in section 2.0.
Power costs are not the only costs that have been consistently
underestimated. AEC engineering estimates of CIP/CUP investment
costs have been systematically low,7 0 which leads to the
supposition that Portsmouth add-on costs are similarly
underestimated.
5.2.2.1.6 Minor Factors
Lastly, in addition to these cost underestimates there exist a
number of other minor factors which contribute to a downward bias in
the SWU price. Not all of these factors are discussed here because
their impact on the SWU price is small. For the interested reader,
however, Appendix I to essay #2 provides some insights into the
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biases present in the AEC pricing formula's treatment of one such
minor factor--split tails feed sales. Although the impact of this
item on the SWU price is small, the detailed review in Appendix I is
interesting because it reveals how the underpricing spirit which
permeates the AEC pricing procedure has penetrated to the furthest
reaches of the formula's components.
5.2.2.2 Comparison with Regulated Monopolist
One obvious alternative to public ownership of enrichment
facilities is government regulation of a private monopolist enricher,
making enrichment a public utility similar to electric power
utilities and the telephone company. How might the prices
established by a regulated monopolist compare to the toll enrichment
prices levied by the AEC?
The literature of public regulation is filled with studies of
regulatory pricing policies. These policies show some variation over
time and across geographic regions, however, during the decade
1965-1975 regulatory procedures tended to have some common features:
1. prices were based on the recovery of average historical
costs;
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2. prices reflected the utility's weighted average cost of
capital, which included both historical debt costs and a return to
equity capital.
The inclusion of a company's rate of return on equity in the
pricing formula was designed to make utilities "competitive" in
obtaining financing in capital markets. A regulated enricher's
required rate of return on equity would undoubtedly exceed the
government bond rate of 6.5%, due to the risk inherent in the
enrichment industry. Presumably a regulatory determination of a
private enricher's weighted average cost of capital would yield a
result roughly equal to the average rate of return for domestic
electric utilities, currently around 12%.
In each year the price would be determined by applying this 12%
cost of capital to the undepreciated portion the enricher's rate base
and adding in the enricher's operating costs before dividing by the
enricher's total utility SWU sales, as follows:
Base /weighted
SWU average | rate + operating cost
Price cost of base
\capital )
SWU Sales
Using the data used by DOE in its most recent SWU pricing
calculation, and a weighted average cost of capital of 12%, this
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calculation yields a SWU price of roughly $100/SWU as of 1/1/78,
which is 30% higher than the AEC inflated base price of $77
($67before the 15% inflator) as of the same date.71 Therefore,
despite the AEC's 15% inflator which is applied to the base price,
the current AEC price is still roughly 30% lower than the price which
might be generated by a traditional regulatory proceeding. The price
differential arises because although the AEC calculation uses
historical asset book values and average debt costs in its pricing
calculation, similar to the standard regulatory practice, the AEC
does not include the return to equity which is a critical part of the
regulatory process.
5.2.2.3 Comparison with Fair Value Pricing
Another obvious point of comparison is with the proposed AEC fair
value price, which modifies the AEC price formula as explained in
section 5.1.6. A comparison of effective AEC prices and announced
fair value prices is provided in Table 12; obviously the fair value
price exceeds the cost-recovery price. As explained previously, the
AEC price is less than the fair value price because the fair value
price uses a higher discount rate and includes income taxes in its
calculations.
Students of public finance will be aware of the long literature
surrounding the choice of a discount rate, and will recognize the
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TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED FAIR VALUE PRICE WITH
EFFECTIVE LTFC PRICE
AEC LTFC
PRICE
PROPOSED
AEC FAIR
VALUE PRICE
$53.35/SWU
$59.05/SWU
$74.85/SWU
$76/SWU
$90/SWU
$100/SWU
Source: Section 5.1.6 footnotes and SWUCO (23)
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DATE
08/20/75
05/06/76
01/01/78
AEC's use of the average Treasury bond rate as a measure of the
"riskless" interest rate. The traditional justification for using a
risk-free interest rate for discounting government projects has been
that governments are so large, and have so many projects, that they
pool risks better than private corporations; similar to a large
insurance company governments achieve a scale economy in
risk-pooling, as expressed by the law of large numbers, which permits
them to discount at the riskless rate.7 2
Recent developments in capital market theory and empirical
research into the efficient markets hypothesis have challenged the
traditional choice of a risk-free rate. Current financial theory
recognizes two sources of risk associated with any investment
project--(1l) unsystematic risk: that portion of the variance in
project returns which is uncorrelated with general movements in
securities markets, and which can therefore be eliminated by
diversification; and (2) systematic risk: that portion of the
variance which is correlated with stock market fluctuations, and
which cannot be reduced by pooling.7 3 Therefore, modern capital
market theory asserts that a risk-free interest rate is appropriate
for discounting only when the systematic risk associated with the
project is zero.74 Further, because tests of the efficient markets
hypothesis allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the US
securities market is inefficient,7 5 financial theory argues that
private corporations are able to spread unsystematic risks as
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efficiently as the government. Therefore, barring a specific
demonstration of a securities market imperfection, or a convincing
argument for rejecting the discount rate chosen by the free market,
public and private concerns should adopt the same discount rate for
evaluating investment projects.
While we do not pretend to be able to explicitly assess the
degree of systematic risk in the enrichment market, it is plausible
that it is greater than zero if only because electricity demand, and
thus SWU demand, is positively correlated with general economic
conditions, which in turn correlate with stock market movements. It
is presumably on these grounds that ERDA selected a 12% discount rate
for use in the fair value pricing calculation. Because forecasted
future enrichment revenues grow much more rapidly than forecasted
future costs, the effect of using a higher discount rate is to
increase the SWU price, since a higher discount rate will reduce the
denominator of the pricing equation relatively more than the
numerator.
5.2.2.4 Comparison with Foreign Enrichers
Another point of comparison is with the AEC's competition, URENCO
and EURODIF. SWUCO, an international enrichment marketing
information corporation, reports that the approximate current price
for a long-term URENCO contract is $125/SWU, while the corresponding
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price for EURODIF services is $113/SWU;76 these are properly
compared with the AEC LTFC price of $75/SWU.
This comparison is important not just because these foreign
enrichers are competitors of the AEC, but because national
cross-investment and joint public-private participation represented
feasible alternative ownership structures for AEC facilities during
the first decade of toll enrichment. Presumably the foreign
enrichment pricing experience is some reflection of what we could
expect from such institutional alternatives in the U.S.
Very few details of foreign enricher pricing procedures are
available, however, it is likely that foreign SWU prices exceed AEC
prices because:
1. The youth of the foreign plants means that their historical
construction cost closely approximates replacement cost, unlike the
AEC base plant which was built during the 1940's and 1950's.
2. The presence of national cross-investment (in both
consortia) and private participation (in URENCO only) increases the
likelihood of including a return to equity in the pricing calculation.
3. Other terms of EURODIF and URENCO long-term enrichment
contracts differ from the terms of AEC LTFC contracts.77
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5.2.2.5 Comparison with UEA
Another point of comparison is the pricing policy suggested by
UEA in their proposal which formed the basis for the NFAA of 1975.
UEA adopted a forward-looking pricing strategy similar to the pricing
policy used by the AEC in implementing the commercial criteria (see
section 5.1.2) Using the following assumptions (all figures in 1975
$):
(1) capital costs = $3.3 billion for a 9 MMSWU diffusion plant,
to be depreciated over 25 years;
(2) UEA to be financed 85% by debt and 15% by equity;
(3) debt cost of capital = 9%;
(4) after-tax equity cost of capital = 15%;
(5) full recovery of audited operating costs;
UEA calculated an average SWU price of $85/SWU (1975 $) over the
life of the plant, at a time when the average AEC SWU price was
roughly $50/SWU. This average price was calculated by dividing the
total unescalated capital and operating costs over the entire
operating period by the total SWU output at full capacity operation.
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Because of the manner in which the debt was to be serviced, the
actual price would exceed the average price during the first part of
the operating lifetime and would be less than the average price
during the latter part of the 25-year period; the posted price would
range from $106-$60/SWU. The SWU price would be recalculated
periodically to reflect actual audited costs during the previous
period, and adjustments to customers' fees would be made
accordingly.
The components comprising the UEA calculation were as shown in
Table 13. If anything, these estimates appear downward biased.
Comparison with AEC cost indices for power and labor used in the
computation of the REQ price ceiling reveals that these components
alone amounted to about $45/SWU in mid-1975, compared to the 1975 UEA
estimate of less than $35/SWU throughout the 25-year life of the UEA
plant. Due to UEA's cost pass-through pricing approach 100% of these
increased costs would be borne by UEA customers, thereby raising the
average SWU price over $85/SWU. In sum, the UEA average price of
$85/SWU is most likely a lower bound on the SWU price that would have
been established following passage of the NFAA of 1975.
The ballpark size of this price is confirmed by the Electro
Nucleonics (2) feasibility study of gas centrifuge enrichment
facilities, which resulted in the formation of the CENTAR centrifuge
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TABLE 13
UEA AVERAGE SWU PRICE
(1975 $)
$/SWU % of Total Price1
Power 28 33
Operating, Maintenance
& General Costs 7 8
Income Taxes 11 13
Royalties 2 2
Equity Return 12 14
Debt Services 25 29
852
Source: UEA testimony before JCAE on NFAA, April 6, 1976 Slide #9,
(pg. 31A)
1. Figures do not add to 100% due to rounding errors.
2. Range of SWU price = $106 - $60
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consortium in response to the NFAA opportunity. The CENTAR study
calculated an average price by assuming (all figures in late 1974 $)
(1) capital costs of $1.13 billion for the construction of a 3
MMSWU GCP facility, which is to be fully depreciated over a 23-year
plant life;
(2) debt cost of capital = 10%
(3) after-tax equity cost of capital = 15%;
(4) plant financed 25% by equity, 75% by debt;
which results in an average price of $70/SWU (late 1974 $) of which
$43 (61%) represent financing costs and $27 (39%) represents
operating costs. CENTAR's estimate of the UEA price in comparable
late 1974 $ was $79/SWU,78 while the AEC's average price at this
time was approximately $45/SWU.
In sum, the difference between the AEC price and the estimated
private price arises because private enrichers, unlike the AEC,
include income taxes and a competitive return to debt and equity
capital, as well as current enrichment plant replacement costs, in
their pricing calculations.7 9
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5.2.2.6 Underpricing Summary
These price comparisons are summarized in Table 14. All prices
have been put on an even footing by quoting them in 1978 dollars.
The price inflation was based on AEC operating experience. 80 The
clear implication of this table is that the AEC has underpriced its
enrichment services relative to the price that would be yielded by
alternative institutional arrangements--including a regulated
monopoly, fair value pricing, foreign cross-investment, mixed
public-private control, and private ownership. Depending upon which
benchmark you choose to adopt, this underpricing is chiefly the
result of:
1. The AEC's failure to include a return to equity or income
taxes in the cost recovery pricing calculation;
2. The AEC's use of a riskless discount rate rather than a
private discount rate as the cost of capital;
3. The AEC's use of book value investment costs rather than
replacement investment costs;
4. Systematic downward biases in the AEC SWU pricing formula.
193
TABLE 14
PRICE COMPARISON SUMMARY
SOURCE PRICE (as of 1/1/78 in 1978 $)
AEC Inflated Base Price $ 77
AEC Fair Value Price 100
URENCO Price 125
EURODIF Price 113
UEA Price 103
CENTAR Price 91
REGULATORY Price 100
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In sum, Table 14 indicates that the current price subsidy
relative to alternative institutional arrangements is roughly
$35/SWU, or approximately 50% of the AEC's inflated base price.
Because the cost of enrichment services is roughly 25% of the total
cost of nuclear fuel, the removal of this subsidy would only increase
total fuel costs by 10%. While this may make the subsidy look
comparatively small, it would amount to $500 MM during 1978, a
non-negligible absolute amount.
Having gone to great lengths to establish that AEC toll
enrichment services have been underpriced by any measure, we are left
to ask how this result reflects on our behavioral proposition. We
shall argue that the underpricing of SWUs is consistent with the
strategy of subsidizing the international growth of nuclear power
while maintaining the U.S. enrichment monopoly, which was pursued
with great success from 1954-1970. Obviously, persistent
underpricing of enrichment services provides an incentive to
over-order SWUs, to overbuild SWU capacity, and to overuse nuclear
fuel, while discouraging entry into the commercial enrichment market
by foreign suppliers. U.S. guarantees of ample, low priced
enrichment services effectively discouraged a French proposal for an
independent EURATOM enrichment plant during 1957.81 In similar
fashion the first announcement of a toll enrichment SWU price of
$26/SWU in 1967 was received in Europe as an attempt to undersell
prospective foreign entrants into the enrichment industry.82 That
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this European view was not altogether groundless is substantiated by
the price series in Table 4. During the era 1956-1968, the record of
sharply declining prices (32% in current dollars, 47% in constant
dollars 83) presented a substantial barrier to entry.
As the 1970's approached and the push for enrichment
privatization intensified, this declining price trend was sharply
reversed, as the AEC moved towards negotiating and pricing its
enrichment contracts on a more businesslike basis. During the five
years from 1968-1973 REQ prices rose from the low of $26 to $32.
Then with the introduction of LTFC contracts in September, 1973, REQ
prices jumped to $38.50 while the LTFC price was set at $36.00.
Prices continued to increase from this point, as indicated previously.
During this later period, as argued in Section 5.2.1, the major
evidence in favor of our behavioral proposition was not that the AEC
intentionally underpriced SWUs, but that they did everything in their
power to increase the prices of SWUs as rapidly as possible within
the confines of the law. It was not so much the fact of the price
subsidy from 1970-1978 as the unsuccessful struggle of the AEC
against the confines of the cost recovery mandate which we cite in
support of our behavioral model.
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5.2.3 Differential Pricing of SWUs
The third regularity which emerges out of the narrative history
of AEC pricing is that the AEC has priced LTFC SWUs at a discount
from REQ SWUs. As described in section 5.1, this price differential
has two components:
1. The REQ risk surcharge, which is added on to the inflated
base price for REQ sales to reflect "the differences in
risks and costs between the two types of contracts;" 84
2. The LTFC advance payment credit which is deducted from the
inflated base price "to reflect interest (received by the
AEC) on advance payments (made by LTFC contract holders)."
85
This section of the essay shall examine the economic rationale
for these two adjustments to the inflated base price, and then
discuss the implications of the differential pricing strategy for our
central proposition.
5.2.3.1 The REQ Surcharge
As described, the role of the REQ surcharge is to recover from
REQ customers the fixed costs that DOE incurs by consistently
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overplanning for actual REQ demands based on Appendix A forecasts.
There remains a theoretical issue of whether such a surcharge is
appropriate at all. Presumably, slippage is one of the realities
that lie behind the mysterious 15% across-the-board inflator already
built-in to the pricing calculation. The fact that DOE bears the
risk of REQ demand slippage is a direct result of the way the REQ
contracts are written. The REQ contract requires the submission of
SWU demand forecasts on a rolling 5-year basis, for use as a DOE
planning tool, but specifically states that these schedules are not
legally binding. To turn around and penalize REQ customers for
exercising the scheduling flexibility legally available to them is
unfair in the sense that it was not anticipated by the provisions of
the REQ contract. The pricing policy effectively extends the firm-up
period beyond 180 days to include the fixed cost portion of at least
a 5-year firm-up horizon.
This penalty is even more paradoxical in view of some other
facts. First, REQ customers must demonstrate an actual demand
requirement in order to acquire enriched fuel. Therefore, even if
they wanted to, they are legally prohibited from accepting deliveries
in excess of actual demands. Second, LTFC customers have in fact not
been forced to bear the full brunt of slippage risk. DOE has already
administered one open season on LTFC contracts during which LTFC
customers could readjust their delivery schedules with no attendant
termination penalties.
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Further slippage since this first open season has resulted in
DOE's announcement that it shall grant case-by-case contract relief
to overscheduled LTFC SWU customers. While the guidelines for this
contract relief have not been established, it appears that the
penalties for requesting relief will be substantially less than those
written into the LTFC contracts. What these two examples point out
is that while DOE is apparently serious about recovering REQ slippage
costs through the imposition of a surcharge, they have been less than
diligent about forcing LTFC customers to bear the full brunt of
demand slippage.
Third, whatever the slippage in REQ demand, the fact is that DOE
SWU plants operate at full capacity, preproducing an enriched fuel
stockpile. No demand charges or depreciation charges are incurred on
idle cascades. Rather, preproduction carrying costs are included in
the SWU price, making the REQ surcharge a case of double counting,
where the customer pays once for the costs of theoretically idle
capacity and again for the carrying costs on preproduction from that
idle capacity.
In addition to the broader question of the legitimacy of such a
surcharge, there is the practical issue of how such a surcharge is
calculated. Returning to the surcharge formula, and recognizing that
STFS costs are less than 3% of total costs, we see that basically the
surcharge amounts to 9.6% (= 1/12 x 1.15) of the base SWU charge. As
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a digressionary note, the STFS cost term is subtracted from the total
campaign costs "because the REQ customers didn't ask for the STFS
program so DOE feels that it is unfair to penalize them for its
existence;" this presents another insight into the contorted and
conflicting logic underlying the SWU pricing procedure.
The practical problem with the surcharge calculation is that the
factor of 1/12 appears to have no analytical basis, much like the 15%
price inflator discussed earlier.8 6 Some research into enrichment
costs, diffusion power contracts, and REQ delivery data, yields no
firm basis for levying a 9.6% surcharge on REQ customers. The data
are not available to permit a precise calculation of what this
surcharge should be in order to recover DOE's fixed costs, but the
following calculations provide some notion of the magnitude of such a
surcharge.
DOE representatives put the historical average of REQ demand
slippage at 10% of forecasted Appendix A demand. A first cut at an
upper bound estimate would be to charge the percentage of total
campaign costs allocated to forecasted REQ sales, to 90% of the
forecasted REQ sales, yielding a base price of $74/SWU, or
equivalently a surcharge of approximately $7/SWU.
Of course, this first cut is a gross overestimate because it
includes a variety of variable costs which DOE would not incur if REQ
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demand was not forthcoming. Most notable of these variable costs are
electricity energy charges; presumably only electric demand charges
will be incurred on idle cascades. Using estimated 1978 data from
the ERDA Budgetary Authorization Request we find that demand charges
average less than 25% of total power costs, which in turn represent
55% of the base SWU price. Therefore, at least 75% of the power
costs, representing 41% of the total campaign costs, are variable.
Factoring this into our calculation yields an upper bound base price
of $71/SWU, or a surcharge of $4/SWU.
In similar fashion, one can deduct other variable costs
associated with the enrichment plants, further reducing the upper
bound for the surcharge. In general, the base price should equal
100% of fixed costs + 90% of variable costs
allocated to REQ sales allocated to REQ Sales
90% of forecasted REQ Sales
Using 1977 DOE SWU pricing data for the 1977-1986 campaign yields, a
base price of $70, or a surcharge of $3 rather than the current
surcharge of $6.
In conclusion, not only does the theoretical basis for this REQ
surcharge rest on shaky ground, but the surcharge appears to be
overestimated by at least a factor of 2. Testimony before the JCAE
by utility nuclear consultants comes to a similar conclusion.
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Whatever its magnitude, a surcharge calculation based on a percentage
of fixed costs, like that performed above, is more appropriate than
the existing surcharge calculation which is effectively based on
total costs.
5.2.3.2 The Advance Payment Credit
Similarly there is a question about the propriety of the advance
payment credit given to LTFC customers as an offset to the interest
forgone on the prepayments made to secure an AEC LTFC enrichment
contract. In the simplest sense this refund results in an
interest-free loan for utilities. Consider the following possible
sequence of events: a utility holding an LTFC contract is faced with
the prospect of forwarding a substantial prepayment to DOE, so
utility representatives apply to a bank for a loan to cover the
prepayment; the bank agrees to provide the loan at a negotiated rate
of interest; DOE receives the prepayment and over the contract period
credits the interest earned on that prepayment against the SWU price;
effectively, DOE pays the utility's interest on the prepayment loan
to the bank, leaving the utility as the middleman in the transaction.
More subtly, the precise manner in which the interest is credited
implies a series of inter-utility subsidies. In calculating the
interest refund, DOE uses the average prepayment date for all
utilities holding LTFC contracts. Because utilities actually made
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these prepayments at different times, this scheme implies that
utilities making payments later than the average date are being
subsidized by utilities making payments earlier than the average
date; paradoxically, promptness in obtaining a SWU contract is
penalized. The data are not publicly available to permit an
assessment of the size of this subsidy, but it provides another
example of the unintentional subsidies arising out of seemingly
simple DOE conventions.
5.2.3.3 Summary of Differential Pricing
The preceding two sections have argued that while some REQ-LTFC
price differential may be plausible, though certainly not mandatory,
on theoretical grounds, the calculated size of the differential is
certainly suspect. A careful reading of AEC testimony during the
hearings surrounding the establishment of LTFC contracts, as well as
recent confidential conversations with DOE pricing officials, reveals
that enrichment privatization objectives were as important as actual
cost differences in the motivation behind differential pricing.
Just as the privatization objective revealed itself in the
establishment of LTFC contracts, so it was prominent in the creation
of a price differential which created an incentive for REQ customers
to convert to LTFC contracts. The GAO Report on the AEC's proposed
price differential found that,
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"According to AEC the proposed price differential will provide
substantial incentive for holders of requirements contracts to
convert to fixed-commitment contracts...(because) a customer
electing not to convert to a fixed-commitment contract would
increase his annual operating costs by about 0.4 percent." 87
That this incentive was at least worth considering is revealed by the
Statement of Arkansas Power and Light Company, an AEC REQ contract
holder, to the JCAE, wherein Arkansas calculates that the penalty
which they would incur for continuing to hold their REQ contract
would be $15 million during the term of the contract, and that
despite bitter protest about the terms of the LTFC contracts, "it is
probable that (Arkansas) will elect to accept the new terms of the
contract and avoid the $15,000,000 penalty." 88 That most
utilities did not find that this incentive outweighed the additional
risks associated with LTFC contracts is evidenced by the fact that
only one utility chose to convert from an REQ to an LTFC contract.
In the face of this failure to achieve a total conversion to the
sort of long-term contracts deemed necessary for the establishment of
domestic private enricher, the AEC redoubled its efforts by
installing the advance payment credit. Although not part of DOE's
original $36 LTFC pricing scheme, a $2.15 advance payment credit for
LTFC customers was included in the subsequent $42.10/LTFC SWU price
calculation. This additional credit raised the price differential
from 7% of the inflated base charge to 13% of the inflated base
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charge, but was still unsuccessful in encouraging contract
conversion. The reason for this ebb tide of converts was that by the
time that this doubling of the percentage price differential had
taken effect (1/1/75) the LTFC contracts had turned into a utility
nightmare with the utilities pleading for relief from their
strait-jacket delivery schedules and the AEC pondering the details of
its Open Season. 89 This climate convinced REQ contract customers
of the wisdom of not converting to LTFC contracts, despite the
increased price incentive.
5.3 Pricing and Contracting Conclusion
The evidence presented in our analysis of the AEC's pricing and
contracting policies strengthens the support for our central
behavioral proposition. Our description of the instabilities in AEC
prices and procedures provides a classic example of an organization's
attempts to respond to major environmental changes by incremental,
isolated responses determined by the existing details of standard
operating procedures; it also provides an insight into the complex,
confusing, and often contradictory pricing contraption that this
short run feedback-react behavior has created. Nevertheless, through
it all we have found evidence of the common thread that these
procedural changes were founded in a desire to motivate enrichment
privatization within the constrictions imposed by the Congress with
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the cost-recovery mandate which came in response to the AEC's pursuit
of commercial prices.
Similarly our discussion of the systematic underpricing of AEC
SWUs has supported our behavioral hypothesis. Prior to 1970 the AEC
was content to concur with the JCAE in the pursuit of an underpricing
strategy as a means of subsidizing the growth of nuclear power. With
the advent of increased interest in enrichment privatization, the AEC
entered an era of conflict with the JCAE on the subject of enrichment
pricing. The AEC struggled mightily, although with only partial
success, to rapidly increase the price of enrichment services as a
means of attracting private investment into the enrichment sector.
While the AEC spoke of "commercial" prices as a means of reducing
entry barriers and eliminating subsidies, the Chairman of the JCAE
took the viewpoint that through price increases,
"...we are going to pick on one industry (i.e., the nuclear
industry), a new industry that we are trying to get into
being...(by) saying not only should the Government get its cost
back, but it should make a profit on it...Should we make a profit
on sending out Government pamphlets, and giving the weather
service to the airline industry?...Remember, the Government was
not set up to operate at a profit. Most of the departments of
Government I know anything about operate at a loss." 90
Further, we have indicated that the changeover to LTFC contracts
was consistent with the need to pave the way for a private enricher,
as was the differential pricing policy which was as much an incentive
for REQ customers to convert to LTFC contracts as it was a reflection
206
of actual cost differences. Indeed, even the Open Season on LTFC
contracts was structured to "offer an additional incentive for a
customer to seek commitments for his post-1982 enriching services
needs from a private domestic enricher." 91 Specifically the AEC
stood ready to consider termination without charge, including return
of advance payments, for all LTFC customers "who express a desire to
be terminated in order to contract with a domestic private enricher."
92 The AEC noted that such termination would permit the customer
to avoid the necessity of costly advance feed deliveries that would
accompany slippage of AEC LTFC contract demands during the Open
Season.
In short, the AEC's pricing and contracting history is consistent
with our central proposition that AEC actions are guided primarily by
domestic commercial objectives.
In section 6.0 we shall scrutinize this proposition against the
evidence of international political attempts at enrichment
multilateralization.
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6.0 SWU TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
This brief section of the essay documents the influence of the
AEC's commercialization objectives, and the accompanying policies of
domestic industry protection and enrichment privatization, on the two
major U.S. enrichment foreign policy initiatives of the early
1970's. Most of the material in this section is drawn from the
political science research of Wonder (32), and the interested reader
is referred to the Wonder references for further amplification of the
political dimensions of these issues. In the context of this thesis,
Wonder's conclusions will be taken as evidence of the predominant
influence of US commercial objectives in the formulation of US
enrichment foreign policy.
6.1 The 1971 Initiative
The two major initiatives referred to earlier were aimed at
encouraging multilateral international enrichment facilities as a
means of reducing the security risks attending the dispersion of
enrichment technology. The first of these proposals came during
1971. Following on several years of unofficial discussions, the U.S.
formally offered to assist its allies in constructing a multinational
enrichment plant. The U.S. offered access to unclassified
information on gaseous diffusion to all interested foreign parties.
By encouraging the construction of a diffusion plant, the U.S. hoped
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to eliminate the safeguards problems associated with the centrifuge
technology;9 3 because of the economies of scale in a diffusion
plant, its use of a single long cascade, and the enormous power
requirements, it is more difficult to maintain a clandestine
diffusion facility than a secret centrifuge facility. In addition, a
multinational diffusion plant would reduce the number of worldwide
enrichment facilities which would ease the materials accounting
safeguards burden, reduce the number of competitors to the AEC in the
enrichment market, reduce the likelihood of prevailing excess
enrichment capacity, and offer U.S. firms an opportunity to tender
component bids for the construction of diffusion cascades.
Two preliminary meetings were held in Washington during 1971 to
discuss the possiblity of multinational cooperation with potential
foreign enrichers. At these meetings, the U.S. delegation laid down
a set of prospective rules for enrichment technology transfer. These
rules may be summarized as follows:
(1) The U.S. demanded technological protection--The exploratory
offer was limited to unclassified diffusion technology only. Prior
to a final commitment to a multinational project, foreign partners
would not have access to classified technology. Therefore,
prospective partners would simply have to trust the operation of the
"black box" which the AEC was offering for sale, without comparing
its technical merits to the French or British diffusion data. In
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addition, the U.S. attempted to limit the chances of technological
surprise by demanding access to information on all technical
development associated with the multinational plant. Therefore, if
any European technology was incorporated in the multinational plant,
the U.S. would have full access to its progress, thereby insuring a
continuous update on the European centrifuges or the British or
French diffusion technologies.
(2) The U.S. demanded commercial protection--No AEC enrichment
contracts would be terminated to create a market for the new
enricher. Diffusion technology would be sold to the new enricher at
a commercial price. U.S. firms would have an equal opportunity to
tender component bids. There must be no commercial barriers to the
importation of enriched fuel from U.S. enrichment facilities.
(3) The U.S. demanded security protection--Involved foreign
governments were to be responsible for security arrangements, subject
to the approval of the U.S. government. The plant and its product
must be subject to IAEA safeguards. The plant would be limited to
the production of low-enriched uranium.
These three forms of protection represented the U.S. attempt to
reconcile two competing views regarding how the multilateral
initiative should be implemented. The protectionist view, championed
by the AEC and the JCAE, considered the 1971 initiative in terms of
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its impact on U.S. commercial leadership and technological
preeminence. It held that any potential transfer must not be a
subsidized giveaway, but must be a commercial transaction which
provided adequate protection for U.S. commercial interests. The AEC
clung to the Eisenhower view that multilateralization was a less
effective means of dealing with foreign fears than a policy of strong
fuel supply assurances backed by expanded U.S. enrichment capacity.
By contrast the internationalist view, championed by the State
Department, held that the construction of foreign enrichment
facilities was inevitable. Thus, rather than employing
obstructionist tactics to control this development, the correct
response was to actively participate in foreign enrichment ventures
as a means of channeling development away from the less
proliferation-resistant centrifuge technology. 94
As analyzed by Wonder, the protectionist forces dominated the
internationalist forces in the implementation of the
multilateralization strategy. The resulting scheme for technology
transfer was grossly unsatisfactory to the interested foreign parties
and there was no follow-up to the preliminary Washington meetings in
1971.
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6.2 The 1974 Initiative
The environment shifted sharply again following the imposition of
the OPEC oil embargo during late 1973. International energy
cooperation suddenly attracted top priority, in the person of
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and led to a reproposal of
enrichment multilateralization during 1974.94 Unlike the UEA
proposal, which attempted to achieve multilateralization by
attracting foreign equity participation in a private domestic
enrichment plant, Kissinger reproposed the notion of international
technology transfer. Contrary to the 1971 initiative, the Kissinger
proposal offered to examine the sharing of U.S. diffusion and
centrifuge technologies for the creation of multinational enrichment
plants outside of the United States.
Unlike the detailed structure laid out by the 1971 rules, the
criteria for the 1974 proposed technology transfer were broader, more
flexible, and open to negotiation. Rather than setting out specific
ground rules, the U.S. invited foreign countries to initiate
discussions on enrichment multilateralization, subject only to a
series of guiding principles such as the "orderly introduction of new
technologies," the "assurance of supply...(through) multinational
investment", "geographic dispersion", non-proliferation, and the
inclusion of "developing countries." 96
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In fact, within this broad negotiating framework, only one detail
was specified; in the present context this specification was of great
interest. The U.S. proposal specifically stated that,
"For its part, the U.S. would expect the interested U.S.
companies to be the principal channel through which exploratory
discussions on technology sharing would be pursued. Proposals
developed and negotiated by companies at the private level would
be brought back to governments for their consideration and the
development of the necessary intergovernmental arrangements."
(emphasis added) 97
In short, domestic enrichment privatization was assumed as a
necessary prerequisite of international enrichment technology
sharing, because a private enricher was to be both the source of such
a sharing arrangement, and the eventual conduit for the necessary
technology.
6.3 Technology Sharing Summary
In this section we have found further evidence in support of our
central proposition. Both the 1971 and 1974 multilateralization
initiatives bear the stamp of AEC commercial objectives. The
predominance of the AEC position is clear in the 1971 initiative's
black box and commercial provisions, which sought to protect domestic
industry and preserve technological preeminence. Perhaps more
revealing, however, is the institutionalization of the enrichment
privatization policy as a vital component in the 1974 initiative.
Even during this latter era when the forces of internationalism and
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the State Department were at their apex, the fact that privatization
was taken for granted in the formulation of such a key international
proposal is testimony to the continued impact of the AEC's commercial
objectives on foreign policy.
The path taken by these two multilateralization initiatives leads
Wonder to conclude that in the final analysis, when conflicts arose
between the international policy of encouraging multilateral
cooperation in building future enrichment plants and the domestic
policy of relinquishing responsibility for enrichment to the private
sector, "multilateral cooperation ranked lower in priority than
successful 'privatization' of American enrichment operations." 98
The influence of the AEC's commercial objectives was evident in both
the 1971 and the 1974 proposals, and the top priority accorded these
objectives is consistent with our behavioral proposition.
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7.0 THE DECLINE IN U.S. SUPPLY CREDIBILITY
By examining in some detail the AEC production planning, pricing
and contracting po:Licies, as well as the U.S. foreign policy with
respect to enrichment technology sharing, we have sought to marshal
evidence in support of our central proposition. As stated in Section
3.0, this proposition is:
U.S. enrichment policies may be understood not as the result of a
continuous global rebalancing of domestic commercial objectives
and international security considerations, but as the result of
the AEC's primary emphasis on domestic commercial objectives,
often to the neglect of the security implications of the
resulting enrichment policies.
We contend that the evidence adduced in Sections 4.0-6.0
substantially confirms the validity of that proposition. We are left
to confront the question, "So what?" The implication of this
proposition was discussed briefly in Section 3.3. This discussion
led in turn to the formulation of a second derivative proposition:
The failure of U.S. enrichment policy to achieve a balance
between commercial and security objectives contributed to the
decline in U.S. credibility as a reliable enrichment supplier,
215
which had negative impacts in both commercial and security
domains.
The present section of the essay shall present the evidence in
support of this second proposition. We shall seek to integrate many
of the broad results of the previous sections into a chronological
narrative aimed at tracing the decline in U.S. supply credibility to
the sole pursuit of commercial objectives. Stated another way, we
shall trace the creation of the "enrichment crisis" and much of the
concern about enrichment supply assurance to the failure of the U.S.
government to anticipate the negative international impacts of
domestic enrichment privatization.
7.1 The Changing International Environment Confronted by the
Enrichment Privatization Policy
Prior to the late 1960s U.S. nuclear policy commercial and
security objectives had been dovetailed neatly into a consistent
strategy which subsidized the growth of international commercial
nuclear power, and along with it the domestic uranium and reactor
industries, while retaining monopoly control of the weapons-producing
enrichment technology. Low enrichment prices and building enrichment
capacity well in advance of demand were characteristic of AEC policy.
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By 1970, however, the international environment had been altered
dramatically. Despite the successful discouragement of the proposed
EURATOM enrichment plant during 1957, and the subsequent security
classification of German, Dutch, and British enrichment research at
American request during 1960-61, the Treaty of Almelo in 1970, which
created URENCO, clearly signaled that the U.S. monopoly of commercial
enrichment technology was a thing of the past.
This signal was not without warning. The rapid growth of
civilian nuclear power in Germany, France, and Japan made continued
dependence on the U.S. as the sole source of enrichment services
unacceptable. NucLear power figured mightily in the energy supply
plans of these foreign industrial powers, who depended more
critically on imported energy supplies to fuel growing economies.
Any delays in the expansion of U.S. enrichment capacity could result
in a painful setback for economic expansion programs. Many foreign
market participants feared that the U.S. monopoly might be exploited
for political purposes or for commercial purposes, by coupling sales
of enrichment services to U.S. reactor vendors, or by favoring U.S.
vendors, as it was the custom for the reactor supplier to contract
for fuel supply as a service to the customer. Each of these foreign
nations recognized that U.S. reactor vendors were securing nearly 90%
of all reactor export orders, and that their domestic reactor
industries must break the U.S. domination of the reactor market to
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realize the scale economies necessary to compete in international
markets.
These observat:Lions combined to suggest the need for commercial
enrichment facilities in Europe. The revival of European interest in
enrichment is described succinctly by Wonder:
"The French (CEA) was contemplating the construction of a
commercial-scale diffusion plant to serve European needs.
FORATOM, the European nuclear industry organization, had released
a report recommending the construction of European enrichment
facilities. The European Community...in 1968, had declared its
support for some measure of European enrichment automony and had
begun developing concrete proposals to accomplish this. This
revival coincided with growing European alarm at the Atlantic
'technology gap' and the 'American challenge.' European
technological independence was seen as the necessary response to
remedying an unacceptable situation where American technical and
scientific superiority could mean the economic and political
subordination of Europe."99
7.2 The Momentum Grows For Privatization
It was into this changing environment that the long-smoldering
iron of domestic enrichment privatization was thrust. The chain of
events set in motion by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and
accelerated by the legislative creation of toll enrichment in 1964,
began to bear fruit during the first Nixon Administration. In 1968
the Atomic Industrial Forum, a domestic nuclear industry group,
published the results of a study which argued for the transfer of the
gaseous diffusion plants to the private sector. The JCAE asked the
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GAO to evaluate the sale of the plants to the private sector; the
GAO's report was generally negative toward the idea. The AEC staff
as well as a White House task force chaired by Paul McCracken of the
Council of Economic Advisors outlined the strengths and weaknesses of
various alternative courses of action. The result of this flurry of
activity was the creation of a position within the Nixon
Administration advocating the sale of the existing diffusion plants
to the private sector. This proposal failed to survive strong
congressional opposition, nonetheless, it alerted foreign and
domestic observers to the vitality of the privatization objective.
7.3 The Failure of the 1971 Initiative
Meanwhile in the international sphere, the U.S. was proposing
strategies for the multilateralization of enrichment as a means of
reducing the security risks of the dispersion of enrichment
technology. As described in the preceding section, the first of
these proposals came during 1971, and was an abysmal failure.
In theory this proposal simultaneously satisfied security and
commercial objectives. However, the strategy failed in its
assessment of European technological and political realities, and the
resulting implementation backfired badly. Primary dissatisfaction
surrounded the differentiation applied by the AEC in its treatment of
foreign and domestic firms on the issue of technology transfer. On
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the one hand, the AEC excluded the U.S. centrifuge technology from
the 1971 proposal, and asked foreign parties to make a firm
commitment to the black box GDP technology prior to access to
classified information. On the other hand, the AEC invited domestic
firms to examine classified data on both U.S. centrifuge and
diffusion technologies with no prior commitment to an enrichment
venture. The exclusion of the U.S. centrifuge from the 1971 offer
was inconsistent with the European technical realities, as evidenced
by the Treaty of Almelo, and the preferential treatment of domestic
firms inflamed foreign suspicions that the true purpose of the U.S.
initiative was to limit potential competition and retain political
control of the international nuclear markets.
Foreign parties showed little interest in the 1971 U.S. offer,
and instead intensified their own development of enrichment
technology. Rather than discouraging the spread of enrichment
technologies, the failure of the 1971 offer encouraged the subsequent
commercial enrichment plans of URENCO, EURODIF, UCOR, TECHNABSEXPORT,
and PNC. As summarized by a U.S. official,
"It (the 1971 initiative) definitely caused Europe to
establish an enrichment capacity before they would have
otherwise. We probably lost out involving ourselves in some
business sense in European plants by our policy of being so
restrictive on the technology."1 00
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In addition to this simultaneous failure in security and commercial
objectives, the upshot of the 1971 fiasco was a shaken foreign
perception of U.S. integrity, and the credibility of official U.S.
nuclear policy. The encouragement of domestic enrichment
privatization, and the accompanying implication that enrichment was
no longer a special case requiring government ownership but was now a
conventional industrial technology, was inconsistent with an
international policy which sought to obstruct the construction of
foreign enrichment plants on non-proliferation grounds, or to at
least limit the technologies and competitive opportunities for these
plants. The handling of the 1971 offer implied to foreign firms that
domestic objectives, rather than international security objectives,
were dominating U.S. nuclear policy.
7.4 Intensified Pressure For Privatization and the Negative Impacts
of LTFC Contracting
Despite tangible evidence of the pitfalls of simultaneously
pursuing privatization and multilateralization, these two policies
persisted. As described in essay #1, the pressures for privatization
intensified during 1972 and 1973. Spurred by OMB's desire to
transfer a large appropriations burden to the private sector, and the
AEC's conviction that U.S. technical superiority and supply
reliability should be exploited by private enrichers, U.S. SWU prices
continued to rise and LTFC contracts were advanced to replace REQ
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contracts. Despite the cool reception given privatization by
domestic corporations,1 01 President Nixon reiterated the
government's commitment to privatization in April, 1973.
The reaction of both foreign and domestic utilities, as well as
the JCAE, to the LTFC contracts was harsh. The sharp differences in
opinion between the testimony of AEC representatives and the views of
utility representatives led one member of the JCAE to comment, "If
you can get a fusion reaction as hot as this room is today, we are in
good shape."1 0 2 Donald Allen, appearing on behalf of the Edison
Electric Institute,, the principal domestic association of privately
held electric utilities, characterized the new LTFC contract criteria
as,
"criteria which have been stripped of virtually every
protective provision, and which have been transformed into a
charter for future unilateral contract changes and price
increases in the Commission's sole discretion,"103
and likened the execution of an LTFC contract to signing "a blank
check."104 Allen and other utility witnesses lamented the fact
that they had no opportunity for advance consultation with AEC about
the provisions of the LTFC contracts and therefore were totally
unprepared for the Commission's package.
The JCAE was also chagrined by the new LTFC criteria because they
felt confronted by a "fait accompli" which they frankly could not
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adequately review (luring the required 45-day period.10 5 The
following exchange between Mr. Allen and Representative Holifield,
Chairman of the JCAE, indicated the JCAE's concern that these new
criteria would substantially weaken JCAE control over AEC contracting
activities:
"Representative Holifield:...What control do you feel the
Joint Committee will have over the essential terms and conditions
of this or any other contract for enriching services under the
new criteria?
Mr. Allen: None
Representative Holifield: Thank you. I came to the same
conclusion." 1 06
Utility representatives also made it quite clear that a near
certain impact of LTFC contracting would be overordering by utility
customers. A representative of Toledo Edison summarized these
contentions:
"The new criteria would indeed provide a fixed schedule of
demand for enrichment services...(which) could be used for
planning...additional enrichment capability. Such a schedule
would, however, inflate the real demand for enrichment services
by requiring each nuclear plant owner to commit to purchase feed
material and enriching services well ahead of his need. (No
nuclear utility)...could take the risk of not contracting on the
long-term basis proposed by the AEC, if that is the only option
realistically available...
The net result may be certainty for planners of enrichment
capability to the detriment of consumers of electricity who will
bear the unnecessary cost...the goal of a reliable planning base
may be achieved but it will not likely be a realistic planning
base. "107
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This extended quotation eloquently foreshadows the problem of
artifically inflated demand that has plagued nuclear markets since
the LTFC contracting rush closed the AEC order books in 1974.
Furthermore, domestic and foreign utilities alike attacked the
inflexibility of the rolling 10-year LTFC firm commitment period.
Sidney Stoller, President of S. M. Stoller Corporation, the nuclear
consulting subsidiary of Arthur D. Little, Inc., argued that if one
major motivation for the LTFC contracts was to create an enrichment
contracting structure "which is harmonious with commercial
contracting practice" at other stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, then
LTFC contracts were much too inflexible. Drawing on examples of
existing commercial contracts both for U 3 08 resources and
fabrication services, Mr. Stoller provided evidence of contractual
flexibility which contrasted sharply with the proposed firm LTFC
delivery schedules. 108 ·
Foreign utilities also questioned the wisdom of the LTFC
criteria. Although the criticism was offered in a slightly more
polite and cautious manner, the LTFC contracts were characterized as
"extremely and unexpectedly severe."1 0 9 The major concern of
foreign utilities was the extended lead time associated with the
execution of the LTFC contracts. The LTFC contracts required a lead
time of 8 years prior to the delivery of the first core, while the
entire lead time for foreign reactor construction was only 5-6
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years. Therefore, foreign utilities would be forced to firm up an
AEC enrichment contract as much as 2-3 years before they began
reactor construction. As diplomatically as possible, a
representative of the Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum, stated,
"Accordingly, we are afraid that we may be forced to
conclude an enrichment contract too early, resulting in a
possible significant gap between the predetermined plan and the
actual outcome in the future."1 1 0
On these grounds the Japanese representative asked for a reduction in
the leadtime, "to the extent possible, down to no longer than around
4 years."1 11 The difficulties associated with the disparity
between SWU contract leadtimes and foreign reactor construction
leadtimes were echoed by representatives of Swedish and German
utilities.112
In addition the German representative made reference to the
European fear that because AEC was the only current enrichment
services supplier, foreign utilities would be forced to contract well
in advance of actual demands and, "there would be no room left for
further contracts with the additional (enrichment) capacities to be
built in Europe."1 1 3 This reinforces the sentiment uncovered by
Wonder during a series of European interviews during 1975. He found
that the difficult LTFC contract terms were seen as an attempt to
squeeze Europe into guaranteeing a post-1980 market for a U.S.
private enricher; a French atomic energy official observed, "The AEC
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has made a strictly imperialist move in the grand tradition of
economic colonialism." 114 Indeed the LTFC lead times were longer
and supply schedule flexibility substantially less than the contracts
subsequently offered by EURODIF and URENCO, which had 5 year lead
times between contract execution and the first enriched fuel delivery
and permitted moderate (10%) flexibility in SWU quantities until 2
years before the delivery date.1 1 5
Despite the obvious misgivings of both foreign and domestic
utilities, as well as the JCAE, the AEC went forward with the LTFC
contracts after a few concessions. Specifically: (1) the AEC
postponed the effective date of the new criteria to allow time to
explain the criteria in more detail to industry representatives; (2)
the AEC proposed an additional contracting approach which would
provide for variations in SWU quantity at increased cost with
additional feed;116 (3) at the suggestion of EURATOM, contracts
were rewritten to permit free exchanges of enriched product as a
means of permitting the free market to offset the tendency to
overorder.117 In retrospect these alterations did not satisfy the
demands of the utility industry, as evidenced by the ensuing
contracting glut.
The European response to LTFC contracts was to accelerate plans
for indigenous enrichment capacity, while turning to the Soviet Union
as an alternative source of enrichment services. This acceleration
226
is clearly documented in JCAE testimony. During July, 1973, prior to
the initiation of LTFC contracts, an AEC representative summarized
the status of foreign enrichment operations as follows:
(1) URENCO's most optimistic investment plans called for a 2
MMSWU/yr. capacity by the end of 1980, growing to 10 MMSWU/yr. by
year-end 1985;
(2) With the withdrawal of Australia and the URENCO nations from
EURODIF feasibility studies, "hopes for realization of a
multinational diffusion plant based on French diffusion technology by
the late 1970's seem to have dimmed," although the French reiterated
their intention to build a 6 MMSWU/yr. diffusion plant, "even if they
have to 'go it alone.' 118
(3) The U.S.S.R's role as a potential supplier of SWU services
was still not clearly defined. Even though some Western nations had
evidenced increasing interest in TECHNABSEXPORT contracts, "aside
from the enrichment services for the Russian-built Finnish nuclear
power plant and the initial core of the French Fessenheim plant,
there have been no other known enrichment contracts consummated with
non-bloc countries.."11 9
Only a year later, July, 1974, immediately after the closing of
the AEC order books, a representative of the General Electric-Exxon
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joint centrifuge venture (CENGEX) summarized the foreign situation as:
(1) URENCO had announced a firm expansion schedule identical to
its earlier most optimistic case of 2 MMSWU/yr. in 1980 and 10
MMSWU/yr. in 1985; because "it has already booked orders for more
than 10 million S.W.U.'s from British, Dutch, and German utilities"
due to its more flexible, shorter leadtime contract terms at a price
($48/SWU) only slightly higher than the prevailing AEC price;1 2 0
(2) EURODIF's future was no longer questionable. The French had
announced a construction schedule beginning in 1974 with planned
outputs of 3 MMSWU/yr. in 1979, 6 MMSWU/yr. in 1980 and 10 MMSWU/yr.
in 1981. "EURODIF has largely sold out its capacity...under
contracts from French, Spanish, Italian, and Belgian utilities...and
has signed a firm contract with Japan for 1 million S.W.U.'s per year
for a 10-year period 1980-89."121
(3) The U.S.S.R. had become an established enrichment supplier.
"Firm orders have been booked with Finland, France, Germany, Austria,
Sweden, Belgium, Italy, and Spain,...(and) they have offered to
supply 100 percent of Japan's needs from 1975 through 1980."122
(4) The Japanese were giving consideration to the construction
of a 6 MMSWU/yr. centrifuge plant by 1985, instead of their previous
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plans which had called for an 0.5 MMSWU/yr. demonstration plant in
1985;123
(5) The South Africans were putting a pilot enrichment plant on
line during 1974 and were conducting feasibility studies with West
Germany contemplating the expansion of this plant to 7 MMSWU/yr. by
the mid-1980's;124
(6) Two groups in Canada, plus EURODIF, were considering the
construction of a 10 MMSWU/yr. Canadian diffusion plant by the late
1980's;125
(7) Finally, Australia was holding preliminary discussions with
URENCO regarding the use of the centrifuge technology to have an
Australian plant on stream by the mid or late 1980's.126
In short, the onerous LTFC contract terms, which resulted from
the push for enrichment privatization, hastened the decline in the
perceived credibility of U.S. supply assurances precipitated by the
1971 cooperative initiative.1 2 7
7.5 The Failure of the 1974 Initiative and the Weakness of
Privatization
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As with the 1971 initiative, the 1974 cooperative proposal failed
to achieve its purpose. Discussions with foreign enrichers during
1974 revealed the difficulty of any technology transfer. The
progress in EURODIF and URENCO in the three years since 1971 led the
Europeans to challenge the U.S. presumption of technical superiority
and to suspect that these new negotiations were a thinly veiled
attempt to preserve U.S. market domination by disrupting formative
European supply arrangements. U.S. supply credibility was lessened
by the stipulation that technology transfer would be channeled
through a private enricher, in view of the absence of a firm
commitment on the part of domestic industry to private enrichment.
This perceived weakness of the privatization program had long
been an issue of concern to the JCAE. As early as 1970
Representative Hosmer, critizing the implementation of commercial
pricing criteria as a stride towards the Nixon concept of
privatization, which revolved around the sale of the existing
diffusion plants, concluded that "(Privatization) was an idea whose
time has not come." 128 He chastized the AEC which
"has pushed the further investigation into private ownership...in
a total vacuum concerning the possibility for implementing this
private ownership." 129
He concluded that this "vacuum" existed because,
"Whereas at the first of 1969 the...(industrial)...people were
all hot for hiring a priest and raffling the plants off...By the
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time they reached November 10, 1969, when a statement was finally
made downtown, it was quite apparent that there was money
absolutely no place in sight...that could possibly finance a
purchase of these plants." 130
Despite the shift of the privatization initiative from the sale
of existing diffusion plants to the construction of incremental
enrichment capacity by private firms, suspicions about the viability
of the privatization policy continued. In March, 1973, JCAE member
Jackson said that,
"(Due to financial circumstances) I have real doubts in my own
mind as to whether industry will really participate (in
enrichment privatization)...(and if these doubts are realized)
you (i.e., the AEC) have real problems as to the predicate on
which you are going to do your future planning." 131
In August 1973, JCAE Chairman Holifield criticized the
shallowness of the privatization policy saying,
"It is really disgraceful that someone in the Nixon
Administration ambiguously said that private enterprise will
provide the next increment of enrichment. No one knows who said
it, and apparently that person went away. This prophecy has been
self-fulfilling since that time. Now we come to the hard part
when we have to really massage this question thoroughly in all
its aspects instead of taking it as an offhand decision. And, we
find ourselves doing so in a climate of urgency because of the
time limits..." (emphasis added) 132
Clearly these informed observers were of the opinion that the
privatization policy was unrealistic; it is not unlikely, therefore,
that this opinion was shared by some foreign utilities and
governments, which served to lessen the credibility of the 1974
initiative.
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Equally clearly, the impression that privatization was a dead end
gained further prominence during 1974. In his June, 1974 JCAE
hearing remarks, Representative Hosmer lamented the religious fervor
of privatization proponents by demanding rhetorically,
"Are we to conclude that 'stonewalling' in the form of repetition
of the (call for privatization) will magically make it so? Are
we to become becalmed in a semantic sea, then told we will cross
that sea by some magic power, with OMB's divine guidance and by
the spiritual inspiration of the five wise persons of Germantown
(i.e. the AEC), and be brought to a heavenly place when even
plates and candlesticks are made of enriched uranium?" 133
The subsequent withdrawal of Union Carbide from the UEA consortium,
and the likely withdrawal of Westinghouse from UEA 134 led
Representative Hosmer to state in August, 1974 correspondence with
OMB that "Your UEA group is in tatters and CENGEX would be if it
knew what UEA has been able to learn about the situation," and went
on to characterize OMB, UEA and CENGEX as "obstinate holdouts against
reality." 135
7.6 The Closing of the Order Books Further Tarnishes AEC Credibility
If the perceived weakness of privatization was not enough to
torpedo the 1974 initiative, the closing of the AEC enrichment order
books guaranteed its demise, and fueled the growing foreign
suspicions of U.S. commercial motives. Many foreign utilities
suspected that the closing of the order books was an artificial
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crisis intended to force Congressional approval of enrichment
privatization.136 The immediate reaction of European nations was
the further acceleration of indigenous enrichment plans, which could
"pose a serious threat to the current U.S. position as chief world
supplier of enriched uranium."1 3 7 One European official was moved
to comment that it was "particularly ludicrous" that the U.S. had
brought this problem on themselves through the pursuit of a misguided
nuclear foreign policy. 138 As described in essay #1, this
acceleration in plans did indeed occur. During 1975, COREDIF, UCOR,
and NUCLEBRAS put forth plans for additional foreign enrichment
capacity.
In addition to the step-up in foreign enriching plans, the
foreign utilities reacted with great trepidation regarding the AEC's
likely management of the contracting process. Testifying before the
JCAE, the Director General of the EURATOM Supply Agency stated,
"I have to say quite frankly that the customers in the community
have been shocked by the absolutely unexpected decision of the
U.S. AEC...to suspend signing contracts, and more so, as all
publications and statements of the preceding 2 months indicated
that the limit of contracting capability would be reached at a
later point in time than previously forecasted." (emphasis added)
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This position was reiterated by a Japanese utility representative
who stated that the AEC's action in closing the order books "came to
us as a surprise and a shock." 140
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Both foreign utility representatives found themselves in the
uncomfortable position of having submitted a large number of signed
LTFC enrichment contracts, along with advance payments, to the AEC
well in advance of the June 30, 1974 deadline, only to find that the
AEC had imposed the contract moratorium after honoring only a
percentage of those requests. 141 Both representatives emphasized
the need for an early resumption of AEC enrichment contracting to
prevent fuel supply shortages for those reactors requiring fuel
deliveries beginning in 1978, 142 and both expressed concern that
they, as foreigners, might not receive fair and nondiscriminatory
treatment from the AEC.
This latter question of non-preferential treatment for all AEC
customers arose due to the AEC's treatment of the LTFC requests made
by Egypt, Israel and Iran. As summarized by the EURATOM
representative,
"Serious concern and criticism has been brought to the attention
of (EURATOM) that, while our contracts, introduced in due time,
were not signed, the United States entered into new enrichment
contracts with Egypt, Israel and Iran up to the very last day of
June 30, 1974." 143
EURATOM indicated that this preferential treatment of "people who are
completely new in the nuclear field" at the expense of those who
"have (had) an agreement for cooperation with the AEC from 1958 on,"
violated the AEC's nondiscriminatory traditions, and attributed this
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AEC abuse to "political reasons." 144 The AEC later testified that
"the sole exception (to the closing of the order books)...was
related to contracts with Egypt, Israel and Iran...(where) a
Presidential commitment of supply had previously been made on
behalf of the U.S. Government." 145
If the management of the contract moratorium displeased many
utilities, the AEC's conditional contracting solution to the problem
only aggravated this concern. At the time of their signing, the AEC
conditional contracts were quite speculative, so that President
Nixon's personal guarantee that the conditional contracts would be
honored failed to satisfy foreign customers.14 6 In large measure,
this failure was also the result of the declining credibility of the
Nixon Administration; Nixon's guarantee was given on the day that he
resigned.
In addition, the shuffling of the conditional contract queue, to
the disadvantage of the Japanese utilities, raised further concerns
about the reliability of the U.S. policy of non-discriminatory
supply. On August 6, 1974, the AEC testified regarding how it would
satisfy the backlog of requested contracts. At the time of contract
suspension, the AEC had countersigned 273 6WE of enrichment
contracts. It subsequently determined that it could execute firm
LTFC contracts up to 320 GWE of capacity and would offer conditional
contracts for the additional 44 GWE of requested contracts.
Basically, the AEC proposed to execute these additional firm and
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conditional contracts in the chronological order in which they were
submitted to the AEC for countersignature. AEC Chairman Ray noted
that,
"Without further adjustment, however, this chronological approach
would result in an imbalance, obviously inequitable, in the
resulting actions in that Japan would receive 25 standard
contracts as related to 27 requests, and Western Europe would
receive 1 standard contract as related to 33 requests.
Following consultation with the Department of State on this
matter, it was determined that a degree of redress of this
situation would be appropriate...
The conclusion was reached that the chronological position of six
Japanese reactors should be interchanged with two from France,
two from Germany, one from Spain, and the one from Puerto Rico.
The chronological position of the other 81 reactors would not be
altered." 147
The upshot of this reshuffling of the contract queue was to guarantee
that all domestic requests received firm contracts (the Puerto Rico
request would otherwise have received a conditional contract), and
that Western Europe received more firm contracts, both at the expense
of the Japanese utilities; the Japanese were understandably miffed.
Wonder concludes that, "the Atomic Energy Commission's handling
of the (contract moratorium) situation was embarrassing and the lack
of interagency coordination was alarming."14 8 Certainly the entire
incident did nothing to bolster declining foreign confidence in U.S.
enrichment supply reliability. In July 1974, Representative Hosmer
summarized these sentiments,
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"Frankly, the AEC has not done much for its credibility over the
past year or so...we have found a great fluctuation in the date
when their contracting capability was to be used up, and every
time somebody at the AEC had to make an important speech about
that matter, the facts seemed to change to accomodate whatever
would be desirable in a public relations way to be said on the
platform on that particular date.
Then with very little, if any, preparation or explanation the
guillotine dropped on the contracting on July 2 (1974)..."149
Although eventually all the customers holding conditional
contracts were given the option of firming up these LTFC contracts,
made possible largely by extensive reactor slippage and by
cancellation from those customers already holding firm contracts,
this process took more than four years and "was more a fortuitous
situation than a method which could be relied upon again." 150
In the midst of this confusion, U.S. enrichment policy appeared
to be floundering without direction. Many observers echoed
Representative Hosmer's condemnations of the feedback-reactor
behavior displayed by the AEC, in the absence of any long-run
strategic planning,
"There has been no forward planning; there has been no overall
concept of management here as a business...
As a consequence, the needs of that kind of management each year
have bent to the necessities of the particular year's budget, and
it has been OMB which has operated this thing on a hand-to-mouth
basis.. ."151
"...the uranium enrichment business carried on by the U.S.
Government is carried on not in the interest of that business and
its customers, but the extraneous interests of the U.S.
Government which largely are the current year's fiscal crisis, of
which there is always one."1 5 2
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"We get a hearings week and get a rush...Everything all of a
sudden seems to happen at once, just before a hearing, or during
one.
I am not at all happy that this very vital function (i.e.
enrichment)...either receives the (constant) attention or the
organizational emphasis required to carry it successfully through
a very difficult period." 153
7.7 Subsequent Events Deepen Reigning Confusion
During January 1975, at the time these additional firm and
conditional contracts were being executed, the AEC ceased to exist,
and its responsibilities were assigned to ERDA and NRC. Foreign and
domestic customers did not know what to expect from the new
organization, nor did the JCAE. Having long derided the "parade of
virgins" and "Johnny-come-latelies" produced by the constant turnover
of AEC commissioners,154 Representative Hosmer took stock of the
situation as the ERDA reorganization loomed on the horizon,
"What do we have? We have ourselves in the middle of an
impeachment...We have new people in all the top executive offices
where they make any decisions...people who don't know a thing
about this business...
Right now we are in one gigantic mess because...we got ourselves
into a situation with many of our friends overseas whom we had
assured that there would always be nuclear fuel from the United
States, and now it 'ain't' coming...
The members of this (JCAE) many of them were around here...when
the Eisenhower 'atoms for peace' declarations were being made.
But there is nobody downtown in a policymaking position that is
still around (who seems to remember those decisions)."155
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Despite the tumultuous history of the privatization initiative,
ERDA, backed by the Ford Administration and OMB, continued to carry
the privatization torch to the Congress in the form of the 1975
Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act (NFAA). Citing the urgent need to open
the order books as a justification for enrichment privatization,
rather than allowing that the reason that the order books had been
closed so suddenly was the pursuits of privatization via LTFC
contracting, ERDA asked the Congress to authorize ERDA to negotiate
agreements with UEA and other potential private domestic enrichers,
for the sale of Government enrichment technology as well as the
establishment of a series of Government guarantees. Despite
continuing evidence from domestic and foreign utilities alike that
UEA was offering an unacceptable enrichment contract,156 the
privatization juggernaut lurched forward.
Meanwhile the order books remained closed. Foreign concern was
further heightened by the March, 1975 suspension of all fuel exports
by the NRC, pending case by case evaluation of physical security
measures. The European Community protested vigorously because the
resulting delivery delay threatened to slow reactor start-ups and
shut-down some operating reactors. The European nations were "openly
questioning the integrity of American treaty commitments...The only
alternative was the Soviet Union (and)...many European governments
considered such dependence politically undesirable." Even so, the
United States began to appear little more attractive as a source.
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The Economist observed: "...'American suppliers...have proven
unreliable in the past and are now turning awkward again"' 15 7
Subsequent events described in essay #1 further tarnished the
U.S. image and revealed the consequences of this loss of
credibility. Four years after the closing of the U.S. enrichment
contract order books, they remained closed. The intermediate delays
in designing a new enrichment contract, the death of the NFAA, and
the postponement of the Portsmouth add-on solidified foreign
suspicions about the level of confusion in U.S. nuclear policy.
Meanwhile the artifical surge in demand created by LTFC contracts
contributed to the rapid price increase in uranium markets which, in
conjunction with uncertainties about the future management of DOE's
STFS policy, advance feed policy, and enrichment contracting
policy,1 57 and the subsequent Westinghouse incident, threw the
international uranium market into a state of confusion from which it
has yet to recover. Lastly the decline in U.S. credibility led to
still further entry by potential foreign enrichers, as well as the
expansion of capacity plans by previously announced foreign
enrichers. This in turn has led to a circumstance of excess
enrichment capacity which will continue to prevail through much of
the 1980's. This inability to rationalize capacity expansion could
lead to stiff competition in the enrichment market, which may have
undesirable security implications if it results in any compromising
of safeguards standards.
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7.8 Conclusion
This section of the thesis has attempted to scrutinize the
proposition that the single-minded pursuit of AEC commercial
objectives in the form of enrichment privatization contributed
mightily to the loss of U.S. credibility as a supplier of enrichment
services. This tarnished credibility in turn accelerated the spread
of commercial enrichment technologies in foreign nations, which
increased the fears of further weapons proliferation, and aggravated
already grave uncertainties in uranium markets. This combination of
events, and the chain reaction that emanated outwards from them,
created much of the prevailing concern surrounding "nuclear fuel
assurance" which currently occupies the attention of nuclear
policymakers. One proposed solution to the assurance problem is the
focus of our third essay.
It is difficult to substantiate the contention that the sort of
organizational behavior posited in our first proposition led the sort
of negative impacts as posited by proposition two. We have relied
almost exclusively on the public record to weave the narrative which
suggests the plausibility of this cause-effect relationship.
Obviously we cannot conduct a controlled scientific experiment and
hold all other variables constant to verify our contention.
Therefore we find that while the weight of the evidence in support of
our second proposition is not absolutely conclusive, it is too
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substantial to be dismissed out of hand without an equally well
defended alternative.
We have cited extensively from the public record to demonstrate
both the commercial motivations of the AEC and the negative
ramifications of the actions undertaken in response to the commercial
objecties. To demonstrate that these actions were pursued in the
absence of an interdependent analysis of the international political
implications of these actions, we appeal to the deafening silence of
the record in this regard. It is indicative that the AEC chose not
to consult with the State Department about the international
implications of price increases 159 or the closing of the order
books 160 until after the fact. More to the point, despite the
anti-proliferation thrust of the two multilateralization initiatives
of 1971 and 1974, the AEC and the JCAE continued to conceptualize the
international implications solely in terms of the balance of
payments.161
It is only in February, 1976, that the testimony on international
implications finally recognizes the non-proliferation aspects of
enrichment policy. At this late date, as the Administration's final
witness in support of the NFAA, Secretary of State Kissinger touched
on the interdependencies between domestic enrichment policy and
international non-proliferation policy.162 Nevertheless, he finally
admitted that the State Department's primary reason for supporting
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the NFAA, "was that additional enrichment capacity should be provided
as rapidly as possible," and that, "from the point of view of foreign
policy it is not of decisive consequence whether (incremental
enrichment capacity comes from) a governmental plant or private
plant." 163 Indeed his only defense of the battered privatization
policy was,
"I was impressed by the arguments -- though they are not
primarily in my area of jurisdiction or in my field of competence
-- that this was the time to move the enrichment capacity into
the private field if we were ever going to do it." 164
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8.0 SUMMARY
This essay has suggested an institutional model of U.S.
enrichment policy, and looked at two propositions which flow from
this model. Drawing on the historical privatization theme, as
revealed in essay #1, we have offered an organizational argument for
presuming that AEC commercial objectives, particularly enrichment
privatization, will predominate over security objectives in the
formulation of U.S. enrichment policy. Enrichment privatization is
an old idea, whose roots may be traced directly to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and which has long enjoyed AEC support at the Commission
level. It was the next logical step in the progressive
commercialization of the nuclear fuel cycle, following on the
subsidization of civilian reactor installations, the creation of a
privately held uranium industry, and the removal of legal barriers to
the private ownership of nuclear fuel.
This proposition has been tested by examining U.S. enrichment
policy with respect to production, pricing, contracting, and
technology transfer. In each arena we have found significant
evidence of the dominance of privatization initiatives; in most cases
policy choices were made in an attempt to pave the way for a private
enricher.
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In the area of SWU production we have revealed the commercial
origins of the AEC's production strategy and explained how the
resulting cost-minimizing computer calculation justified the choice
of operating tails assays, the desirable size of the preproduction
stockpile, and the tails recycle program. In addition, we have shown
how these production decisions were made in the absence of any
analysis of their interaction with security objectives, by
demonstrating that the inclusion of a vanishingly small stockpile
security premium may dramatically alter the pursuit of the tails
recycle program.
Furthermore, having established the rationale for these
production policies, we have explained the subsequent course of AEC
production policies as a sequence of short-run responses to short-run
external budgetary and political pressures. These responses have
been determined by AEC "standard operating procedures" of enrichment
privatization, uranium industry protection, and the pursuit of
preproduction stockpiling and tails recycle. This incremental
decision-making mode, which has replaced long-run strategic planning,
ties back to the notion of bounded rationality which forms the
foundation for our organizational model.
In the area of SWU pricing we have uncovered a sequence of
regularities in the pricing formula. Consistent with the promotional
theme highlighted in essay 1, we have recounted the historical
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underpricing of AEC enrichment services as a subsidy to buyers of
nuclear electric energy and a vehicle for fostering domestic
industrial and foreign trade interests. In addition, we have
documented the struggle of the AEC to escape from the confines of the
underpricing mandate throughout the 1970's, as a means of lowering
the barriers to the entry of domestic private enrichers. This
attempt, which was explicit in the abortive attempt to adopt
commercial pricing during 1970, has revealed itself, both in the
continual shifts in AEC pricing procedures, which have resulted in
the maintenance of AEC prices at or near the legal ceiling price, and
more recently in the AEC push for fair value pricing as a
transitional compromise measure. Along the way we have once again
sought to tie back our pricing discussion to our organizational model
by describing the evolution of the pricing formula as a sequence of
accumulated conventions chosen in response to short-term problems
rather than long-run goals. The resulting pricing formula, which we
have characterized as the accretion of a myriad of confusing, and
often conflicting incremental decisions, is a classic example of the
output of this feedback-react decision-making mode.
We have also seen how SWU contracting has borne the stamp of
enrichment privatization. There is little dispute that a major
motivation for the changeover from REQ to LTFC enrichment contracts
was to provide for a smooth transition to private enriching. Indeed,
the AEC pricing formula sought to further promote this changeover by
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the creation of a differential pricing strategy for REQ and LTFC
SWUs. Although by some interpretations this differential price is
founded in actual differences in AEC costs associated with the two
types of contracts, our research reveals that the encouragement to
REQ customers to convert to LTFC contracts was equally important in
the adoption of the differential pricing approach.
Finally, in the area of international technology transfer, we
have demonstrated the domination of AEC commercial objectives in the
two U.S. foreign policy proposals for enrichment multilateralization
during 1971 and 197'4. In the implementation of the 1971 initiative
the protection of domestic commercial interests and the attempted
preservation of technological preeminence were evident, while in 1974
the predication of the transfer policy on the creation of a private
enricher was explicit.
Having argued the validity of the model's basic commercial
predominance proposition, we next turned to an examination of the
international implications of this behavior. We have traced the
failures of the 1971 and 1974 foreign policy initiatives to the
preeminence of the privatization policy over international
multilateral policies, and the failure to reconcile the
inconsistencies between these two policies. These inconsistencies
link back to the minor theme of political-market tension identified
in essay #1. We have also traced the closing of the order books and
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the subsequent confusion in uranium and enrichment markets,
exacerbated by the mishandling of the conditional contracting
process, to the institution of LTFC contracts which we have already
seen to be motivated by the privatization policy. This uncertainty
links back to the second minor theme identified in essay #1.
The result of these foreign policy and enrichment contracting
failures has been the destruction of U.S. credibility as a reliable
supplier of enrichment services. This decline in U.S. credibility
led to a foreign concern about nuclear fuel supply assurance and a
resulting proliferation of foreign enrichment projects. This
untoward result has defeated both the U.S.'s commercial and security
objectives and created a circumstance of grave uncertainty in
international enrichment and uranium markets which continues to
plague today's policymakers.
With the advent of the Carter Administration has come increased
White House pressure for the placement of security objectives above
commercial objectives in the formulation of U.S. nuclear policy.
International enrichment cooperation has replaced enrichment
privatization at the head of the nuclear policy agenda. The
commissioning of a government-owned Portsmouth centrifuge plant and
the prospective reopening of the enrichment order books, subject to a
more flexible enrichment contract, are seen as the first strides in
attempting to restore U.S. supply credibility. Whether this
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rehabilitation of U.S. image and the reordering of nuclear priorities
will be successfully accomplished remains to be seen. The results of
this essay lend a deeper perception to the difficulty of this task
and the price of a failure to complete it.
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APPENDIX I
BIASES IN THE AEC PRICING OF SPLIT TAILS
FEED SALES (STFS)
The highly complicated accounting treatment of the STFS program
appears to impart a downward bias to the SWU price. The assumption
that STFS will end in 1981 as the basis for the pricing calculation
is inconsistent with DOE's current public position regarding the STFS
program. DOE has indicated that 1981 is the earliest date that STFS
will be terminated, and most internal DOE calculations consider three
future STFS scenarios where the program extends until 1981, 1985, or
1990. Given recent demand slippages, STFS will not exhaust DOE's
natural uranium stockpile until after 1990. The selection of the
first scenario as the basis of the pricing calculation understates
the size of the uranium sales from the DOE stockpile, relative to the
two extended STFS scenarios.
Not only is the magnitude of the STFS probably underestimated,
but the use of an average market price as a value of U3 OS probably
underestimates the value of uranium sold through STFS. Research into
uranium prices reveals the price series data to be sparse and
suspect. Standard microeconimic theory would value uranium at its
market price, which would equal the social opportunity cost of the
marginal source of supply, but under current circumstances it is
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extremely difficult; to identify the market price. Presumably the
relevant market is the long term contract market, rather than the
spot market which is subject to short-run fluctuations. The
distinction between the spot and the contract market is an important
one because the current average spot price is around $45/lb. while
the current price for delivery today under a long-term contract
averages $20/lb.
Even within the long-term contract market there are problems in
defining the price. DOE collects market survey data on prices but
these data are not publicly reported in separate long-term and spot
contract categories, so the price data show a broad range. Private
conversations with DOE representatives reveal that even within the
long-term contract market there exists a broad range of prices. This
broad price band is a function of many factors, including: (1) the
differing ages of the contracts, some being negotiated when the
government support price U 3 08 was $6/lb., and others being
negotiated after the Westinghouse incident when spot prices topped
$40/lb.; (2) the differing terms of the contract, some being
arms-length agreements and others involving prepayments or an equity
position in a joint venture not reflected in the transaction price;
and (3) lack of standardization in the price inflators built into the
contracts, some being tied to an undefined world market price or to
the as-yet unknown actions of a national pricing board, while some
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are linked via complicated formulas to indices of mining cost or
general price level which are difficult to forecast.
In any event, the price picture is one of broad uncertainty and
lack of standardization. While DOE has one of the world's premier
data sources in its commercial price survey, our discussions reveal
that this survey relies almost exclusively on utility buyer forecasts
of delivered uranium prices with little cross-checking against U3 0s
seller price forecasts. Because DOE takes these buyer forecasts at
face value, with minimal inquiry into the forecasting methodology, it
is difficult to assess the data's validity. Beyond that, we do not
know how DOE processes these data to arrive at the average market
price. Operating on the assumption that DOE merely averages the
delivery prices under all long-term contracts for each year, we
conclude that this will underestimate the price at the margin because
the average will be depressed by the older, low-priced contracts and
the implicit costs not reflected in the transactions price. The more
interesting figure would be the annual average delivery price for new
long-term contracts signed during the past few years, where the
delivery price is adjusted to reflect the implicit cost of
prepayments or joint venture involvements.
The inclusion of the tails recycle credit in the calculation of
STFS costs obviously reduces the SWU price. Setting aside for now
the manner in which the tails are valued, one must inquire whether
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such a credit is appropriate at all. While it is true that the 0.3%
tails came from toll enrichment customers it is not obvious that
fairness dictates a tail recycle credit for current SWU customers.
All of DOE's REQ and LTFC SWU contracts contain a provision
specifying the customer's option, exercisable upon written notice to
DOE at least 90 day's prior to the scheduled delivery of enriched
uranium, to acquire tails material from DOE. The maximum quantity of
tails material (kg U) is equal to the difference between the total
quantity of uranium supplied in the feed and the total quantity of
enriched uranium returned as final product. With the exception of
handling charges, no charge will be made in connection with
furnishing tails material to the customer.
There is, however, a catch in this option to acquire tails
material. The customer is not guaranteed the tails material
resulting from the processing of the feed material that he furnished,
rather, the U-235 assay of the tails material delivered to the
customer is within the sole discretion of DOE. Effectively, this
insures that any customer exercising his tails option, which happens
less than 1% of the time, will receive 0.2% tails. This tails
material will have value to the customer only if: (1) laser
enrichment technology becomes available, which permits him to strip
those tails to a near-zero tails assay, or, (2) DOE agrees to accept
tails material as feed, which they currently do not do, and is
operating at a tails assay below 0.2%. At present both of these are
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distant, opportunities, which explains why so few customers choose to
acquire tails material.
Is this "fair"? We argue that fairness should be defined with
respect to a set of' agreed-upon ground rules, not with respect to a
test of economic efficiency or social morality. Therefore, because
utility acceptance of this contract provision implies its acceptance
as a ground rule, the effective ownership of all tails material by
DOE is fair. The contract goes on to state, "The customer shall
receive no credit for tails material subject to its option but not
taken." This statement flatly contradicts the tails recycle credit
contained in the SWU pricing formula, rendering the SWU price
"unfairly" low. In fact, this reading of the contract would argue
that DOE should charge customers for U- 0 8 recovered from DOE-owned
tails and resold through the STFS program, rather than offer a credit
to them. DOE's neglect of the SWU contract provisions results in
roughly a $40 MM subsidy of nuclear power by U.S. taxpayers over the
campaign period. This subsidy is comparatively minor; the
elimination of the tails recycle credit would increase the SWU price
by about .03%.
Even if the DOE: notion that the customer should be compensated
for the residual uranium in the tails material were borne out by the
SWU contract, the DOE pricing scheme rewards not those customers who
supplied the uranium in the first place, but those customers who
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happen to buy SWUs during the campaign when tails recycle is in
effect. Finally, even if the tails recycle credit were appropriate,
DOE's valuation of the tails material is inconsistent with the U O0
prices used in the STFS calculation and the SWU price produced by the
pricing calculation. The method for tails valuation is summarized in
Table 15. Using market prices for uranium and enrichment services
yields a tails value of 29¢/kg. U. Obviously if a value more closely
approximating the marginal costs of SWUs were used in the valuation
formula, the value of tails material would be negative. We conclude
that DOE's valuation of tails material at $22/kg U is both an
overestimate of its value and one which is inconsistent with the
other valuations in the pricing calculation.
In sum, the use of a lower bound for STFS sales, the under-
valuation of the uranium sold through this program, and the improper
conclusion of an overstated tails recycle credit, combine to under-
state STFS costs relative to long-run marginal costs. It could be
argued that this understatement is relatively unimportant in view of
the minor role of the STFS cost component in the final SWU price;
during the last two price calculations STFS costs have accounted for
less than 1% of the SWU price. We have examined these biases in
great detail not because of their significant impact on the SWU
price, but because they are indicative of the internal incon-
sistencies, misinterpretations and inappropriate conventions that
plague the DOE base price formula and result in the underestimation
of SWU price.
:z-5-S-
TABLE 15
SHADOW PRICING OF TAILS MATERIAL
We begin with two equivalent means of producing 1 kg U 3% enriched
product:
using natural feed or
5.96 kg U natural feed
+
3.81 SWUs
using 0.3% tails feed
55 kg U tails feed
+
7.63 SWUs
Next we compute the cost of these alternatives, using market
prices of $75/SWU and $18/kg U as U 08
(5.96 * 18) + (3.81) * 75 = $588 or 55 kg U value tails
kg U
+ 7.63 * 75
Because these two final products are identical we can solve
for value tails = $0.29/ kg U
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ESSAY #3: A CRITIQUE OF A MEDIUM-TERM NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
PROPOSAL
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The following press release summarizes the remarks by President
Carter at the opening of the INFCE Conference (see Essay #1, Section
2.4.3) in Washington during October, 1977:
"President Carter called yesterday for the creation of an
international nuclear fuel bank as one means of discouraging the
spread of technology that can be used to fashion nuclear weapons.
The President's proposal would be an attempt to assure a
worldwide supply of nuclear fuels and thus reduce pressure on
other nations to develop their own advanced nuclear technology,
which might lead to the production of nuclear weapons.
Addressing the opening of a three-day nuclear fuel cycle
conference at the State Department, Carter said the United States
would be willing to contribute "our own technical ability and our
own portion of the enriched uranium supplies" to such an
international fuel bank.
The proposal was the Administration's latest step in an effort to
halt the spread of nuclear weapons."1
This fuel bank proposal is part of the Administration's
three-tiered plan for improving enrichment supply assurance, as
contemplated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (see Essay
#1, Section 2.4.4):
(1) "The first; tier deals with steps the U.S. can take
independently to re-establish its credibility as a reliable
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supplier of enrichment services."2 These steps include
the re-opening of the U.S. enrichment contract order books,
closed since mid-1974, and the expansion of DOE's enrichment
capacity by building the Portsmouth centrifuge plant.
(2) "The second tier of our approach will be to promote
strengthened cooperation on the multilateral level to
improve existing fuel assurance arrangements."3
(3) "The 'third tier' is envisioned as an instrument for
enhancing the credibility of both unilateral and bilateral
contractual terms and conditions governing uranium feed and
enrichment; supply.,,4
This rather tortured language about the "third tier" of assurance
is generally taken to refer to a stockpile, also known as a fuel
bank, as proposed in President Carter's remarks.
Our purpose in this third essay is to analyze one variant of this
fuel bank proposal aimed at providing supply assurance during the
next 5-30 year period (which we refer to as the medium term). The
essay shall begin by stepping back to explain the broad logic of the
fuel bank, before performing some simple calculations of the
potential magnitude of such a bank and examining the details of a
specific stockpiling proposal.
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2.0 THE MOTIVATION FOR A MEDIUM-TERM FUEL BANK
As indicated in the previous press release, a nuclear fuel bank
represents an attempt to satisfy prevailing concerns about supply
assurance as a means of reducing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. This section of the essay offers a more precise definition
of medium-term nuclear fuel assurance fears and the role of a fuel
bank in alleviating these concerns.
2.1 A Definition of Medium-Term Assurance Fears
In seeking a definition of medium-term nuclear fuel assurance, we
draw on a larger project on the topic of nuclear fuel assurance, of
which the author is a member.5 The research of this project
summarizes medium-term assurance concerns as fears about supply
access and stability during the next five to thirty year period
(1983-2008). During this period consumer concerns center around the
availability and sanctity of standard long-term contracts for uranium
and enrichment services. Consumers are heard to voice the fear that
they will be unable to get a contract. We interpret this to mean
that they will be unable to get a contract at an acceptable political
and economic cost.
This concern i clarified by considering various sorts of
economic and non-economic costs. Economic costs include not merely
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the price paid for the final product; advance payments, equity
positions and bartered goods must be considered as elements of
price. Political (non-economic) costs are much more difficult to
measure. Examples of these costs include:
(1) non proliferation standards--for example, an agreement to
give the supplier unilateral veto power over the retransfer
or reprocessing of spent reactor fuel;
(2) dependence on political enemies--e.g. reliance on the
U.S.S.R. as a major source of enrichment services;
(3) exclusive dealing agreements--e.g. restrictions on the
choice of trading partners imposed as part of a far-reaching
nuclear pact, such as the Germany-Brazil treaty, which
included German sales of reactors, enrichment and
reprocessing technologies in return for preferential access
to Brazilian uranium resources.6
Taken together, these two types of costs define a two-dimensional
region of "contract acceptability" as shown in Figure 3. It should
be emphasized that the shape of this curve is purely hypothetical and
is chosen only for discussion purposes.
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FIGURE 3
THE REGION OF ACCEPTABLE CONTRACTS
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The abscissa of this graph represents economic costs, calibrated
in dollars. The ordinate represents an ordinal ranking of
non-economic costs corresponding to various future states of the
world. The tradeoff between these two types of cost defines a
boundary. Every point lying in the cross-hatched region represents
an acceptable combination of economic and non-economic costs
associated with a given contract, while every point outside the
diagram represents an unacceptable contract.
The point labelled X, corresponding to a generalized contract
price P4 and a political state of the world C, is an unacceptable
contract. Notice however that if the political cost is lowered to
State A, leaving price unchanged, the total contract moves from point
X to point Y which lies within the range of acceptability.
Similarly, if the contract price is reduced to P , leaving political
costs unchanged, the contract moves from point X to point Z and
becomes acceptable. Such a tradeoff is not always possible as
indicated by observing that a price P is considered a prohibitive
economic cost, irrespective of the political state of the world,
while non-economic cost D is unacceptable, no matter what contract
price is offered.
2.2 Two Polar Models of the Evolving Allocation System
In discussions with consumers expressing medium-term assurance
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fears, the following model of the evolution of the world's nuclear
fuel allocation system is revealed:
The World of Exclusive Dealing -- In this world, political
relationships predominate. Nuclear fuel suppliers and consumers
are constrained by an overlaid web of bilateral and multilateral
national nuclear trade agreements, which bind buying and selling
nations together, along the lines of the Germany-Brazil Treaty.
What is important is not what price a buyer is willing to pay,
but what supplier nations have reliable trade agreements with his
host country.
Clearly a world of political exclusive dealing agreements would
not effectively resolve assurance concerns. By its very nature,
exclusive dealing implies an absence of supply diversity. Therefore,
the extent to which a buyer's assurance fears are reduced by
dependence on a single seller is a function of the strength of the
political ties at the national level; even though contracts may be
available, the sanctity of those contracts will always be open to
doubts. In addition to these assurance fears which plague nations
who participate in this web of political agreements, one must
consider those nations (most likely developing countries) who are
outside of this fabric. Because the vast majority of nuclear supply
would be rigidly committed along politically negotiated lines, these
residual nations will have only a very thin market in which to
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purchase fuel cycle services. They are most certainly worse off in a
world of exclusive dealing.
By contrast, consumers and suppliers who disparage the validity
of medium-term assurance fears implicitly accept a polar model of the
evolution of the nuclear fuel allocation system:
The World of Smoothly Functioning Markets -- In this world,
price, not political ties, is the determining factor.
International nuclear markets are filled with homogeneous,
competing suppliers who are not encumbered by exclusive trade
agreements or "most favored nation" preferences. Most sales are
made under standard long-term contracts, although this mechanism
is supplemented by the operation of a spot market. Price
fluctuates narrowly around long-run marginal cost, and
information about price and contract terms is widely
disseminated, to permit potential buyers to make intelligent
decisions.
In this second world, the presumption is that smoothly
functioning nuclear markets will virtually eliminate medium-term
assurance concerns, as for example happens in the international coal
market, where standard long-term coal contracts are available from a
variety of competing sellers at a well-defined price whose historical
trajectory is fairly predictable and fairly closed linked to long run
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marginal costs. This is not to say that coal buying utilities have
no problems with fuel supply assurance. Our most recent domestic
experience with striking coal miners revealed why most U.S. utilities
maintain a 3-month stockpile of coal as insurance against short-term
supply interruptions. Unlike nuclear utilities, however, coal
utility buyers are rarely heard to voice concern about the
impossibility of obtaining a long-term contract for coal delivery,
because the availability of diverse, alternative sources of supply
eliminates fears of contract nonavailability.
Therefore, the critical issue in analyzing the seriousness of
consumer medium-term assurance fears is the extent to which smoothly
functioning international nuclear markets will develop. The link
between consumer assurance fears and supplier concerns comes through
nuclear weapons proliferation. In the name of fuel assurance, a
variety of nations are pursuing a series of actions which increase
the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, and this increased risk
imposes an external cost on the world at large. Some of the events
which have substantial proliferation overtones, and which are at
least partially justified by fuel assurance arguments, include:
(1) the acquisition or sale of domestic enrichment capacity, as
a means of reducing sole dependence on the U.S. as a source
of enrichment services (Germany-Brazil, URENCO, EURODIF,
UCOR, PNC);
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(2) the acquisition or sale of domestic reprocessing capacity,
as a means of extending the uranium resource base, and
diversifying the sources of uranium supply (Germany-Brazil,
France-Pakistan);
(3) the pursuit of breeder R&D as an expansion of the resource
base (France, Germany, U.K., U.S.S.R., Japan).
2.3 Trends
These two polar models of the evolving allocation system reflect
the political-market tensions identified in essay #1. Furthermore,
the difficulty in identifying whether the current trend is in the
direction of a market system or an exclusive dealing system is
aggravated by the prevailing uncertainties noted in essay #1. As
described in our first essay there have been some incidents (e.g. the
Canadian and Australian embargoes, and the closing of the U.S. order
books) which have heightened consumers' medium-term assurance fears.
Some consumers have reacted to these assurance concerns by trying to
achieve supply assurance by negotiating exclusive dealing
arrangements.
The German-Brazilian Treaty is the leading example of a movement
towards a world of exclusive dealing. Subject to this $4 billion
agreement, Germany will transfer enrichment and reprocessing
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technology to Brazil, in return for which Brazil will purchase two
German reactors, take an option on six more, and give Germany
preferential treatment regarding purchase of Brazilian uranium. In
effect Brazil will receive the means for eventual energy
self-sufficiency while Germany will create a market for reactor
exports and acquire a captive uranium supply.7 Both parties to
this agreement have argued that it was necessitated by the need to
achieve independence from the insecurities in the uranium and
enrichment markets.8
On the other hand, there are other less obvious indications that
the market system is attempting to function to allocate risks through
the contracting process. DOE is in the process of proposing the AFC
enrichment contract which will allow the customer more scheduling
flexibility than the LTFC contract, thereby sharing some of the risks
of slippages in reactor demand. Uranium contracting has created a
series of utility-mining company joint ventures aimed at sharing the
risks of uranium exploration and production. Utilities and national
governments have begun to accumulate stockpiles of natural and/or
enriched uranium as an assurance measure. EURODIF and URENCO are
examples of enrichment consortia which offer a guaranteed percentage
of the consortium's output in return for equity participation.
Similarly there exists substantial supranational investment in
foreign mining operations as a means of guaranteeing supply and
reducing the risk of expropriation.
279
2.4 The Role of a Medium-Term Fuel Bank
In sum, the role of a medium-term fuel bank is to reduce the
perceived degree of political control over the nuclear marketplace by
offering an alternative to reliance on a few national suppliers who
have proven unreliable in the past and whose future policies are
still highly uncertain. Presumably, this attempt to "take the
politics out of nuclear fuel" will restore international confidence
in the international nuclear market system, thereby reducing the
incentives both for the negotiation of exclusive deals, which
frustrate the ability of the market to provide supply assurance, and
for the assurance-motivated pursuit of proliferation-prone
technologies.
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3.0 THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT A MEDIUM-TERM FUEL BANK
Section 2.0 of this essay has outlined what might be loosely
referred to as the theoretical basis for a medium-term fuel bank. As
described there, the notion certainly makes logical sense. To
appreciate the actual impacts of such a fuel bank, however, one must
understand the status quo market situation with which the fuel bank
is to be compared. The description of this baseline alternative is
the purpose of this third section of the essay. Using some simple
international stockpile forecasts we shall demonstrate that the
operation of the enrichment market, without the addition of a fuel
bank, will result in the accumulation of large, geographically
disperse stockpiles of enriched fuel during the next decade which
should substantially mitigate medium-term assurance concerns.
3.1 Stockpile Forecasts
In this section of the essay we shall use publicly available data
on enrichment supply and demand to compute a base case aggregate
stockpile forecast which indicates the cumulative excess enrichment
capacity available for private or public stockpiling from now through
1990, and we shall test the sensitivity of our estimates to
variations in our input assumptions. Lastly we shall comment on how
these estimates relate to any medium-term fuel bank proposal. Next
using data on enrichment contract deliveries we shall estimate how
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this aggregate stockpile is likely to be allocated between suppliers
and consumers in five geographic regions of the Non-Communist
World--U.S., EURODIF nations, URENCO nations, Japan, and Other
nations.
3.1.1 Demand Projections
In order to compute stockpile forecasts, we require, as one
input, the demand for nuclear-generated electricity, in terms of
annual forecasts of GWE installed capacity by region and by reactor
type. For our demand forecasts we have chosen to use the most recent
OECD projections, published in December, 1977, as given in Table 16.
Table 16 estimates reflect the substantial slippage in reactor
installations in recent years, The OECD world estimate for the year
2000 is now 1,000 GWE nuclear, which is one-half of the "low"
estimate of 2,005 GWE reported in the 1975 version of this report.
In addition these estimates are significantly lower than the official
estimates of many countries; assuming the realization of the
ambitious goals of official national nuclear programs would yield an
installed world nuclear capacity of 1890 GWE by the year 2000.
Even with these drastic reductions in capacity forecasts, the
OECD/IAEA estimates are likely to remain upward biased. This bias is
the result of all the problems in demand estimation cited in essay
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TABLE 16
OECD/IAEA FORECAST OF NON-COMMUNIST WORLD
INSTALLED LWR NUCLEAR CAPACITY (GWE)9
END OF
CALENDAR YEAR USA
EURODIF1
NATIONS
URENC02
NATIONS JAPAN OTHER TOTAL
8 6 77
12 10 94
13 12 114
15 15 133
17 17 152
19 19 174
22 20 199
24 24 228
27 27 259
31 32 296
35 35 339
39 41 381
44 48 427
50 53 410
SOURCE: OECD and IAEA, "Uranium:
Demand", December 1977.
Table 9, page 31.
Resources, Production, and
Derived from Table 8, page 28, and
1 France, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Iran
2 United Kingdom, West Germany, Netherlands
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1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
48
50
55
60
68
77
88
101
115
130
146
162
178
194
5
9
16
23
28
35
43
49
57
66
77
88
100
111
10
13
18
20
22
24
26
30
33
37
46
51
57
62
#1. This upward bias is confirmed by comparing the OECD/IAEA
estimates with the most recent independent DOE, and IEA estimates, as
done in Table 17. Nevertheless, we have chosen to use the OECD/IAEA
estimates because they are the most recent publicly available data
series which is disaggregated both by region and by reactor type.
Due to the likely residual bias we shall interpret these demand data
as providing an upper bound on demand.
Assuming a tails assay of 0.25%, a steady state reactor load
factor of 65%, and no uranium or plutonium recycling, one can convert
the GWE forecasts of Table 16 into the SWU demand forecasts shown in
Table 18.
3.1.2 Supply Projections
Similar to the demand side of the market, there are problems in
forecasting the supply of commercial enrichment services that serve
as the second major input into the stockpile simulations. Just as
official national demand forecasts have consistently overestimated
reactor installations, there is a tendency for SWU suppliers to
overstate the size of their capacity expansion forecasts, and to
understate the delays inherent in operationalizing capacity
additions. This overstatement is motivated by commercial
gamesmanship, national prestige, and engineering optimism. An
example of the sorts of delays that have been experienced is offered
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TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF WORLD LWR CAPACITY ESTIMATES
1990
OECD/IAEA 504
"Low" 405
DOE/
"Base" 420
IEA 410
285
2000
1,000
915
1,012
960
TABLE 18
FORECASTS OF ENRICHMENT DEMAND
DERIVED FROM OECD/IAEA GWE FORECASTS (MMSWU)10
YEAR
EURODIF
USA NATIONS
1977 4.7
1978 5.7
1979 6.1
1980 7.2
1981 8.1
1982 9.3
1983 10.8
1984 12.2
1985 13.7
1986 15.2
1987 16.7
1988 18.2
1989 19.6
1990 21.0
TOTAL 168.5
1.2
2.3
3.0
3.2
4.0
4.9
5.2
6.2
7.1
8.3
9.3
10.6
I 11.4
112.4
89.1
URENCO
NATIONS
1.5
2.3
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
3.2
3.3
3.8
5.3
5.3
5.9
6.3
6.7
52.8
OTHER
JAPAN NATIONS
* No recycling
* 0.25% tails assay
* 65% equilbibriuml load factor
* GWE data from Table 16
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1.5
1.3
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.3
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.7
5.3
5.9
42.3
1.4
1.3
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.6
2.8
3.4
3.5
4.5
5.2
5.4
5.8
43.2
TOTAL
10.3
12.9
14.4
16.2
18.3
21.0
24.2
27.3
31.2
35.9
39.8
44.6
48.0
51.8
395.9
by the U.S. experience in the construction of 9 MMSWU of additional
enrichment capacity. Originally scheduled for completion as a
privately owned Alabama-located gaseous diffusion plant in 1983, the
incremental SWU capacity is now scheduled as a government owned,
Portsmouth, Ohio, centrifuge facility to be completed by 1988. Given
that the completion date is 10 years away, and contracts for much of
the construction have not yet been let, even this 1988 completion
date may be hopelessly optimistic.11
Once again, we rely on the publicly stated capacity expansion
plans of current and potential SWU suppliers. Even here, however, it
is possible to draw distinctions between the degree of firmness
associated with different capacity expansion plans based on a careful
monitoring of the nuclear trade literature and discussions with
veteran nuclear market participants.
The firm category of enrichment supply includes the most recent
publicly announced expansion plans of DOE, EURODIF, URENCO, and
TECHNABSEXPORT (U.S.S.R.). DOE's plan to expand the current (1977)
domestic SWU capacity of 17 MMSWU has three components:
(1) The Cascade Improvement Program (CIP), currently ongoing at
the three government-owned enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio. Initiated in
1973, CIP is intended to implement technological improvements in
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existing diffusion barriers and pumping units, which will increase
the total SWU capacity by 5.7 MMSWU at a cost of $320 M. With the
exception of a 15 - week strike at Portsmouth, CIP is on schedule and
is targeted for completion in 1982; it is presently 60% completed.
12
(2) The Cascade Uprating Program (CUP), also currently ongoing.
Unlike CIP, which modifies existing equipment to improve its
efficiency without adding new barriers or requiring more power
inputs, CUP is designed to add additional barriers to the diffusion
complex which will increase the total SWU capacity by 4.8 MMSWU.
Initiated in 1975, with a total cost of $250 MM, CUP is currently on
schedule and is targeted for completion in 1985; it is presently 60%
complete. The uprating of the 4140 CUP stages will require
increasing the power input into the diffusion complex from 6100 MWE
for
to 7400 MWE. Power contracts have been signed.100% of the additional
1300 MWE.
(3) The Portsmouth gas centrifuge plant (GCP), currently in the
contract-letting stages for planning and design. The current
schedule calls for construction to begin during 1979, with the 8.8
MMSWU capacity coming on line as shown in Table q.13
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Because the centrifuge process is so much less energy-intensive
than the diffusion process, only 100 MWE will be required to operate
the GCP; this power is currently under contract.
The combined effect of these three programs is to increase DOE's
SWU capacity as shown in Table 19. This rated capacity assumes that
all firm power is delivered as contracted; although DOE holds
interruptible power contracts, no interruptible power deliveries are
assumed.
EURODIF is a multinational consortium headed by France (43%),
including Spain (11%), Italy (25%), Belgium (11%) and Iran (10%).
The French Government supplies the gaseous diffusion technology and
operating skills, while the other partners supply equity investment.
The non-French partners do not share in the development of the
technology or the operating decisions; in return for their capital
funds these other partners are guaranteed a percentage of the
enriched output proportional to their equity holdings, and likewise
are able to vote their shares on marketing decisions such as contract
terms and pricing. EURODIF is presently building a gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant at; Tricastin, France; commercial sales are scheduled
to commence in 1979, with the full scale production level of 10.8
MMSWU being reached by 1982. Total engineering, plant and equipment
costs are estimated at $10.7 billion (1975 dollars), and
construction, initiated in 1974, is currently on the schedule
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TABLE 19
DOE ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
CIP
2.3
3.6
4.7
5.5
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
5.7
73.2
CUP
1.9
3.1
3.9
4.5
4.8
4.8
4.8
4. 8
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
61.4
GCP
1.2
,,
1.2
(4), and DOE Power Contracts
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TOTAL
BASE
PLANT
14.4
14.0
13.9
13.2
13.0
13.0
14.5
16.5
17.5
18.5
18.4
18.0
17.2
17.2
219.3
END OF
CALENDAR
YEAR
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
SOURCES:
18.7
20.7
22.5
23.2
23.5
23.5
25.0
27.0
28.0
30.2
33.0
35.7
36.5
36.5
384.0
reflected in Table 20. This capacity may be considered firm as
almost 95% of EURODIF's SWU capacity is under contract, and the
balance is being aggressively marketed worldwide.
URENCO is also a multinational consortium comprised of the United
Kingdom (1/3), West Germany (1/3), and the Netherlands (1/3). The
organization of URENCO is more complicated than that of EURODIF,
because in the URENCO consortium the three partners share in the
development and operation of the enrichment technology, as well as
the marketing of the enriched product; this structure is described in
detail by Allday ().
Two URENCO enrichment plants are now operating, and their first
commerical contract deliveries were made during 1977; they are due to
be expanded to 2.1 MMSWU by 1982, in accordance with the schedule
shown in Table 20. This expansion may be considered firm, as roughly
75% of the cumulative production is under contract and the balance is
being offered for sale worldwide. Although we consider the size of
this expansion as firm, the location of this expansion is as yet
undetermined, and the timing of the expansion may be delayed as much
as three years.
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TABLE 20
FIRM FOREIGN ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
END OF
CALENDAR YEAR
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
EURODIF
2.6
6.3
8.4
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.8
10.8
114.5
URENCO
0.2
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
23.1
USSR
2.1
2.0
3:.4
3.4
3.4
3.0
3.6
2.6
2.7
2.6
3.1
3.1
2.5
2.5
40.0
SOURCES: (2), pg. 11 modified to eliminate URENCO expansion
beyond 2.1 MMSWU.
USSR data based on DOE estimates of contracts as
reported by Newman ().
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TOTAL
2.3
2.4
6.8
10.9
13.4
15.9
16.5
15.5
15.6
15.5
16.0
16.0
15.4
15.4
177.6
Little hard data are available regarding the commerical
enrichment plans of the Soviet supplier, TECHNABSEXPORT. Unconfirmed
reports have estimated U.S.S.R. enrichment capacity to be about 7 -
10 MMSWU, of which 4 - 7 MMSWU could conceivably be available for
civilian nuclear power programs. As a rule of thumb, the U.S.S.R.
offers about 3 MMSWU per year to the Non-Communist World market.
This capacity may be considered firm, as TECHNABSEXPORT has committed
90% of this cumulative capacity under contracts with West Germany,
France, Italy, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Great Britain, and
Spain, and is contacting utilities in nations such as Australia, the
United States, and Japan for the purpose of additional sales.1 5
Table 20 estimates of U.S.S.R. capacity are derived directly from
U.S.S.R. contracts data reported by Newman (9).
In addition to this firm foreign SWU capacity, three SWU sellers
have announced future expansion plans which we have classified as
potential capacity. The first of these sellers is COREDIF, a
multinational consortium created by the EURODIF participants, with
the following ownership structure:
EURODIF 51%
Iran 20%
France 29%
COREDIF was organized in May, 1975, and is contemplating the
construction of 10.8 MMSWU of gaseous diffusion enrichment capacity
by 1989. The COREDIF facility will only enrich fuel to 1.3%, with
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the balance of the enrichment done by EURODIF. The COREDIF site has
not yet been chosen, but France, Belgium, or Italy, are all candidate
locations. Financing of the $2.2 billion plant will not be sought,
nor any contracts offered, until engineering studies have been
completed. Current expansion plans are catalogued in Table 21.
COREDIF's shareholders have already spoken for 4 MMSWU of the 5.4
MMSWU capacity planned for 1985; the subsequent expansion to 10 MMSWU
by 1989 will be a function of market response, particularly from U.S.
utilities. 16
URENCO has also announced enrichment capacity expansion plans,
although their current reading of the market is much different from
COREDIF's optimistic assessment which forecasts a shortfall of
worldwide enrichment capacity in the mid-1980's. Originally, URENCO
planned to have 10 MMSWU of enrichment capacity operational by 1985,
yet their recent market experience has failed to support these
expectations and URENCO is adjusting its schedule to delay the 10
MMSWU capacity until 1987 or 1988; this revised schedule is
reproduced in Table 21.
A third potential source of commercial enrichment services is
South Africa's Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR). South Africa
officially announced in 1975 that it intends to build a commercial
SWU facility using its domestically developed stationary-wall
centrifuge process. Currently UCOR is operating a centrifuge pilot
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plant, and during 1978 it confirmed its plans for a commercial
plant. Although no official public statement has been offered
detailing the size and timing of the plant, unofficial South African
sources estimate a 5 MMSWU facility will go on stream in 1986; this
expansion plan is reflected in Table 21.
Beyond firm and potential foreign enrichment capacity, there are
a series of proposed ventures that we have classified as
"speculative" SWU sellers. The first of these is NUCLEBRAS, a joint
venture of Brazil and West Germany created by the Brazil-Germany
Treaty of 1975. Current plans are to build an 0.2 MMSWU
demonstration plant; in Brazil during the early 1980's using the
German-supplied Becker nozzle technology. A successful pilot test
will presumably be followed by a commercial enrichment plant,
although the timing and size of such a facility remain unspecified.
The pilot plant construction is proceeding very slowly, as Brazil
appears to attach higher priority to other fuel cycle stages than
enrichment.
Another speculative foreign enricher is the Japanese Power
Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). PNC is
planning to construct a gas centrifuge test plant with a capacity of
0.05 MMSWU in 1980. If successful, this test plant will be followed
by a demonstration plant of roughly 0.5 MMSWU for completion during
the late 1980's. Finally, plans call for the construction of a 4
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TABLE 21
POTENTIAL FOREIGN ENRICHMENT CAPACITY
END OF
CALENDAR
YEAR
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
COREDIF
1.8
3.6
5.411
7.0
8,,0
9.0
10.0
10.0
54.,8
URENC01
1.3
2.6
4.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
45.9
UCOR
1.6
3.2
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
29.8
TOTAL
3.1
7.8
12.6
18.0
21.0
22.0
23.0
23.0
130.5
1 in addition to firm URENCO capacity listed in Table 20.
SOURCES: (2) pg. 1'1 and various issues of Nuclear Fuel
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MMSWU commercial centrifuge plant from 1990 - 1995. Meanwhile, Japan
has been actively seeking partnership in joint enrichment ventures,
where Japanese financing can complement a partner's enrichment
technology and uranium feed; these negotiations have been extensively
pursued with Australia, which has developed its own version of the
centrifuge technology, although no official agreement has yet been
concluded.
Beyond these two speculative enrichment ventures, a host of other
nations have evidenced an interest in pursuing a commercial
enrichment technology. Even without Japanese participation,
Australia has expressed confidence in its ability to build a
commercial facility using its domestic technology. Although Canadian
plans for a domestic plant as a joint venture with EURODIF are now in
abeyance, this interest could revive if the market picks up.
Portugal is conducting negotiations with Germany in an effort to
create a nuclear pact modelled on the German-Brazilian agreement.
Sweden has expressed interest in acquiring an established enrichment
technology for use in a domestic enrichment plant. Other nations
expressing interest in acquiring enrichment capability include India,
Iran, and Zaire.
3.1.3 Aggregate Stockpile Forecast
Using the demand estimates of Table 18 and the firm supply
estimates of Table 20, we can compute the worldwide cumulative excess
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enrichment capacity potentially available for stockpiling programs.
The results of this base case calculation are given in Table 22,
measured both in:
(1) MMSWU--defined as the separative capacity used to create the
stockpile, and,
(2) GWE-yrs.--defined as the amount of electrical energy that
could be generated if the stockpiled fuel were used to reload
standard LWRs.
Because the SWU is not a measure of physical output, but of
thermodynamic potential (see essay #1, section 1.2) the physical size
of any stockpile will be a function of the feed assay, tails assay,
and product assay with which this separative capacity is used.
Therefore, in quantifying stockpile size we have used both a measure
of separative capacity available for stockpiling (MMSWU), and a
measure of possible physical output (GWE-yrs.). For more on the
pitfalls and intricacies of stockpile accounting, the interested
reader is referred to Appendix I of this essay.
Table 22 includes the initial DOE stock of 21.5 MMSWU, as of
1/1/77, and the initial Japanese stock of 8.9 MMSWU, as of 1/1/77,
created by the Japanese Advance Sale (JAS) during 1973. Under the
terms of the JAS a group of Japanese utilities purchased part of the
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ERDA preproduction stockpile. The fuel from this advance purchase is
held on-site at DOE production facilities, and is used to satisfy a
portion of Japanese DOE enrichment contract deliveries. Table 22
assumes that the JAS stock is drawn down at the rate of 0.9 MMSWU per
year over the 10-year period 1977 - 1986. Aside from these initial
DOE and JAS stocks, no additional initial stockpiles are assumed to
exist. Table 22 also reflects DOE's estimate of the U.S. non-power
SWU demand of 1.5 IMSWU/yr., the great bulk of which is used to
produce fuel for research reactors and naval submarines.
The calculation in Table 22 reveals that excess commercial
enrichment capacity will prevail throughout the 1980's, thereby
creating an opportunity for the construction of worldwide stockpiles
able to satisfy between three and four years of forward demands. Of
course the magnitude of these stocks is a function of our
assumptions, but it is safe to say that the conclusion that enough
excess enrichment capacity will exist to create gigantic stockpiles
is a robust result, Table 23 indicates the sensitivity of the 1990
stockpile to changes in the input assumptions. Obviously our base
case forecast is a conservative calculation because it uses an upper
bound for demand and a lower bound for supply. Only a reduction in
the tails assay, an increase in reactor operating efficiency, or a
delay in expansion plans will sharply cut back the potential
stockpile, while a number of events, including plausible further
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TABLE 23
SENSITIVITY OF 1990 STOCKPILE TO INPUT ASSUMPTIONS
Base Case 1990 Stockpile = 166 MMSWU = 1824 GWE-YRS.
Changes in Demand:
1. increase load factor to 70%
2. decrease tails assay to 0.20%
3. increase tails assay to 0.30%
4. have demand slip 10%
5. recycle uranium and plutonium
beginning in 19851
Changes in Supply:
-16
-38
+55
+40
STOCK
MMSWU
MMSWU
MMSWU
MMSWU
+51 MMSWU
1. delay Portsmouth past 2.2 MMSWU
2. include potential foreign enrichers
3. recycle entire DOE stockpile of
0.3% tails2
-7 MMSWU
+130 MMSWU
-32 GWE-YRS.3
1 assumes 20% SWU savings due to recycle (Nuclear Fuels Policy pg.
115). This is actually an upper bound.
2 DOE stockpile of 0.3% tails = 42,281 MT U as of 7/1/77.
3 Unlike the other sensitivity tests, tails recycle will have no
effect on the size of the stock calibrated in SWUs, but it will
reduce the physical mass of reactor fuel as calibrated in
GWE-YRS. (See Appendix I).
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slippage as well as entry by potential foreign enrichers, could
increase the magnitude of the potential stock.
3.1.4 Contracts Data
Given, therefore, that the potential for extensive worldwide
stockpiles does indeed exist, we next inquire as to how these stocks
are likely to be distributed across geographic regions in future
years. Knowledge of the deliveries to be made under currently
existing enrichment contracts provides the link that is required to
disaggregate the worldwide stockpile by region.
DOE compiles data on U.S. and foreign enrichment contract
deliveries based on Appendix A of its current enrichment contracts.
Using these data, Table 24 calculates DOE's contractual commitments
assuming an 0.25% operating tails assay and a 75% contract load
factor. Recall that as discussed in essay #1, and as confirmed in
conversations with DOE contract personnel in Oak Ridge, enrichment
contract load factors significantly exceed expected load factor
experience, which we earlier estimated at 65% for purposes of our
aggregate stockpile calculation. Oak Ridge officials estimate that
most SWU contract load factors are between 70% and 80%, therefore, we
have chosen 75% as a representative load factor.
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TABLE 24
DOE ENRICHMENT CONTRACT DELIVERIES (MMSWU)
CALENDAR U.S.
YEAR UTILITIES
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
6.5
7.8
9.6
11.4
13.2
15.0
17.5
18.9
20.7
20.8
22.1
21.2
21.9
21.5
228.1
EURODIF
UTILITIES
1.0
1.4
1.4
1.9
1.8
1.9
2.0
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
24.7
URENCO
UTILITIES
0.9
0.8
1.0
1.5
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
20.9
OTHER
UTILITIES
1.3
1.6
1.8
2.4
3.3
3.2
3.7
3.4
3.4
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
41.7
JAPAN
UTILITIES
1.6
1.6
1.9
2.1
1.9
3.2
4.6
4.2
5.2
5.6
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
51.9
0.25% tails
75% contract load factor
SOURCE: DOE Enrichment Contract Appendices
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TOTAL
11.3
13.2
15.7
19.3
22.1
25.1
29.5
30.1
32.8
33.5
34.1
33.2
33.9
33.5
367.3
Similarly, DOE uses a variety of sources to compile a data series
for enrichment contract deliveries by foreign enrichers. Tables
25-27 provide these data for EURODIF, URENCO, and TECHNABSEXPORT
contract deliveries.
3.1.5 Disaggregated Stockpile Forecasts
Using the demand, supply, and contract delivery data of Tables
18-20 and 24-27 we can compute the disaggregated base stockpile
forecast given in Table 28 in MMSWU and plotted in Figure 4 in
GWE-yrs. These results reveal that not only is there a worldwide
aggregate cumulative excess enrichment capacity, but that there is
excess capacity within each region. The allocation of the stockpile
between utilities and enrichers within each region depends on whether
current contract deliveries are actually made, or whether utilities
get relief from their over-contracted position. To the extent that
relief is granted some of the stocks will shift back to the
enrichers, but in any event this contract relief will have no effect
on the size of the aggregate potential stockpile; it merely
determines who holds what portion of the potential stocks.
It is important to emphasize that these are potential stockpiles
which are forecasted on the assumption that all of the available
excess enrichment capacity is used for preproduction purposes. In
view of the staggering magnitude of the stocks that accumulate from
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TABLE 25
EURODIF ENRICHMENT CONTRACT DELIVERIES (MMSWU)
JAPAN
UTILITIES
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
TOTAL 10.0
URENCO
UTILITIES
0.2
0.2
0.2
__e
__..
0.6
OTHER
UTILITIES
0.1
0.1
0. 1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.0
EURODIF
UTILITIES
2.8
6.1
7.1
7.8
8.6
9.3
9.6
9.6
9.6
9.6
9.6
8.5
98.2
SOURCE: Estimates compiled
Security Affairs
by DOE Office of International
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1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
2.8
6.1
8.4
9.1
9.9
10.4
10.7
10.7
10.7
10.7
10.7
9.6
109.8
TABLE 26
URENCO ENRICHMENT CONTRACT DELIVERIES (MMSWU)
1977'
1978
19791
1980
1981
1982
1983;
1984
1985;
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
OTHER
UTILITIES
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
3.2
URENCO
UTILITIES
0.3
0.5
1.1
1.5
1.8
2.0
1.9
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
21.0
TOTAL
0.3
0.5
1.1
1.5
1.9
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
24.2
SOURCE: Estimates compiled by DOE Office of International
Security Affairs
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TABLE 27
U.S.S.R. ENRICHMENT CONTRACT DELIVERIES (MTSWU)
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
EURODIF
UTILITIES
230
0
98
713
748
1,693
2,208
1,843
1,573
2,018
1,1951
1,1951
1,1251
1,6501
1,6501
1,050
1,050
20,039
1 = 600 on option
2 = 125 on option
Source: (8) pp. 76 - 77
(3,000
Option)
URENCO
UTILITIES
170
295
262
1,183
702
1,479
1,131
, Z73
1,115
1,115
1,115
1,115
1,115
1,1122
1,1122
1,1122
1 1122
16,S18
OTHER
UTILITIES
0
0
0
160
620
230
70
290
290
512
292
410
410
410
410
410
410
4,924
TOTAL
400
295
360
2,070
3,402
3,409
3,406
2,978
3,645
2,602
2,720
2,650
3,172
3,172
2,572
2,572
41,481
(3,500 Option)(500
Option)
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pursuing this strategy, it is likely that national budgetary pressure
will be brought to bear in an effort to encourage contract relief
which will permit nations to defer proposed additions to SWU
capacities as a means of reducing the inventory carrying costs on
these substantial stockpiles. In the U.S. these pressures are
already evident in the DOE decisions to offer contract relief to LTFC
customers, to delay the proposed Portsmouth expansion, to idle a
percentage of existing SWU capacity by accepting reduced power
deliveries from TVA, and to consider delays in the completion of the
CIP/CUP programs. The preceding potential stockpile analysis
suggests that this pattern may soon reveal itself in foreign nations
as well.
3.2 Summary
This section has sharpened the focus of our critique of any
medium-term fuel bank proposal. We have demonstrated that even in
the absence of any fuel bank, the normal operation of the enrichment
market will result in the creation of large, geographically disperse
stocks of enriched fuel during the next decade. This excess capacity
result follows from the combination of utility over ordering, as an
insurance measure under long term contracting, and the continuing
slippage in reactor demand forecasts. Although the concern during
the early 1970's centered around the enrichment crisis and the
shortage of enrichment capacity, it is now obvious that the
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prevailing condition in enrichment markets during the 1980's will not
be one of crisis shortages, but of a glut of excess capacity.
Therefore we must recognize that in contemplating the
establishment of a medium-term fuel bank the appropriate comparison
is between a condition of geographically disperse stocks whose
disposition will be determined primarily by market forces, and a
condition of a larger, centralized fuel bank stockpile whose
disposition shall be governed primarily by politically-determined
institutional rules. We emphasize that it is inappropriate to
compare a nuclear fuel bank with a world in which no other stockpiles
exist. The reader must bear this point in mind during the balance of
this essay.
It should be pointed out that the preceding forecasts have dealt
solely with the circumstances in the enrichment market, with no
mention of the uranium market. Essay #1 has indicated that the issue
of nuclear fuel assurance is tied not only to the reliable behavior
of the enrichment market, but to the stability of the uranium market
as well. Obviously without readily available uranium feed, the
enrichment capacity cannot be used for stockpiling. The adequacy of
uranium reserves, the performance of the uranium market, and the
implications of enriched fuel stockpiles for the performance of the
uranium market, are complex topics beyond the scope of this essay.
The reader desiring; more analysis of the uranium market is referred
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to the larger MIT Nuclear Fuel Assurance Project, of which the author
is a member. For our present purposes it is sufficient to observe
that publicly available forecasts of uranium supply indicate that the
availability of uranium will not constrain the accumulation of base
case enriched uranuim stockpiles. A simple calculation confirming
this observation is included as Appendix II to this essay.
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4.0 A SPECIFIC MEDIUM-TERM FUEL BANK PROPOSAL
Now we are ready to consider a specific proposal for a
medium-term fuel bank. Unfortunately no specific official proposals
are in the public domain, although an entire INFCE task force is
being devoted to the study of nuclear fuel assurances. Nevertheless,
discussions with DOE and State Department officials, as well as
reports in the nuclear press, have suggested enough of the outline of
such a fuel bank proposal to permit us to offer the following
hypothetical medium-term fuel bank, for use as a subsequent focus of
criticism. 17
The fuel bank would be held under the international auspices of
the International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA) contemplated in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (see essay #1, section 2.4.4).
As such, it would be jointly owned and managed by supplying and
consuming nations. The INFA would seek to stabilize the uranium
market, and to create greater supply assurance in the enrichment
market by participating in the siting, operation, and ownership of
new enrichment facilities.
In order to offer effective supply assurances, the INFA
would require widespread voting representation of both consumers and
suppliers. This system of checks and balances would be achieved by
patterning the voting structure after the three-tiered INTELSAT
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structure.18 First, INFA would have a universal membership body
operating on a one nation/one vote basis; this would be the forum for
deciding on general non-proliferation policy issues. It would serve
to reduce the perceived likelihood of unilateral discriminatory
supply restrictions by giving all nations participating in the INFA a
voice in the operations of the fuel bank.
Second, the INFA would have a board of governors exercising
direct oversight of the system. This board would be the forum for
reviewing financial and operating decisions. Investing nations would
contribute enriched uranium, U3 0 , or cash, as a means of gaining
membership on the INFA Board, and would receive voting power
proportional to their investment. This weighted voting scheme would
encourage contributions from suppliers by offering some greater
degree of control in return for their assumption of greater financial
risks as a result of their proportionally larger investments.
Consumer representation on the INFA Board would ensure wide
geographic representation in order to prevent domination by a single
supplier nation.
Finally, the INFA would have an international administrative and
technical staff, under a director-general, responsible for making
day-to-day decisions under the guidance of the board. Presumably the
INFA would draw its staff from different national atomic energy
commissions, as well as enrichment contractors and mine operators.
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The INFA fuel bank would be held in a single, centralized
location. It would consist of 3.2% enriched uranium, as this is the
highest enrichment required for fueling an LWR, and lower assays may
be achieved by diluting this fuel with natural uranium. Initially
stocks would be amassed by contributions from enrichment supplier
nations, such as the roughly 10 MMSWU of the DOE preproduction stocks
which has been proposed as the U.S. contribution to such a bank. For
later stockpile increments, the INFA would purchase enriched fuel
from SWU suppliers at market prices, or participate directly in the
ownership of enrichment facilities. The costs of building and
holding these stocks would be shared proportionately by INFA Board
members.
The purpose of the INFA fuel bank would be to act as a supplier
of last resort. Nations unable to obtain long-term contracts for
enriched fuel at acceptable political and economic costs, or nations
experiencing an interruption in fuel supply, could purchase enriched
fuel directly from the INFA stockpile. In order to discourage
capricious use of these stocks, INFA sales would be made at a slight
premium, say 5%, over the prevailing market price for enriched fuel.
Nations which would draw on the INFA bank need only agree to IAEA
safeguards on the shipments received from the INFA stockpiles; no
other non-proliferation conditions would be attached because this
would prohibit universal access to the fuel bank.
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As stated earlier, this INFA proposal is our best effort at
reconstructing the Congressional intent in suggesting a fuel bank.
As such, this large international fuel bank will be the primary focus
of our subsequent discussion. We note here, however, that the
suggestion has also been made that a small emergency reserve fuel
bank, of say 5 MMSWU, is a more appropriate strategic response to the
fuel assurance problem than the large INFA bank. For now, we only
wish to draw the distinction between this emergency reserve fuel
bank, which is part of a scheme of restrained market intervention,
and the proposed INFA fuel bank, which represents a massive market
intervention. After critiquing the INFA strategy, we shall return to
say a few words about the emergency reserve approach.
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5.0 A CRITIQUE OF THE FUEL BANK PROPOSAL
As the starting point for our critique of this proposal, we
recall the discussions in section 2 of this essay where we
established that the role of a medium-term fuel bank should be to
reduce the perceived degree of political control over nuclear
markets, thereby fostering the development of a smoothly functioning
international market. Therefore, we must ask whether the proposed
fuel bank is likely to achieve both, or indeed either, of these
objectives.
5.1 Depoliticization
Will this proposed fuel bank effectively insulate nuclear markets
from the vagaries of political change? We think it unlikely. The
success of the fuel bank as a mechanism for resolving some of the
prevailing political uncertainties which hamper the development of
nuclear markets will be a function of:
1. the details of the INFA voting structure, and
2. the conditions of stockpile access.
As described by Skolnikoff (12) the success of INTELSAT in
persuading countries to depend solely on an international
organization for the operation of an essential technical service is
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largely attributable to its innovative three-tiered structure, which
provides both political control and operational efficiency. While
the success of the INTELSAT experience is reassuring evidence of the
viability of an international high technology corporation, certain
stark differences between the nuclear fuel cycle and communication
satellite technologies call into question the transferability of the
INTELSAT experience to the INFA.
First, in 1964, at the time of the creation of INTELSAT, the U.S.
had a technological monopoly on space communications capability.
Furthermore, there were substantial economies of scale to be realized
by deploying the satellite technology worldwide and making maximum
use of the technical advances. In 1978, the United States enjoys
less than a monopoly position in enrichment technology. The
existence of competing technologies, and some years of vigorous
competition, makes the selection of a preferred technology for
constructing enrichment plants to be owned and operated by the INFA a
highly contentious choice. Also, the economies of scale in
enrichment are not so large as to encourage worldwide participation
to take advantage of them. Lastly, the uranium enrichment
technologies, as well as much of the data on national stockpiles, are
surrounded by military classification barriers that will make
international conferrals extremely sensitive; although communications
capability is an essential aspect of a nation's economy, a
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communications satellite is less transparently usable as a weapon of
war than a uranium enrichment plant.
Whatever the parallel with INTELSAT, it becomes obvious that the
negotiation of an INFA agreement will be orders of magnitude more
complicated than is implied by our fuel bank proposal. An elaborate
set of rules must be agreed upon in order to represent competing
interests. Voting rules must be structured so that not only can no
single nation dictate INFA policy, but no easily foreseeable
alliances (SWU suppliers-DOE, EURODIF, URENCO; uranium
producers-U.S.A., Canada, Australia, South Africa; militant
non-proliferators-Canada, Australia, U.S.A.) can dominate corporate
proceedings.
Further, it remains to be seen whether a set of voting rules can
be devised which effectively reduces the perception of political
control by creating a stable consensus of INFA participants regarding
the non-proliferation terms and conditions of access to the INFA
stockpile. Our fuel bank proposal blithely assumes that only minimal
proliferation conditions will be attached to fuel bank sales. While
these minimal conditions may satisfy European nations, and
simultaneously permit broad, non-discriminatory access to INFA
stocks, the acceptance of these minimal conditions would represent a
major concession on the part of proliferation-conscious suppliers
like Canada, Australia, and the U.S., who would prefer that nations
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agree to forgo the acquisition of domestic enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities, and to accept full-scope safeguards on all
of their nuclear activities, in return for stockpile access. Under
some interpretations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the U.S.
would not be able to make a contribution to the INFA bank in the
absence of a veto right over subsequent retransfer of spent fuel for
reprocessing purposes. On the other hand, the French have made it
clear that they find such retransfer restrictions unacceptable, and
in view of their commercial reprocessing industry, both they and
other European nations are likely to balk at any restrictions on
spent fuel reprocessing and subsequent plutonium recycle.
In addition, other consumer and supplier nations, such as India
and South Africa, may find these additional proliferation conditions
unacceptably restrictive, and determine that access to the INFA
stocks under those terms is an insufficient incentive to forgo
enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The result of a failure to
include these other nations in the fabric of an INFA agreement would
be the segmentation of the nuclear fuel market; in the INFA-serviced
segment, consumers could have access to fuel supplies at lower
transactions prices in return for the acceptance of tougher
proliferation conditions, while in the other segment, consumers would
pay a price premium to receive fuel with no proliferation strings
attached. Obviously the creation of such a side-by-side market
structure is contrary to the purpose of a fuel bank.
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These disagreements regarding access restrictions, which we
forsee arising during the INFA negotiations, are rooted in two
different perceptions of the proliferation problem. These differing
perceptions were the focus of the 1977 World Peace Foundation
Conference on Managing in a Proliferation - Prone World, as reported
by Dunn (5). This Conference highlighted two theories of why nations
"go nuclear." The "supply-push" hypothesis, which lies at the root
of current U.S. policy, holds that the continuing spread of civilian
nuclear technology, including possibly reprocessing and breeder
technologies, creates scientific and bureaucratic momentum which
culminates in a slow drift towards nuclear weapons. Although a
home-grown weapons program was a difficult task in the past,
"imminent destabilizing technological developments (such as) the
adoption of the plutonium fuel cycle" will drastically reduce the
barriers to weapons acquisition. Therefore, advocates of the
supply-push hypothesis hope to reduce the temptation to go nuclear by
controlling the spread of sensitive technologies through explicit
agreements to forgo these technologies in return for fuel bank supply
assurances.
By contrast, the "demand-pull" hypothesis, championed by the
European nations, argues that possession of a nuclear weapons
capability does not predetermine the decision to use that capability,
as proven by the decisions of Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and others,
not to pursue weapons construction. Instead demand-pull proponents
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stress the factors that produce a growth in security as well as
status-related incentives for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
As such, access to the INFA fuel bank should not be predicated on
restrictive supply-side provisions, whose only effect will be to
discourage use of the stockpile with a resulting increase in the
incentives to acquire domestic enrichment and reprocessing
technologies. Rather, easy fuel bank access will reduce the demands
to go nuclear and slow the drift towards proliferation, without the
need for costly confrontations or potentially discriminatory
technological restrictions.
Disagreement about the relative emphasis given to these two
hypotheses about the driving forces behind proliferation, which has
prevailed since the early negotiations of the NPT, and has persisted
through the London Suppliers Conferences and the first INFCE
meetings, resurfaced at the World Peace Foundation Conference. Dunn
concludes that the Conference demonstrated that, "the current
American view of the new nuclear consensus could be realized only,
and if then, with the use of considerable coercion"1 9 and that, "it
is becoming increasingly necessary that the United States should
begin to consider which modifications of its preferred image of the
future world nuclear energy system would have an acceptable marginal
risk of proliferation."20 Dunn recommends that,
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"(U.S.) policy should shift from internationally unacceptable
efforts to restructure completely other countries' domestic
nuclear energy programs to a more limited, but potentially more
successful, attempt to influence at the margin the
characteristics of these programs."21
As an example of an "internationally unacceptable" U.S. policy,
Dunn selects President Carter's efforts to preclude spent fuel
reprocessing. Given that the U.S. does not retain absolute leverage
over foreign nuclear programs, Dunn suggests the evaluation of
compromise arrangements such as multinational fuel cycle centers,
spent fuel buy-back agreements, or reprocessing only in nuclear
weapons states. Similarly, we can interpret the results of the last
decade's attempt to reach a modified nuclear consensus as mandating a
compromise of the stringent U.S. access conditions in order to create
a workable fuel bank.
We do not pretend to resolve this conflict in this essay. We
merely indicate that it does exist and that the difference of opinion
is both significant and long-standing. The creation of the INFA will
not short-circuit this conflict; rather, it must confront it
head-on. The same considerations which prohibited the supplier
nations from reaching a satisfactory consensus on commercial
proliferation conditions in the Zanger Committee and at the London
Conferences (see essay #1, section 2.2.2) will surface during the
INFA negotiations. Because consumer nations will also participate in
the INFA negotiations the scope of this ideological rift will be
323
further broadened and amplified. In sum we are not sanguine about
the political prospects for reaching an INFA agreement which
guarantees the universal participation in the fuel bank program
necessary to depoliticize the nuclear fuel market. Indeed, if such
an agreement could be reached, the creation of a stockpile might be
unnecessary.
5.2 Market Stimulation
Having argued that the INFA is unlikely to achieve the goal of
depoliticization, can we at least commend it as an effective support
system for encouraging the development of a smoothly functioning
nuclear fuel market? We think not. In fact, there are indications
that its actual effect may the opposite of its desired effect.
For example, stockpile pricing will have a strong effect on both
fuel bank consumers and suppliers. Some fuel bank proposals have
naively assumed that the impact of the stocks on the marketplace can
be eliminated simply by making stockpile sales at prevailing market
prices. This assumption is improper because it fails to recognize
that, due to the magnitude of INFA stocks, the prevailing market
price will necessarily reflect the stockpile price. In fact, if the
posted INFA stockpile price exceeds a competitive market price, it is
likely to become a focal point for the coordination of supplier
pricing policies. This form of tacit collusion will clearly reduce
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supply diversity and slow the development of a smoothly functioning
market. Conversely, if the INFA price is lower than a competitive
price, the result may be the disappearance of spot markets because
other sellers are unable to match the INFA price. Again, the result
is decreased, rather than increased, diversity. Problems of the
interactions between INFA prices and market prices are particularly
crucial in the SWU market, because the high degree of concentration
makes for a gaming environment.
Similarly, INFA pricing policies will impact entry and capacity
expansion plans. The INFA could consciously pursue a limit pricing
strategy aimed at deterring entry, however, if INFA prices are too
low, existing suppliers will have no incentive to expand operations
and supply diversity will decline. INFA prices which are too high
may actually encourage entry and the resultant proliferation of
enrichment technology.
In addition, rather than stabilizing uranium markets, the size of
the INFA stocks overhanging the market may instead create additional
uncertainty about future market prices by broadening the diversity of
expectations about future events.
A contrary approach, which involves pricing stockpile sales on a
cost recovery rather than a market price basis, also has significant
disadvantages. This scheme would theoretically establish stockpile
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prices such that fuel bank suppliers fully recover their costs of
production, yet fuel bank consumers pay a price low enough to insure
that sellers do not realize windfall profits from stockpile sales.
Our second essay's description of DOE's SWU pricing procedure
reveals, however, that the idea of cost recovery is vague enough to
leave much latitude in establishing prices. Our insights there warn
us of the endless bureaucratic complexity that would accompany the
administering of a cost recovery pricing policy, and the subsidies
that may result from its misapplication.
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6.0 SUMMARY
The conclusion of this essay can only be a partial one. The
results presented in this essay do not permit us to draw a policy
conclusion in favor of, or opposed to, stockpiling as an instrument
of nuclear fuel assurance. The policy problem is too large, and too
complex, to be dealt with in the context of this essay.
Nevertheless, a variety of partial conclusions do emerge from this
essay.
Section 2 of te essay revealed that there are two diametrically
opposed routes that; may be pursued as a solution to the nuclear fuel
assurance problem. The first route is the market approach, which
consists of supplementing the existing market processes in an attempt
to deal with the elements of non-economic costs that lie beyond the
ken of the current market structure. The market approach rests on
the belief that a smoothly functioning market system, unimpacted by
political factors, will provide sufficient medium-term nuclear fuel
supply assurance, Just as the functioning of the international coal
market deals with problems of coal fuel supply assurance.
The second route is the political approach, which seeks to
replace much of the existing market structure with an administrative
process created by political negotiations. The political approach
rests on the belief that a wisely constructed universal political
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agreement which draws all interested parties into its web, and which
makes it unacceptably costly to violate the agreement, is the proper
means for achieving nuclear fuel assurance.
Which of these approaches is adopted is a function of one's
analysis of the current performance of the nuclear market, as well as
one's fundamental faith in the effectiveness of the market process.
If one sees the current nuclear market as a system in hopeless
disrepair, where buyers and sellers are driven by gigantic
uncertainties to take actions which may have dangerous proliferation
implications, and where the market has proven incapable of dealing
with these uncertainities, then the creation of a universal political
agreement is the preferred alternative. On the other hand, if one
sees the existing nuclear market as a desirable tool for resolving
most of the prevailing risks, where buyers and sellers are acting
through the market process to deal with these risks, but where
residual political factors are inhibiting the ability of the market
to perform efficiently, then the market approach is the desired
alternative.
These two assurance strategies, the market approach and the
political approach, translate into two different stockpile
strategies. The design of a limited scope fuel bank whose pricing
policies and access conditions are chosen to make the fuel bank a
supplement to, rather than a replacement for, market processes, may
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be consistent with the market approach. The creation of an expanded
fuel bank under the direction of an INFA, which envisions the
construction of an administrative process as a proxy for the market
process, is consistent with the political approach.
Section 3 of the essay further focusses this disagreement by
demonstrating that the operation of the enrichment market, even in
the absence of any fuel bank, will result in the creation of large,
geographically disperse stocks of enriched fuel during the next
decade. Therefore, the relevant policy choice in the medium term is
not between stockpiling and no stockpiling, but between the market's
management of disperse international stocks and an administrative
agency's centralized management of international stocks.
Having more precisely defined the two policy alternatives,
section 4 offers a hypothetical proposal for an international fuel
bank, and section 5 offers some criticisms of this proposal. This
criticism finds that while the INFA fuel bank strategy is
theoretically comprehensive enough to offer a complete solution to
the assurance problem, consistent with non-proliferation policies,
some thinking regarding the practical details of this scheme leads us
to forecast implementational problems, such as:
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(1) a potential political impasse, or at best a time-consuming
negotiation, in the achievement of a consensus regarding the details
of the INFA voting structure and the conditions of stockpile access;
(2) the undesirable potential market feedback effects of
stockpile pricing policies, such as the reduction in supply diversity
or the encouragement of cartel behavior.
In sum, the INFA strategy certainly carries greater costs, both
direct and indirect, than a strategy of relying on a small fuel bank
as a supplement to the market process. Appendix III to this essay
estimates the net present value of the direct costs of an
international fuel bank to be $23.4 billion. Stated another way, the
carrying charge (at 10%) on one GWE-yr. of reactor fuel is $2.4
million, which amounts to 0.4 mills per kilowatt-hour for each year's
worth of stock held in reserve. This amount is relatively small when
compared to total fuel cycle costs (3 to 5 mills per KWH),
nevertheless, the large absolute magnitude of this cost portends a
difficult negotiation surrounding the distribution of these costs
among INFA participants.
In return for these costs the INFA strategy offers potentially
greater non-proliferation benefits by proposing a comprehensive
solution to the fuel assurance problem. We have not attempted to
estimate these benefits; instead we have been satisfied to
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demonstrate that the choice of a fuel bank strategy hinges on one's
assessment of the likely future performance of the nuclear markets
compared to the likely performance of the administrative process
which would replace it.
As stated earlier some observers have argued that the emergency
reserve fuel bank referred to at the end of section 4.0, is the
appropriate strategic response. Its proponents suggest that the
limited fuel bank strategy has several advantages which make it
easier to implement:
1. Because it is less comprehensive than the INFA bank, it will
be easier to negotiate, and can be established more rapidly;
2. Because it will represent a smaller stockpile commitment, it
requires a smaller front end investment, thus simplifying the
negotiation of a cost sharing agreement;
3. Because it leaves much of the market system unperturbed, it
minimizes undesirable feedback into the market's pricing and
entry decisions.
Our research, however, suggests that even this emergency reserve
strategy faces substantial implementational problems. Even though an
emergency reserve bank is an order of magnitude smaller than the INFA
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bank, it is not far wrong to suggest that its creation must confront
virtually the same political impasse which threatens the INFA
strategy. Our stockpile forecasts have shown that a 5 MMSWU bank is
paltry compared to the stocks which are likely to exist around the
world during the 1980's. As such a small fuel bank can only have
value if: (1) the political conditions of access are fundamentally
different from those offered by the individual suppliers; and (2) all
the proliferation-prone consumers that one is worried about have
access to the bank. It is virtually tautological, however, that if a
political consensus can be achieved which satisfies these two
conditions, then proliferation-prone consumers would have access to
individual supplier stocks as well, and there would be no need for an
emergency bank. Therefore, although the limited fuel bank strategy
acquits itself well in the dimension of preserving the ability of the
market to function, the political hurdles which it faces lead either
to the conclusion that it will fail to achieve an effective
resolution of medium-term fuel assurance fears, or, in achieving such
a resolution, will render itself obsolete.
During the early years of its life, the nuclear fuel allocation
system was clearly a politically dominated process. The system was
created to serve military needs and as a result most transactions
occurred at the level of national governments. Our discussions in
essay #1 have recounted the change in emphasis from military to
civilian objectives, and the slow emergence of a fledging market
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allocation process during the late sixties and early seventies. The
second essay highlighted how the blind pursuit of U.S. domestic
commercial objectives, at the expense of international security
objectives, backfired and hampered this transition from a political
regime to a market system. The third essay warns of the possibility
of this failure in reverse. The blind pursuit of international
security objectives, by improving nuclear fuel assurance through the
mechanism of an extensive international fuel bank, may backfire by
inhibiting the functioning of the market system thereby aggravating,
rather than ameliorating, the assurance problem.
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APPENDIX I
STOCKPILE ACCOUNTING CONVENTIONS
As will soon be demonstrated, there are many ways of stating the
size of a stockpile of enriched fuel. While there exists no uniquely
right or wrong way to measure stockpile size, a failure to appreciate
the strengths and weaknesses of the various stockpile accounting
conventions has created widespread confusion in the interpretation of
stockpile forecasts. This Appendix identifies a set of stockpile
accounting conventions and alerts the reader to the pitfalls in
trying to compare stockpile forecasts based on different conventions.
The problem of comparability arises because the unit of
enrichment capacity, the separative work unit (SWU), is not a measure
of physical output, like tons/year, but a thermodynamic measure of
available work; the physical output of an enrichment plant is a
function of how this thermodynamic potential is used. Stated another
way, the relationship between excess enrichment capacity and the
physical output going into the stockpile, cannot be calculated
without specifying the operating tails assay of the enrichment plant,
as well as the feed assay used and the product assay produced.
Therefore, whenever one encounters a stockpile forecast measured in
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SWUs, one must discover what assay assumptions lie behind the
calculation before it can be compared to alternative forecast results.
Historically, DOE has stated the size of the U.S. preproduction
stockpile in SWUs at a reference tails assay. The details of the DOE
accounting conventions are clarified by appealing to a simple
numerical example. Suppose that during some year, the DOE enrichment
capacity equals 25 MMSWU, and DOE's contracted SWU deliveries equal
15 MMSWU; therefore, DOE's excess SWU capacity equals 10 MMSWU.
Assuming that the enrichment plants operate at full capacity, what
will be the increment to the preproduction stockpile, as measured in
SWUs?
The simplest answer, and the answer adopted by Jacoby (6) in his
Technology Review article, is 10 MMSWU. Clearly no matter how
wisely, or stupidly, this enrichment capacity is used, the stockpile
increment will represent the expenditure of 10 MMSWUs of effort. The
Jacoby measure is an ex ante convention, in the sense that the SWU
increment to the stockpile is measured before the excess SWU capacity
is used for preproduction; as a result we shall refer to this
stockpile measure as before-SWUs, e.g., the size of the stockpile
increment would equal 10 million before-SWUs.
The DOE stockpile accounting convention, on the other hand,
attempts to measure the amount of reactor fuel added to the
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preproduction stockpile, rather than the effort expended to produce
this additional fuel. The calculation begins by assuming that the
excess 10 MMSWU is applied to natural uranium feed (xF = .00711), to
produce 3% enriched product (x, = .03) at the current operating
tails assay of 0.25% (x, = .0025). Next the question is asked,
"Given that I have preproduced a measurable mass of 3% product, how
many SWUs would it have taken to produce this product mass at a
reference tails assay of 0.3%?" This amount of SWUs is taken as
DOE's measure of the stockpile increment. This calculation is an ex
post calculation in the sense that the stockpile increment is
conceptually computed after the excess SWU capacity is used for
preproduction; as a result, we shall refer to this measure as
after-SWUs, e.g., the size of the stockpile increment in this case
equals 9 million after-SWUs.
The preceding discussion reveals the source of confusion in
comparing stockpile forecasts. Although both the Jacoby and DOE
forecasts state their stockpile increments in SWUs, they are clearly
not measured in the same units. Two different SWU conventions are
being used, before-SWUs and after-SWUs, and a reader trying to
compare stockpile forecasts must be aware that these units are
related by the formula:
After-SWUs=(SWUs per unit product at reference assay)*before-SWUs
(SWUs per unit product at operating assay)
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In the case where the operating assay equals 0.25%, and a reference
assay of 0.3% is chosen, the conversion formula yields, after-SWUs =
0.9 * before-SWUs.
This 10% difference due to accounting conventions has a greater
than 10% effect on the stockpile forecasts. Looked at from another
perspective, the after-SWUs/before-SWUs conversion formula states
that the effective annual DOE SWU capacity is reduced by 10% when an
after-SWUs stockpile measure is used. Cumulated over the next
decade, this 10% difference equals approximately 25 million
before-SWUs which represents a substantial fraction of the Jacoby
forecast of 60 MMSWU as the 1985 DOE preproduction stockpile.
Having seen the importance of the variations in stockpile
accounting conventions, what can be concluded about the relative
merits of before-SWUs vs. after-SWUs as measures of stockpile size?
The advantage of the before-SWUs measure is its independence from
arbitrary choices regarding feed assay, product assay, and tails
assay relevant to preproduction. Before-SWUs are best interpreted as
a measure of the potential available for building a stockpile.
Before-SWUs are also a simple measure because they correspond
directly with the unit of measurement of enrichment capacity, SWUs.
Transparently, one SWU equals one before-SWU, so that when we speak
of DOE's SWU capacity as being 35 MMSWU in 1985, we mean 35 million
before-SWUs.
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Given the mathematical identity between SWU and before-SWUs, why
would anyone dream up a convoluted measure like after-SWUs? The
answer, of course, is that the excess SWU potential is in fact used
to preproduce reactor fuel, and the disadvantage of the before-SWUs
measure is that without data giving the feed assay, tails assay, and
product assay relevant to preproduction, the mass of stockpiled
reactor fuel cannot be determined. Using the after-SWUs stockpile
measure one can easily compute the mass of preproduced reactor fuel
without a detailed operating history of the tails, feed, and product
assays. The after-SWUs measure serves this purpose well, provided
that it is interpreted properly.
The basic problem with the after-SWUs measure is that it is not
properly understood by analysts outside of DOE, including members of
the Congress and the OMB, and is subject to easy misinterpretation.
Since the advent of' the preproduction stockpile program, DOE has
consistently reported stockpile data, in Congressional testimony,
using a reference tails assay of 0.3%. This was all well and good
while the enrichment plants were operating at a tails assay of 0.3%,
from July 1, 1971, through July 1, 1975, because before-SWUs and
after-SWUs are equivalent measures when the operating tails assay
equals the reference tails assay. After July 1, 1975, however, the
operating tails assay was reduced to 0.25%. In order to preserve
historical comparability without necessitating the recomputation of 4
years of data, DOE chose to.continue to report at a reference tails
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assay of 0.3%. This convention had the added advantage of keeping
the stockpile forecasts smaller than they would have been if a
reference assay of 0.25% were used, thereby reducing the visibility
of the DOE stockpiling program below what it would have been if the
stockpile forecasts had taken a quantum leap due to a change in
conventions.
One fallacy in interpreting the DOE stockpile forecasts arises
when analysts try to compare the size of the DOE stockpile with the
DOE enrichment capacity. This is a tempting comparison to make,
because both of these entities are measured in SWUs, but it is an
improper comparison, because while the DOE stockpile is measured in
after-SWUs, the DOE enrichment capacity is measured in before-SWUs.
It is often suggested, for example, that the DOE stockpile forecast
of roughly 25 MMSWUI in 1985 shows that we will have a relatively
small stockpile compared to projected 1985 enrichment capacity of 27
MMSWU. In fact the relevant measure for such a comparison would
state the 1985 DOE stockpile at 45 million before-SWUs which properly
reveals a stockpile equal to nearly two years of DOE SWU production
capacity.
That JCAE members have had a difficult time interpreting the
AEC's conventions is revealed in the following statement by
Representative Hosmer,
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"I do not expect (the AEC) to come up here with the same
measuring units or other parametrics that have been used in the
past and with which we are familiar. I expect to be called upon
to make an instant translation of what will be said today into
units with some commonality with those used in the past. Of
course, that will be impossible now, as it was on previous
occasions."
and seconded by the sarcastic remarks of JCAE Chairman Holifield who
greeted an AEC witness, saying, "I thought you spent all your time
changing the units on which you testified."
Although we have been critical of the potential for misuse of the
after-SWUs measure, we hasten to reaffirm its usefulness as a measure
of preproduced reactor fuel. We have sought to capture this
advantage, while reducing the potential for misinterpretation, by
constructing a stockpile measurement in gigawatt-years (GWE-YRS).
This measurement is designed to indicate the number of GWE-YRS. of
electrical energy that one could expect to generate using a stockpile
of enriched uranium. It can be compared to the installed LWR
electrical generating capacity, in GWE, as a means of determining
approximately how many years worth of reactor fuel are held in
preproduction stockpiles.
Of course the construction of this GWE-YR. index requires a
series of assumptions about:
(1) the feed assay and tails assay used for stockpile production;
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(2) the spectrum of stockpile product assays; and
(3) the efficiency with which stockpiled fuel is converted into
electrical energy.
We shall assume that natural feed is used at an 0.25% operating
tails assay to produce LWR reloads, 2/3 of which are designed for
PWRs and 1/3 of which are designed for BWRs, both of which function
at a 65% steady-state load factor. Subject to these assumptions one
can derive the conversion equation:
1 GWE-YR = 0.091 MMSWU
In conclusion, we recommend the simultaneous use of two measures
of stockpile size: SWUs and GWE-YRs. The SWU measurement should be
interpreted as an index of the potential available for stockpile
production, and is calibrated for comparison with installed
enrichment capacity as an indication of the cumulative excess
enrichment capacity. The GWE-YR. measurement should be interpreted
as an estimate of how this excess capacity will be converted into
physical material, and is calibrated for comparison with installed
electrical generating capacity as an index of the number of years'
supply of stockpiled reactor fuel. We do not recommend the use of
the DOE reference tails assay convention because it lends itself to
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easy misinterpretation and manipulation in circumstances where the
chosen reference tails assay differs from the operating tails assay.
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APPENDIX II
THE IMPACT OF URANIUM SUPPLY ON THE FEASIBILITY
OF INTERNATIONAL STOCKPILING
The body of Essay #3 has intentionally focused on the limits to
stockpiling introduced by the availability of enrichment capacity.
This focus has neglected to consider whether the forseeable limits of
uranium production capacity further constrain the attainable size of
a medium-term fuel bank. This appendix attempts to fill some of this
gap.
In part, this omission is due to the complexity of the problem.
This appendix will only consider the issue of uranium supply
constraints at its most aggregated level. Specifically we shall
compute the effective uranium demand with and without the forecasted
base case stockpiles and compare these demands with uranium supply
estimates to see if any bottlenecks exist. Table 29 performs such a
calculation. This calculation reveals that although the complete use
of excess enrichment capacity for stockpiling purposes increases
cumulative uranium demand by 25% over actual needs during the next
decade, projected cumulative uranium supplies are sufficient to
permit the building of these base case stockpiles. Annual supplies
exceed annual demands for each of the years 1981-1990, and although
supplies are slightly less than demands during the years 1976-1980,
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the cumulative shortfall of 27,000 MT U3 0V is substantially lower
than worldwide Us 08 stockpiles at the start of 197622.
As observed, this is purely an aggregate result. Constraints may
exist at lower levels of aggregation where individual consumers or
suppliers of enrichment services may have inadequate access to enough
uranium to permit enriched fuel stockpiling. This disaggregated
issue goes beyond the scope of the current essay; it can only be
answered by extensive data-gathering in the area of uranium supply
contracts and by further disaggregated simulations. For further
results regarding these constraints the interested reader is referred
to the work of the MIT Nuclear Fuel Assurance Project, of which the
author is a member.
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TABLE 29
URANIUM SUPPLY AND DEMAND COMPARISONS (103 MT U30 8)
DURING
CALENDAR
YEAR
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Cumulative
OECD
U3 08
DEMAND( 1)
18.9
23.7
26.5
29.8
33.7
38.6
44.5
50.2
57.4
66.0
73.2
82.1
88.3
95.3
728.2
INCREMENTAL
U 3, O
FOR STOCKPILING(2)
16.4
23.9
25.7
29.4
31.2
27.6
18.2
22.0
14.7
14.7
9.2
5.5
238.5
TOTAL
Us OS
DEMAND(3)
35.3
47.6
52.2
59.2
64.9
66.2
62.7
72.2
72.1
80.7
82.4
87.6
88.3
95.3
966.7
ESTIMATED
U 5 O s
SUPPLY(4)
26.2
38.9
49.5
55.4
62.5
71.9
90.8
96.7
103.8
108.5
113.2
117.9
122.6
127.4
1185.3
(1) derived from Table 18 assuming additional 1 year
and 1.84 x 103 MT U O (see OECD (10), pg. 32,
MMSWU
mining lag
Table 10)
(2) assumes stockpiles consist of LWR reloads, produced at 0.25%
tails assay, used at 65% load factor. Derived from Table 22
assuming 2 year lag and 167 MT U3 O0
GWE-yr.
(3) sum of previous two columns.
(4) OECD/IAEA (10), pg. 24, interpolated for years 1986-1989,
does not include U.S. or foreign U308 stockpiles.
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APPENDIX III
THE DIRECT COSTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL STOCKPILE
The calculation of the cost of building stocks for a fuel bank is
a complicated and uncertain one. We shall attempt only a rough
calculation aimed at showing the order of magnitude of the applicable
costs. Following Jacoby (6), we shall make a series of assumptions:
1. The fuel bank would hold only 3.2% enriched uranium, as this
is the highest enrichment required for fueling an LWR and
lower assays may be produced by diluting this fuel with
natural uranium,
2. The cost of the fuel bank will be compared to the "no
stockpile" option where the total stock held within and
outside tile U.S. is assumed to remain at its 1977 level,
3. The cost of enriched fuel is calculated to include the
marginal cost of uranium, conversion, and enrichment
services. Enrichment services are valued at $100/SWU,
uranium is priced at $40/lb. U 3 Oy , and conversion is
assumed to cost $4.15/kg U. Therefore, the cost of adding 1
GWE-yr. to the fuel bank, assuming an equilibrium load
factor of 65% and an 0.25% operating tails assay, is $24.5
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million, and this cost is assumed to remain constant over
the period of the calculation.
Using these assumptions, we can calculate the annual cost of our
base case stockpile forecast through the year when the base case
stockpile peaks. As of this date, the stockpile will have some
security value, which we do not attempt to estimate; instead we
assume the terminal value to be zero. The 1977 present value of
these costs, at a 10% interest rate, is $23.4 billion.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Boston Globe, October 20, 1977
2 (11), pg. 15.
3 Ibid.
'4 (9), pg. 2.
5 (8).
6 (7).
7 Ibid.
8 (13).
9 Assumptions made to derive Table 17 include--
1. include SGHWR, AGR, HTR, and FBR capacity as part of LWR
totals,
2. assume all HWR capacity resides in other nations,
3. divide GCR capacity equally between EURODIF and URENCO
nations,
4. estimate Iranian capacity at:
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1.2 1.2 2.4 3.0 3.9 4.9 6.3 8.0
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10 Technical data used in deriving Table 19:
for the no-recycle LWR fuel cycle,
- first core requires 213 MTSWU/GWE-Yr.
- reload core requires 140 MTSWU/GWE-YR. at 100% load factor
- there is a one-year lag in the enrichment process from
enrichment; in to reactor in
Technical source: (10) Table 10, pg. 32
Table 19 also relies on author's estimate of first-core demands
for 1990 which assumes they are identical to first-core
estimates for 1989.
11 Since the writing of this paragraph the scheduled
Portsmouth expansion has indeed been slipped, as reported in
Energy Daily May 11, 1978 Vo. 6, No. 92, pp. 1-3.
The new expansion schedule is:
End of Calendar Year MMSWU Capacity
1987 1.1
1988 2.2
12 (8).
13 see footnote 11
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14 (2). pp. 46-51
15 (2). pg. 14
16 (2). pg. 30
17 See "International Nuclear Fuel Authority Sought". Nuclear
Fuel Vol. 2, No. 15. July 25, 1977 pp. 1-2 and "Washington
Sharply Eyes Concept of Fuel Bank and its Organization",
Nuclear Fuel Vol. 2, No. 19, September 19, 1977 pp. 7-8
18 (12).
19 (5), pg. 7
20 (5), pg. 18
21 Ibid.
22 As of 1/1/76 cumulative government stockpiles in the U.S.,
Canada and Germany alone exceeded 75,000 MT U 3 0.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AND
ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym/
Abbreviation Full Name/Definition
AEC Atomic Energy Commission
AFC Adjustable Fixed Commitments Enrichment Contract
CEA Council of Economic Advisers
CENGEX Centrifuge enrichment partnership: Exxon and
General Electric
CENTAR Centrifuge enrichment partnership:
Electro-Nucleonics, Inc. and Atlantic-Richfield
Company
CIP Cascade Improvement Program
COREDIF Enrichment Consortium: France, Italy, Spain,
Belgium, Iran
CUP Cascade Uprating Program
DOE Department of Energy
ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
EURODIF Enrichment Consortium with same membership as
COREDIF
GAO Government Accounting Office
GCP Gas Centrifuge Process
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GDP Gaseous Diffusion Process
GWE Gigawatts of Electricity
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INFCE International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
JCAE Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
KG U Kilogram of Uranium Metal
KWH Kilowatt Hours
LTFC Long Term Fixed Commitments Enrichment Contract
LWR Light Water Reactor
MMSWU Million Separative Work Units
MT Metric Ton
MWE Megawatts of Electricity
NFAA Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act of 1975
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PNC Japanese Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation
R&D Research and Development
REQ Requirements Enrichment Contract
STFS Split Tails Feed Sales
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Separative Work Unit
Separative Work Unit Corporation
U.S.S.R. Enrichment Corporation
Tennessee Valley Authority
South African Uranium Enrichment Corporation
Uranium Enrichment Associates, a diffusion
consortium headed by Bechtel whose participants at
various times have included Union Carbide,
Westinghouse, Goodyear.
Centrifuge enrichment consortium: United Kingdom,
Germany, Netherlands.
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SWU
SWUCO
TECHNABS-
EXPORT
TVA
UCOR
UEA
URENCO
